Removing the Disincentives of Long Careers in Social Security August 10, 2006 Gopi Shah Goda, Stanford University John Shoven, Ph.D., Stanford University Sita Slavov, Ph.D., Occidental College

2 Motivation Life expectancy has improved dramatically since the introduction of Social Security –Period life expectancy for 20-year-olds in 1935 was 66 for males, 69 for females –Today, 20-year-old males have life expectancy of 76, and females have life expectancy of 80 However, men are retiring much earlier

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5 What are implicit Social Security tax rates? The implicit Social Security tax rate is the change in the net Social Security tax as a percentage of earnings

6 Assumptions Single male worker who starts working at age 20, and retires at the NRA Assume 2005 benefit rules persist Earnings by age simulated using a time-series of average wages for U.S. and an age-wage profile constructed from 2001 and 2002 CPS OASI tax rate = 10.6%  maximum implicit tax Real wage growth = 1% Real discount rate = 2% Work years are “front-ended”

Career Length Implicit Tax Rate average 10th %ile 90th %ile full cap

Career Length Implicit Tax Rate average 10th %ile 90th %ile full cap

Career Length Implicit Tax Rate average 10th %ile 90th %ile full cap

Career Length Implicit Tax Rate average 10th %ile 90th %ile full cap Male Mortality

11 Female Mortality Career Length Implicit Tax Rate average 10th %ile 90th %ile full cap

12 Why do we see these patterns? Once a person works 35 years, additional years of earnings are no longer replacing zeroes – they are replacing lower earnings years Each additional year of work does not count the same because of the way the system handles progressivity

13 What do implicit tax rates look like for actual earnings histories? Benefits and Earnings Public Use File, % sample of SSA beneficiaries in December 2004 Limit attention to beneficiaries receiving retirement benefits based on their own earnings histories, and who started working 1951 or later This leaves 123,552 individuals in the sample –75,368 men and 48,184 women –Birth years range from 1910 to 1942 Earnings above the cap are not available No way to link couples in the data

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17 Three Possible Reforms 1.Use 40 years rather than 35 in the AIME calculation 2.Disentangle career length and progressivity Current PIA CalculationProposed PIA Calculation

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19 Three Possible Reforms 1.Use 40 years rather than 35 in the AIME calculation 2.Disentangle career length and progressivity 3.Establish a “paid-up” category of workers who have worked a full career of 40 years

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Career Length Implicit Tax Rate average 10th %ile 90th %ile full cap

Career Length Implicit Tax Rate average 10th %ile 90th %ile full cap

Career Length Implicit Tax Rate average 10th %ile 90th %ile full cap

Career Length Implicit Tax Rate average 10th %ile 90th %ile full cap

Career Length Implicit Tax Rate average 10th %ile 90th %ile full cap

Career Length Implicit Tax Rate average 10th %ile 90th %ile full cap

Career Length Implicit Tax Rate average 10th %ile 90th %ile full cap

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30 What impact do these reforms have on progressivity?

31 What impact do these reforms have on women? Since women in the sample are more likely to experience shorter careers, the reforms disproportionately affect women Benefit levels are 2.44% higher for males, 0.07% higher for females (vs. 1.52% overall) We look at policies to alleviate this redistribution…

32 What impact do these reforms have on women?

33 Summary Flat payroll taxes and the current benefit formula together imply that workers face increasing disincentives for working long careers This may be contributing to what could be suboptimally long retirement periods

34 Summary Policies that flatten the pattern of implicit taxes as individuals age would reduce the disincentives of working longer careers These policies can be enacted in ways that are either revenue- or benefit-neutral in aggregate These policies would involve some redistribution from individuals who work short careers to individuals who work long careers