All together in a safe couch Press briefing on the Mass transportation security demonstration programme Prague May 2009 Dr E. Anders Eriksson, FOI DEMASST Coordinator

Dr E. A. Eriksson; Why is mass transportation security important? Extremely high densities of people –accidents, terrorist attacks, contagious diseases, etc. may create very major casualties Public transport is a critical infrastructure for the good functioning of all metropolitan regions –disturbances very costly Increased market share for Public transport has big environmental upside –requires improvement in security and other dimensions of quality of service Important with all hazards approach to exploit synergies between the different types of risks and threats

Dr E. A. Eriksson; Why is mass transportation security difficult? Compared to air transport: –large numbers of open access points –much more passengers typically 100 times more per day in major PT system vs. major airport –infrastructures squeezed into existing cities with imminent risks for collateral effects of all kinds of disturbances –lower acceptance of delays and disruptions of service –lower acceptance of invasion of privacy –lower acceptance of investment and operations costs for security systems PT systems typically tax subsidised –more heterogeneity systems developed over many decades and without obvious needs for standardisation and harmonisation difficult for solutions to find sufficiently big market

Dr E. A. Eriksson; The FP7-SEC modular approach to building security System-of-systems level: –Demonstration programmes (DP) –DEMASST first phase of DP Mass transportation security System level: –Integration projects Modular level: –Capability projects The economies of modularity: –Use the same module in different systems (and systems- of-systems) –Dont make new modules if good alternatives are available off-the- shelf

Dr E. A. Eriksson; DEMASST structure

Dr E. A. Eriksson; Work towards the roadmap proper Shared system-of-systems map to –identify candidate integrated solutions –guide the design of experiments Identification of experimentation resources –live experimentation in systems under normal operations necessary to capture e.g. new types of passenger behaviour due to new ICT services –test ranges and test beds –computer simulation necessary for the most dangerous, dull and difficult tasks

Dr E. A. Eriksson; B. Major interchange (typically intermodal) A. Whole urban/intra- regional transport system (network level) C. Passenger information systems (system-to- customer and peer-to-peer) D. Lines and roads E. Vehicles/transport platforms F. Vehicle parking areas, repair and maintenance shops, etc. G. Technical support systems incl. SCADA H. Intelligence I. Risk assessment- based command and control J. Comprehensive threat detection K. Preventive/early intervention L. Passive/automatic protection M. Cyber defence N. Post-incident intervention and restoration of services O. Forensics P. Learning and training System-of-Systems Map for Mass Transport Security Demonstration & Experimentation Thick lines – much info exchange Green/red – easy/difficult to do real life experiments