COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY IN SOCIAL ONTOLOGY Corrado Roversi University of Bologna Faculty of Law EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE DECEMBER 12, 2012

Institutional facts Rule-dependent A complex institutional fact such as: «Last week Prime Minister Monti said he is going to resign after Berlusconi announced that he intends to be the right-wing candidate for premiership. President Napolitano is trying to ensure the Governments stability until some laws crucial for the financial stability of the State are passed by the Parliament. After Montis resignation, elections will very likely be called in February 2013.» presupposes rules about elections, Prime minister, President, laws, resignations. Constitutive rules X counts as Y in context C and Y has normative outcome(s) or status functions Z

Institutional facts Rule-dependentConstitutive rules DOES THIS THEORY AMOUNT TO AN ONTOLOGY OF INSTITUTIONAL FACTS? NOT WITHOUT AN ONTOLOGY OF RULES Collective Intentionality

Institutional facts Rule-dependentConstitutive rules DOES THIS THEORY AMOUNT TO AN ONTOLOGY OF INSTITUTIONAL FACTS? NOT WITHOUT AN ONTOLOGY OF RULES Collective Intentionality We collectively intend (and/or accept) that: X counts as Y in context C and Y has normative outcome(s) or status functions Z

THREE CONCEPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY Collective intentionality as a biologically primitive mental phenomenon in the form of We SEARLE Collective intentionality as a network of mutual beliefs BRATMAN, TUOMELA GILBERT, MILLER Collective intentionality as the outcome of a collectivization of reason PETTIT

COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY AND MUTUAL BELIEFS I intend that we X, and believe that you intend that we X, and believe that you believe that we intend that we X, and believe that you believe that I believe that we intend that we X … Collective intentionality as a network of intentions and mutual beliefs BRATMAN, TUOMELA GILBERT, MILLER

COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY AND MUTUAL BELIEFS As member of group g, I intend that p, and believe that you intend that p, and believe (or at least am disposed to believe) that we mutually believe that p … Collective intentionality as a We-mode we attitude RAIMO TUOMELA We-mode intentions Fixed vs. iterative mutual beliefs Explicit agreement: collective intention vs. co-intention

COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY AND MUTUAL BELIEFS As member of group g, I intentionally express my willingness to jointly do or accept p together with the other members of g, believe that you have expressed your willingness, believe that you believe that I have expressed my willingness… Collective intentionality as the intention/belief of a plural subject MARGARETH GILBERT The group may believe/intend that p even if no one believes/intend that p. Believing/intending as member of a group vs. believing/intending as an individual. Communicative act (even if not explicit) at the root of a plural subject: normative dimension «Group belief» meaningful at least as a metaphor

COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY AND MUTUAL BELIEFS I intend that we j because I and you intend that we j by means of meshing subplans, and I believe that you intend that we j because you and I intend that we j by means of meshing subplans, and I believe that you believe that I intend that we j because …. Collective intentionality as a shared intention having a shared cooperative activity as its outcome MICHAEL BRATMAN Part of the concept of a shared intention is that the effectiveness of your intention is included in the content of my intention What makes a shared intention different from a mere joint intention is a commitment to mutual support Reductive analysis in terms of individual intentions

COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY AND MUTUAL BELIEFS I intentionally perform x, if and only if I believe that you have performed or will perform x, in order to realise end e, and I (truly) believe that you intentionally perform x, under the same conditions, in order to realise end e, and I (truly) believe that you believe that I believe….. «Collective intentionality» not as a shared intention but as a shared end SEUMAS MILLER «Behaviourism»: Insistence on the actual regularity in action – Less importance to the actual intention as an occurring mental state Theleological account: What is relevant is the shared end, which in the case of institutions is always a moral good - Normativity Even more reductive analysis in terms of individual intentions

COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY AND MUTUAL BELIEFS I intend that we X, and believe that you intend that we X, and believe that you believe that we intend that we X, and believe that you believe that I believe that we intend that we X … Collective intentionality as a network of intentions and mutual beliefs BRATMAN, TUOMELA GILBERT, MILLER Some of the open questions are: Cognitive overloadIndividualism vs. collectivism Tacit/dispositional vs. explicit Normativity

THREE CONCEPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY Collective intentionality as a biologically primitive mental phenomenon in the form of We SEARLE I intend that we X, and believe that you intend that we X, and believe that you believe that we intend that we X, and believe that you believe that I believe that we intend that we X … We intend that X Intentionality «in the plural»: a biologically primitive phenomenon Radical internalism: something that even a «brain in a vat» could have Collective recognition is weaker than collective action: «a continuum from enthusiastic endorsement to just going along with the structure»

THREE CONCEPTIONS OF COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY The group, as an intentional subject, intends that X No intentionality without rationality: reason must be collectivized over the actual preferences of individuals in order to have genuine collective intentionality Typically, purposive groups must collectivize reason in this way. Collective intentionality as the outcome of a collectivization of reason PETTIT Groups that collectivize reason are institutional persons and thus subject to epistemic rationality.