Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?: The Demography of Religious Radicalism Eric Kaufmann and Vegard Skirbekk Eric Kaufmann, Birkbeck College University of London, UK Vegard Skirbekk, World Population Program, IIASA, Laxenburg, Austria

Demographic Radicalization The demographic increase of the conservative religious population at the expense of moderate or secular groups Why radical? Enlarges the pool of suppliers of, or recruits to, religious violence – unless totally quietist (ie Amish) May alter alliance behaviour and foreign policy

Source: ‘The Moment of Truth’, Ha’aretz, 8 February 2007

Israel: Ultra-Orthodox Jewish Growth Jewish Primary Schools: 2012: 1/3 Haredi, 50 pc Orthodox; Israel: Just 41 pc secular Haredi TFR of 6.49 in increasing to 7.61 in ; Other Israeli Jews decline 2.61 to 2.27 Exemptions in 1948: 400 (not all used). Today: 55,000. No indication of major outflows Majority of Israeli Jews after 2050?

UK: A Tale of Two Cities: Salford v Leeds US: –American Jews have TFR of In alone, Haredim increase from 7.2 to 9.4 pc of total. –Kiryas Joel, in Orange Co., New York, nearly triples in population to between 1990 and 2006 Diaspora Will be Haredi-majority by 2050

Decline of Liberal Protestants

Religious Demographic Advantage USA – more conservative and intense have higher fertility (Hackett 2008) Fertility Gap, Women Aged (Children Ever Born), GSS Biblical LiteralistHomosexualityAbortion

Quiverfull 'Probably the most subversive and effective strategy we might undertake would be one of militant fecundity: abundant, relentless, exuberant, and definant childbearing. Given the reluctance of modern men and women to be fruitful and multiply, it would not be difficult, surely, for the devout to accomplish-in no more than a generation or two-a demographic revolution.' – David Bentley Hart, First Things 'Let's outbreed the Mormons', Russell Moore, Dean of the School of Theology at Southern Baptist seminary

Same Trends in Europe Religious have stable or increasing fertility advantage (Adsera 2004; Regnier-Loilier 2008, etc) Europe: Conservative Muslim and Christian immigration to Europe

Secular Birth Dearth?: The Second Demographic Transition

Source: Westoff and Frejka 2007 Islam is No Exception

Source: WVS N = 2796 respondents in towns under 10,000 and 1561 respondents in cities over 100,000. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.

Religion and Extremist Politics Amish or jihadis? Israel: Haredim and Religious Zionism Sunnis: Salafis and Jihadis Shia: Quietist Flagellation, but also Khomeini/Hezbollah USA: Evangelical mainstream, but also anti- abortion violence (i.e. Tiller) Religion not worse than secular ideologies, but worse than individualism

A More Violent World? Cannot have religious fundamentalism without producing a violent fringe Rise in religious civil wars as proportion of total (Toft 2007) Rise in proportion of terrorist incidents attributable to religion (Philpott 2007) Conflict sacralized, harder to reach settlements and agree common interests (i.e. Toft 2007; Appleby) But also more of a nonviolent side to religion than to secular ideologies (i.e. SW Africa, N Ireland)

Conclusion Changing balance of religious traditions/intensities affects domestic and international politics Secularism will grow in the West until Conservative theologies, initially reacting to secularism, are demographically expanding in major Abrahamic faiths Longer term (post-2050) effects, apart from Israel Religious Fundamentalism will increasingly shape civil conflict and terrorism