Inspiring Vision, Disappointing Results: Implementing NCLB The National Education Association February 13, 2004 Gary Orfield, Professor of Education & Social Policy The Civil Rights Project at Harvard University

Agenda  Purpose and Design of NCLB National Study  Goals of NCLB  Key Findings from Four Reports  Policy Recommendations  Discussion

Purpose of CRP’s Study on NCLB  Purpose of NCLB: “to close the achievement gap between high- and low-performing children, especially the achievement gaps between minority and non-minority students, and between disadvantaged children and their more advantaged peers” within 12 years  Purpose of CRP Study is to understand How the whole system works to implement NCLB How the law actually works at state & local levels How the law impacts minority children and schools

Study Design  Select states with quite different educational systems and policies but with large minority enrollments  AZ, CA, IL, NY, VA, GA  Two Urban Districts within Each State Except IL (only Chicago)  Qualitative Data Collection-Field Visits, Interviews, Document Collection  Quantitative Data Collection-Demographic and Achievement for All Schools, 6 States

Bush Administration’s Goals  NCLB Embodies 4 Principles: Flexibility More Choices for Economically Disadvantaged Families Accountability Focus on What Works  Key Question: What are the intended and unintended consequences?

( 1) Bush Administration and Federalism  Little deference to local priorities or local decision making  Little consideration of state capacity  Growing political resistance linked to lack of resources, state fiscal crisis, and unreasonable requirements

(2) NCLB and State Accountability  Federal requirements impose “one size fits all” accountability model on states  States layered the federal accountability requirements on top of pre-existing plans  NCLB complicates state accountability Dual system produces conflicting messages, and divergent definitions of proficiency AYP has disparate impact on minority schools Subgroup rules punish disadvantaged schools

School Ratings Are Confusing  Conflicting signals for schools Arizona, 289 schools identified as “needing improvement,” but met the state’s performance targets and earned either a “performing” or “highly performing” label. Virginia, 723 (40% of all schools) failed to make federal AYP goals while only 402 (22%) failed to meet state accreditation standards.

“Proficiency” Has No Common Meaning

AYP Has Disparate Impact on High Poverty, High Minority Schools

Subgroup Rules Punish Schools with Large Numbers of Minority, Low-Income, LEP, Spec. Ed. Students - CA

(3) More and Better Choices for Students in Low-Performing Schools?  Choice and SES implemented primarily in urban districts  Low participation rates  Ignores local district capacity to implement programs: high-poverty districts have limited seats in low-poverty schools with high achievement levels

Burden of implementing choice falls on urban districts District% Schools Within the District Offering Choice % Schools in State New York City65%27.1% NY’s Schools Chicago34%13.8% IL’s Schools Los Angeles13%7.4% CA’s Schools Richmond City50%3% VA’s Schools

Participation Rates in NCLB Transfers  In each of the ten districts fewer than 3% of eligible students requested to transfer to a different school.  NCLB transfer policy 1.9% of eligible students requested transfers in Chicago, and only 2.3% of eligible students requested transfers in New York. Parents whose transfer requests were approved often chose to keep their children in the neighborhood schools. in Fresno, only 62 of the 111 students (56%) whose transfer requests were approved actually moved out of their neighborhood school.

High Poverty Districts Don’t Have Lots of Low-Poverty Schools

(4) Supplemental Educational Services  Primarily minority students eligible  Low participation rates, but greater demand for SES than for NCLB transfer option  Fewer than 16% of eligible students requested and received services  Irony of SES: creates more bureaucracy and undermines push for “scientifically-based” education policies and interventions

Minority students are primarily eligible for SES

Yet There is Little Accountability and Evidence for Supp. Ed. Services  Supplemental Educational Services requirements impose administrative burdens on districts and schools  Without increase in resources  Diverts resources away from poorly performing schools  Does not adhere to “scientifically-based” research standards (111 times in statute)

Recommendations  Revise NCLB in collaboration with education professionals, recognizing the variation in conditions, and incorporating the best research on realistic time frames and rates of progress.  Revise subgroup accountability rules especially for LEP and disability categories & end double counting.

Recommendations  Encourage multiple models for measuring student learning and school accountability with an emphasis on progress.  Emphasize narrowing learning gaps for minority and poor students.

Recommendations  Choice program should be limited to schools that are not improving and should be only to better schools. Existing transfer policies, especially in desegregation plans should be given priority.  The supplemental educational services requirement should be suspended and replaced by experiments to determine whether and how this works. If it is resumed, it is resumed, it should be forward-funded rather than withheld from current year Title I budget.