Characteristics of Network Traffic Flow Anomalies Paul Barford and David Plonka University of Wisconsin – Madison SIGCOMM IMW, 2001.

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Presentation transcript:

Characteristics of Network Traffic Flow Anomalies Paul Barford and David Plonka University of Wisconsin – Madison SIGCOMM IMW, 2001

Barford & PlonkaIMW Motivation Traffic anomalies are a fact of life in computer networks Anomaly detection and identification is challenging –Operators typically monitor by eye using SNMP or IP flows –Simple thresholding is ineffective –Some anomalies are obvious, other are not Characteristics of anomalous behavior in IP flows have not been established –Do same types of anomalies have same characteristics? – Can characteristics be effectively used in detection systems?

Barford & PlonkaIMW Related Work Network traffic characterization –Eg. Caceres89, Leland93, Paxson97, Zhang01 Focus on typical behavior Fault and anomaly detection techniques –Eg. Feather93, Brutlag00 Focus on thresholds and time series models –Eg. Paxson99 Rule based tool for intrusion detection –Eg. Moore01 Backscatter technique can be used to identify DoS attacks No work which identifies anomaly characteristics

Barford & PlonkaIMW Our Approach to Data Gathering Consider anomalies in IP flow data –Collected at UW border router - 5 minute intervals –Archive of two years worth of data (packets, bytes, flows) –Includes identification of anomalies (after-the-fact analysis) Group anomalies into three categories –Network operation anomalies Steep drop offs in service followed by quick return to normal behavior –Flash crowd anomalies Steep increase in service followed by slow return to normal behavior –Network abuse anomalies Steep increase in flows in one direction followed by quick return to normal behavior

Barford & PlonkaIMW IP Flows An IP Flow is defined as a unidirectional series of packets between source/dest IP/port pair over a period of time –Exported by Lightweight Flow Accounting Protocol (LFAP) enabled routers (Ciscos NetFlow) We use FlowScan [Plonka00] to collect and process Netflow data –Combines flow collection engine, database, visulaization tool –Provides a near real-time visualization of network traffic –Breaks down traffic into well known service or application {SRC_IP/Port,DST_IP/Port,Pkts,Bytes,Start/End Time,TCP Flags,IP Prot …}

Barford & PlonkaIMW Characteristics of Normal traffic

Barford & PlonkaIMW Our Approach to Analysis Analyze examples of each type of anomaly via statistics, time series and wavelets (our initial focus) Wavelets provide a means for describing time series data that considers both frequency and scale –Particularly useful for characterizing data with sharp spikes and discontinuities More robust than Fourier analysis which only shows what frequencies exist in a signal –Tricky to determine which wavelets provide best resolution of signals in data We use tools developed at UW Wavelet IDR center First step: Identify which filters isolate anomalies

Barford & PlonkaIMW First Look at Analysis of Normal Traffic Wavelets easily localize familiar daily/weekly signals

Barford & PlonkaIMW First Look Analysis of Attacks DoS: sharp increase in flows and/or packets in one direction Linear splines seem to be a good filter to distinguish DoS attacks

Barford & PlonkaIMW Characteristics of Flash Crowds Sharp increase in packets/bytes/flows followed by slow return to normal behavior eg. Linux releases Leading edge not significantly different from DoS signal so next step is to look within the spikes

Barford & PlonkaIMW Characteristics of Network Anomalies Typically a steep drop off in packets/bytes/flows followed a short time later by restoration

Barford & PlonkaIMW Conclusion and Next Steps Project to characterize network traffic flow anomalies –Based on flow data collected at UW border router Anomalies have been grouped into three categories –Analysis approach: statistical, time series, wavelet Initial results –Good indications that we can isolate signals Future –Continue analysis of anomaly data –Analysis of data from other sites –Application of results in (distributed) detection systems

Barford & PlonkaIMW Acknowledgements Somesh Jha Jeff Kline Amos Ron