Secure Neighbor Discovery in Wireless Networks Marcin Poturalski, Panos Papadimitratos, Jean-Pierre Hubaux 1
Neighbor Discovery (ND) “Who are my neighbors?” In wireless networks: “Can I communicate directly with B?” Fundamental Building Block 2
Neighbor Discovery: Routing in ad-hoc networks C A 3 B
Naïve Neighbor Discovery A B “A: Hello” 4 A is a neighbor
Naïve ND: relay attack C B A “A: Hello” 5 A is a neighbor “A: Hello” PHY preamble… MAC A …… IP A …“A:Hello”…… PHY preamble… MAC A …… IP A …“A:Hello”……
Routing in ad-hoc networks: Violation of ND 6 B A C D M
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ND is an important and fragile building block Secure ND protocols have been proposed – Distance Bounding Does not quite solve the problem… To what extent is secure ND possible? 8
Outline Model of wireless networks – language: set theory, 1 st order logic Specification of ND Investigate two classes of protocols: – Time-based (T-protocols) – Time- and Location-based (TL-protocols) Results: – T-protocol ND impossibility (general case) – T-protocol solving ND (restricted case) – TL-protocol solving ND (general case) 9
Model 10
Traces and events Trace is a set of events 11 A B C
SS S,P Feasible traces System execution: feasible trace Traces feasible with respect to: - setting S - protocol P - adversary A 12 S,P,A
Setting 13 { A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H } ……… H A C B D G F E
Trace feasible wrt setting S Causal and timely message exchange A B 14 v – signal propagation speed
Trace feasible wrt setting S Causal and timely message exchange 15
Local trace 16 A B
17 Local view
Protocol 18 Actions:
19 Correct nodes follow the protocol Trace feasible wrt protocol
Trace feasible wrt adversary 20 Adversarial nodes can only relay messages, with minimum delay A
21 Neighbor Discovery Specification
Neighbor Discovery specification 1)Discovered neighbors are actual neighbors 2)It is possible to discover neighbors 22 Protocol P solves Neighbor Discovery for adversary A if
Neighbor Discovery specification 1)Discovered neighbors are actual neighbors 2)It is possible to discover neighbors 23 Protocol P solves Neighbor Discovery for adversary A if in the ND range R … 2-party ND
Results T-protocol ND impossibility (general case) T-protocol solving ND (restricted case) TL-protocol solving ND (general case) 24
Results T-protocol ND impossibility (general case) T-protocol solving ND (restricted case) TL-protocol solving ND (general case) 25
T-protocol impossibility 26 No T-protocol can solve Neighbor Discovery for adversary if Proof (sketch): Any T-protocol P which satisfies ND 2 cannot satisfy ND 1
T-protocol impossibility 27 A B C A B
T-protocol impossibility 28 A B
T-protocol impossibility 29 A B A B C
T-protocol impossibility Trace b is feasible in S b A declares B a neighbor in b A and B are not neighbors in S b ND 1 is violated 30 A B C C A B
Results T-protocol ND impossibility (general case) T-protocol solving ND (restricted case) TL-protocol solving ND (general case) 31
Temporal packet leash: T-protocol solving ND 32
Results T-protocol ND impossibility (general case) T-protocol solving ND (restricted case) TL-protocol solving ND (general case) 33
TL-protocol solving ND “Geo-Temporal” packet leash: 34
Conclusion Investigation of Neighbor Discovery in wireless networks for two general classes of protocols T-protocols can solve ND iff TL-protocols can solve ND if 35
Conclusion Problems with proposed protocols: – require synchronized clocks – require very accurate time measurements – require line-of-sight communication (TL) – require secure location (TL) 36
Future work Reasoning about a wider range of protocols – e.g. Challenge-Response schemes Multi-party ND? Moving closer to the physical layer – ? 37