Adaptive Trust Negotiation and Access Control Tatyana Ryutov, et.al. Presented by: Carlos Caicedo.

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Presentation transcript:

Adaptive Trust Negotiation and Access Control Tatyana Ryutov, et.al. Presented by: Carlos Caicedo

Introduction Electronic business transactions Parties in transaction don’t know each other Attacks can be launched to the transaction (negotiation) infrastructure Trust is required for transaction For buyers: Trust that sellers will provide services No disclosure of private buyer info For Sellers: Trust that buyers will pay for services Meet conditions for buying certain goods (age)

Introduction In an electronic business transaction, participants interact beyond their local security domain. Proposed framework: Adaptive Trust Negotiation and Access Control (ATNAC) Combination of two systems into an access control architecture for electronic business services TrustBuilder: Determines how sensitive information is disclosed GAA-API: For adaptive access control

GAA-API : Generic Authorization and Access-control API Middleware API Fine-grained access control Application level intrusion detection and response Can interact with Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to adapt network threat conditions It does not support trust negotiation and protection of sensitive policies.

GAA-API

TrustBuilder Trust negotiation system developed by BYU and UIUC Vulnerable to DoS attacks. Large number of TN sessions sent to server Having the server evaluate a very complex policy Having the server evaluate invalid or irrelevant credentials Attacks aimed at collecting sensitive information

ATNAC Combines an access control and a TN system to avoid the problems that each has on its own. Supports fine-grained adaptive policies Protection based on perceived suspicion level Uses feedback from IDS systems Reduces computational overhead Associates less restrictive policies with lower suspicion levels.

ATNAC (2) GAA-API Access control policies for resources, services and operations Policies are expressed in EACL format TrustBuilder Enforces sensitive security policies Uses X.509v3 digital certificates Uses TPL policies

ATNAC Framework

Suspicion Level Indicates how likely it is that the requester is acting improperly. A separate SL is maintained for each requester of a service. Has three components: S DOS : Indicates probability of a DoS attack from the requester S IL : For sensitive information leakage attempts S o : Indicates other suspicious behavior SL is increased as suspicious events occur and decreased as “positive” events occur.

ATNAC operation The Analyzer identifies requesters that generate unusually high numbers of similar requests and increment S DoS In a trust negotiotion process, credentials sent by client must match credentials requested by the system otherwise S DoS set to 1. If either S DoS, S IL or S o > 0.9, the system will block the requester at the firewall If S Il > threshold. Trust Builder will impose stricter sensitive credential release policies. As S IL increases, GAA-API uses tighter access control policies

ATNAC operation - example

Conclusions ATNAC = framework for protecting sensitive resources in e-commerce Trust negotiation useful for access control and authentication. ATNAC dynamically adjusts security policies based on suspicion level System protects against DoS attacks on the service provider Guards against sensitive information leaks.