Language as a Tool System Mark H. Bickhard

Language as a Tool System Abstract It is common knowledge that language can be used as a tool to accomplish tasks. But utterances are taken to be constituted as encodings of mental contents. I argue that this encoding view is in error, and that language is directly constituted as a tool system. In particular, utterances are tools for engaging the common understandings that constitute social realities.

Doing Things with Words J.L. Austin was an early investigator of actions performed with words, e.g., assertions, commands, promises, etc. Searle is one contemporary who has followed in this path Others also focused on actions using words, such as the later Wittgenstein’s likening of language to a tool box

Actions with Encodings All of these approaches have in common the assumption that the actions are performed with encoded propositions These propositions represent states of affairs that are asserted to exist, commanded to be brought into existence, promised, and so on. The encoded representations are used in the service of the actions

Problems with Encodings But such encoding assumptions encounter serious problems The problem is not that encodings do not exist — they clearly do But they cannot serve primary epistemic functions

Encoded Representations Consider how actual encodings work: Example: Morse code “...” encodes “S” Example: Neutrino counts encode properties of fusion processes in the sun Encodings change the form of representation This can be useful: “…” can be sent over telegraph wires while “s” cannot Neutrinos can be counted on earth, while fusion in the sun is not accessible

Encodings are Derivative Encodings must borrow their representational content They are derivative representations, not primary Some agent must know — represent — both ends of the encoding relationship, and the relationship itself.

Encodings Cannot be the Basic Form of Epistemic Access Consequence: encodings cannot cross epistemic boundaries — they cannot be the primary form of representation for perception or for language Not mind to world in perception Nor world to mind in language Because both ends must already be represented, the epistemic boundary would have to be already crossed in order for the encoding to exist There is no way in which such non-derivative encodings could be defined or learned

Circularities Circularities result from assuming that encodings can serve as their own ground, can provide their own representational content: Incoherence Piaget’s copy argument Classical radical skeptical argument

Encodingism Nevertheless, the assumption that representation is encoding is common Encodingism: The assumption that (all) representation is encoding Representation, including mental representation, is presumed to be constituted in some kind of encoding correspondence causal, nomological, informational, conventional

Fatal Problems Such encodingism assumptions, however, encounter myriads of fatal problems: Circularities Too many correspondences Possibility of error Possibility of system detectable error Possibility of emergence Innatism is not a solution

What Could Language Be If Not Encodings? Apperception Other side of visually perceived object Animal in forest on basis of sound Modifies representation of environment Adds, subtracts, transforms Apperceptive maintenance of representation of environment around you, including extended environment Anticipations of what could happen, what would be possible

Apperceptions of Utterances Utterances induce apperceptions of representations Apperceptions add, subtract, transform Utterances operate on, transform, representations Utterances interact With what?

The Locus of Language What is the locus of language interactions? Obvious candidate: other minds Partially correct, but this overlooks the sociality of language What about, e.g., the difference between arranging for someone to see that X is the case and telling them that X is the case? Both have mind as object — interactive locus — but the first is not language In the second case, the result is a transformation of the common understanding between the utterer and the audience: both end up knowing that X was asserted, and knowing that both know that X was asserted, etc.

Situation Conventions Commonalities of understanding — which I call situation conventions, conventions about the current social situation — constitute social realities E.g, lecture situation, birthday party, formal meeting, etc.

Utterances as Operators Utterances transform situation conventions, in multiple ways, at multiple scales Macro: e.g., call a meeting to order Micro: e.g., change the manner in which a pronoun will be resolved in a conversation

What About Minds? Situation conventions are constituted in relations of commonality and consistency among the representations of social participants So, transforming situation conventions does transform minds, but indirectly Lifting a coffee cup is interacting with the atoms in the cup, but indirectly

Productivity Signals can transform social understandings Language provides a means for constructing unbounded ranges of operators on social understandings Language is productive

Language as a Tool System Language is a conventional recursive tool kit for constructing conventional tools (utterances) for interacting with situation conventions

Context Dependence One strong consequence: Language is inherently context dependent Utterances transform the context in which they are uttered, and therefore are sensitive to that context. Operators are sensitive to their arguments Unless they are akin to constant functions

Ubiquitous Context Dependencies Not just for pronouns, indexicals, etc. Even proper names This is obvious, but has tended to be overlooked in favor of the model of language as encoded Names Recursive context dependencies: Partee: “The man who gave his paycheck to his wife was wiser than the man who gave it to his mistress.” Not co-referential

What Happened to the Propositions? Utterances are interactions with representational systems They are not representational themselves Representations are generated by utterances, not encoded by them There are no encoded propositions wrapped up in utterances

Many Further Consequences An interactive model of language has many further consequences Syntax, Semantics, Pragmatics cannot be defined in standard ways These do not constitute a theory neutral division of the field of study Functional constraints on syntax generates UG Provides an approach to creative language Utterances do not encode transformations either Apperception can yield problem solving tasks

Conclusion Utterances as actions using encoded propositions suffers serious logical problems Language as a tool system for interacting with social realities avoids these problems And induces multiple changes in conceptualizations of language and its properties