PSI Charging Policy: Some open issues Budapest, March 23 rd, 2012

LAPSI, Budapest 23/03/ Deciding for a specific PSI Charging Policy means comparing the pros and cons of the available options What are these available options? And which are their pros and cons?

LAPSI, Budapest 23/03/2012 PSI Free of Charge Is consistent with the idea that public sector bodies should not profit from those activities that are connected to the pursuit of their public task and Prevents any windfall in favor of public sector bodies that have already received taxes and maybe are not very efficient in managing them Is consistent with the industrial goal of promoting the emergence of a EU- wide market for information services Is consistent with specific political aims, such as the open government and the e-democracy A Price for PSI Allows public sector bodies to find by themselves sources of revenue other from taxpayers money – a possibility that is crucial especially during financial crisis and that could make taxes decrease, at least in the long rum Encourages public sector bodies to maintain/ improve the quality of their raw-data, given the costs that these raw-data imply Is consistent with the industrial goal of involving private sector firms in the generation of PSI-substitutes Is consistent with another political aim, that of realizing a minimum state, at least in the long run Pros This is not true for each kind of PSI These are bets: we lack empirical data

LAPSI, Budapest 23/03/ What are our political aims? Are there any others? 2.What are our industrial aims? And we should know: 1.The kind of PSI at which we are looking 2.The costs of PSI generation and, in particular, of making PSI available to re-use 3.Market performances Some questions to be answered Or, without answering these questions and making these empirical researches, we can look for a kind of compromise In order to choose between these two clear-cut alternatives we should answer the following questions … Empirical analysis

LAPSI, Budapest 23/03/2012 In medio stat virtus: the proposed article 6 4. The burden of proving that charges comply with this Article shall lie with the public sector body charging for re-use. 3. [Current article 6] 2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to a) Public sector bodies that are required to generate revenue to cover a substantial part of their costs relating to the performance of their public tasks b) Libraries (including university libraries), museums and archives 1. Where charges are made for the re-use of documents, the total amount charged by public sector bodies shall be limited to the marginal costs incurred for their reproduction and dissemination. The default rule is next to the free of charge solution: re- users pay only for services that facilitate re-use. It works to realize its pros. These exceptions are consistent with some of the pros coming with a price for PSI: A ceiling Deterrent effect/ easier enforcement – a regulator is necessary a) Finding other sources of revenue b) Improving/ maintaining raw-data quality

LAPSI, Budapest 23/03/2012 Few preliminary comments In the absence of clear-cut positions, the compromise may work As to the second exception for libraries (including university libraries), museums and archives, it solves the problem of improving/ maintaining the quality of their raw-data. Yet, are there any other bodies that are in the same conditions of libraries, museums, and archives and that, hence, could need the possibility to use the same exceptions? As to the first exception, some questions deserve to be answered: 1.Isnt it too broad? Which are the public sector bodies that it addresses? 2.The text says public sector bodies that are required … are required by whom/what? A specific piece of law? Their management? Objective exceptional circumstances? Other? 3.The text says substantial part of their costs relating to the performance of their public task … what does it mean? What is substantial? How related? Perhaps, we will be able to answer these questions after years of litigation

LAPSI, Budapest 23/03/2012 In sum Deciding for a charging policy means regulating the market … and Regulating the market means favoring specific economic agents and market performances If we do not want to make clear cut decisions – or if we do not have enough elements to take those decisions – the interplay between a default rule and its exceptions could represent a good compromise Yet, we need to be much more precise as to the exceptions, in order not to increase a lot transaction costs