The Yom Kippur War Part 2

By 1970 Egypt was near bankruptcy  Cost of defeat in 6-day War  Loss of tourism and Canal Revenue  Off-shore and Sinai oilfields in the hands of Israelis.  No economic aid coming in  Could not get arms from USSR Sadat lacked Nasser’s charisma and the army and the people were dissatisfied. If Diplomacy failed to reverse Egypt’s fortunes, Sadat was prepared to turn to war as a solution  Reverse the humiliation of 1967  Regain self confidence  Gain international respect

Sadat  Endorsed and extended the Roger’ Plan (1971)  Proposed extended cease-fires, a re-opening of Suez Canal, restore relations with the US contingent on Israeli withdrawals from Sinai. Both Egypt’s political leadership and the Israelis rejected the proposal. 1971: 1 st of four trips to Moscow by Sadat. He wanted:  Weapons  Missiles  Planes USSR would not comply. They sent some missiles but no planes or replacement ammunition.

Following an unsuccessful bid by US Secretary of State Rogers (early May 1971) to directly secure peace the Soviet President Podgorny visited Egypt, late May 1971 and pressed Sadat to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.  Soviets sent arms but not the hi-tech offensive types that Sadat wanted. Three more unsuccessful trips to Moscow left Sadat angry and disillusioned. Nixon’s trip to Moscow and the new spirit of Détente made Sadat realise that the Middle East was of secondary importance to the superpowers. Nikolai Podgorny

Sadat planned for War  First priority was Egypt. Palestinians were of no consequence  Expelled Soviet technicians and military personal. July removed Advisers, clearing the path for war.  US and Israel falsely assumed that this was a gesture of peace towards them. Conversely Sadat realised he needed US diplomatic and political support in bringing pressure to bear on the Israelis while needed military support from the USSR.  New US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, re-iterated that US would not be directly involved in the Middle East.  Jan 1973 US sell Phantom F-4E fighter planes to Israel  Spring 1973 Soviets send SCUD missiles to Egypt.

Egypt devises a sophisticated battle plan for the invasion of Israel  2 pronged attack involving Syria who wanted to recapture Golan Heights Soviets pump massive amounts of arms into Egypt. Israelis failed to read the signals. Believed their superior forces and well-protected borders would deter an Egyptian first strike. Despite Dayan’s opposition, Israeli troops were mobilised. October 6, 1973 Egyptian and Syrian forces attacked Israel.  Israel was caught by surprise but recovered quickly, but only just.  Egypt dispelled any myths about their military capabilities, They crossed the Suez and destroyed the Bar-Lev line, proved Israelis were not invincible  Israelis were able to re-cross Suez.  Furious and deadly tank battles of Golan Heights biggest since WW2  Israelis nearly ran out of ammunition – US airlift saved situation.  Kissinger deliberately withheld aid to force Israel accept a cease-fire – restore Arab honour and maybe break diplomatic stalemate.

Henry Kissinger

With Nixon embroiled in Watergate, Kissinger oversaw massive military influx to Israel in October 1973, in response to the Soviets airlift to Egypt. The Israelis were able to move within 40km of Damascus and re-captured the Suez Canal and the approaches to Cairo. As the 3 rd Egyptian Army became trapped in the Sinai and the USSR threatened to intercede the US went to full military alert (one step down form Nuclear Alert). However, Oct 24 a cease fire was accepted.

Israel came close to losing the war  $4 billion cost  casualties  emotional and psychological shock  lack of appreciation of Arab capabilities  borders not as secure as thought  balance of military power was shifting towards Arab nations  felt increasingly isolated in the diplomatic world  became heavily reliant on the US Ended the careers of Meir and Dayan.

The Arabs lost the War but:  casualties  an important psychological victory, won the diplomatic battle  thrust the Arab-Israeli conflict back into the spotlight The USSR lost ground and were left with Syria as keystone of Soviet policy in Middle East. The US became the primary super-power player in the region.  Kissinger over a two year period of ‘shuttle diplomacy’ secured the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Canal in 1974 and the Egyptians to re-open the Canal in 1975 to non-Israeli shipping. In 75 Israeli bound cargo was allowed.

1977: Sadat decided to take the lead in finding peace and solving the Palestinian problem  Sadat visited Israel in 1977  Sadat and Israel PM, Begin visited US President Jimmy Carter and eventually a peace deal was settled (the Camp David Accords) March 26,  Israel agreed to dismantle the settlements in the Sinai built after 1967 and to a phase military withdrawal for the peninsula, which was completed by  In Egypt many were opposed to Sadat’s attitude towards the Israelis and Islamic fundamentalists assassinated him in Sadat, Begin and Carter shake hands

The Palestinians: The PLO emerged stronger. It emerged as the sole representative of the Palestinian people breaking away from King Hussein of Jordan. At the Arab League meeting of 1974 Hussein acknowledged that Palestinians had a right to the territory lost to the Israelis in The notion to settle for a separate Palestinian State created by any territory evacuated by the Israelis emerges amongst moderate PLO.

The Oil Embargo  During the war, the Organisation of Arab Oil Producing States OAPEC imposed a total oil embargo of oil exports to the US and other varying embargos on other countries who supported Israel  In December 1973, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced a four-fold increase of oil to $11.65 per barrel.  In 1973 the Arab states produced 37% of the world’s oil consumption (Saudi Arabia 7.5 million barrels a day) at the same time as US production had decreased.  Lasted five months cost US jobs and a $10 to $20 billion loss to its economy. Politically the embargo galvanised the international community into action The EEC urged Israel and Egypt to return to pre 1967 cease-fire lines and for Israel to end its occupation of seized territory. Also it insisted the Palestinians be considered in any future peace settlements