The Future of American Religion to 2050 Vegard Skirbekk Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Eric Kaufmann Birkbeck College (U. London) & Harvard KSG Belfer Center Anne Goujon IIASA
Context and Data US Census Bureau Race Projections to 2050 No census question But can use large surveys (GSS), plus census and immigration statistics Pew 2007, 2008 surveys for small groups
Methodology Cohort Component Projections Multi-State Projection (PDE) Software Inputs (for each group, by 5 yr age bands and sex): –Base Population –Total Fertility Rate (TFR) –Net conversion/apostasy per year –Net immigration per year –Mortality (standard)
Resident population Net immigrants Immigration based on numbers acquiring citizenship in (Homeland Security) 1.2m per year Faith of immigrants computed from source countries x religious composition of source countries (CIA Fact Book) Catholic and Other overrepresented, Protestants underrepresented
Fertility and Population Share,
Proportion of Jews and Muslims in the American Population and Electorate (Constant Scenario) Source: GSS; Author’s calculations
White Voting Age Population
Fertility and Population Share,
Fertility Differentials ConversionMigration ConstantDoublesHalfZero Constant H0H1H7H4 ZeroH3 H5 Converging ConstantH2 Zero H6
Ethnoreligious Categories by Religious Attitude (%) Anti-Abortion Anti- Homosexuality Jewish287 Hindu/Buddhist3313 No Religion3712 Other non-Christian5021 Muslim5533 Liberal Protestant5523 Moderate Protestant5927 ‘White’ Catholic6420 Black Protestant6630 Hispanic Catholic7224 Fundamentalist Protestant7433 Total5924 Source: GSS
Total Fertility Rate by Religious Attitudes, 2003 Fundamentalist vs. Liberal Protestant Fundamentalist vs. No Religion Homosexuality Always Wrong (Y/N) Abortion Always Wrong (Y/N) Traditionalist TFR Modernist TFR Difference in percent Source: GSS Traditionalist-Modernist Fertility Gap, Children Ever Born (CEB), for Women Source: GSS Abortion Always Wrong (Y/N) Homosexuality Always Wrong (Y/N) pre
Projected Trends in Opinion Under Various Scenarios
Conclusions: Market Share Main drivers to 2043 are immigration and secularization, fertility matters more long term Conversion favours Fundamentalist Protestants but is not large enough to compensate for immigration of Hispanic Catholics and rise of No Religion Fundamentalist Protestants will decrease in total, among whites, and among voters Muslims will outnumber Jews by approximately 2020 Jews, white Catholics and liberal Protestants will decline Protestants decline from a majority in 2003 to 40 percent by 2043; Catholics may outnumber Protestants by mid-century
Conclusions: Religiosity Seculars will increase their share of the white population but not of the total population Secularization will plateau by 2043 and will reverse thereafter. Secular-Religious Fertility differences between partisans on opposite sides of 'culture war' issues are substantial and growing Opinion on abortion is likely to become more pro- life Attitudes regarding homosexuality will be stable, reflecting more liberal attitudes among younger cohorts but more conservative attitudes among demographically-growing groups
The Future of American Religion to 2050 Vegard Skirbekk Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Eric Kaufmann Birkbeck College (U. London) & Harvard KSG Belfer Center Anne Goujon IIASA
Current TrendZero Immigration
Projections fit observed changes
Size of five aggregated rel i gious groups