Intentionality and artificial intelligence Michael Lacewing

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Presentation transcript:

Intentionality and artificial intelligence Michael Lacewing

Intentionality Mental states are ‘about’, or ‘directed onto’, something, e.g. belief about Paris, desire for chocolate. Intentionality has nothing to do with intentions. An Intentional mental state has Intentional content.

Intentional content Oedipus kills his father out of anger –Was Oedipus angry with his father? Yes, and no We always think of the world in a particular way –Do atmospherically formed crystals in hexagonal form reflect all wavelengths of visible light? –Call this ‘aspectual shape’. Intentional object: the thing we think about Intentional content: object + shape

Reduction How can anything physical have Intentionality? –Physical states and properties, e.g. chemical ones, are never ‘about’ anything Functionalism: Intentionality is a causal- functional property –A belief is about dogs because it is caused by dogs and causes behaviour towards dogs. –But a cloud is caused by water evaporating from the sea; yet the cloud isn’t about the sea.

Functional accounts Beliefs carry information about the world. –Natural states do this, e.g. smoke carries information about fire. But beliefs can be mistaken, smoke cannot. The function of beliefs is to represent the world truly. –Many natural things can malfunction. –Mistake = malfunction Stomachs can malfunction, but still aren’t ‘about’ food.

The Chinese Room Is artificial intelligence intelligent? Searle: only if Intentionality could be reduced to functions

One response The issue is the type of interaction with the world: –Replace the person by a computer. –Put the computer inside a robot. –Connect up a visual input and audio output. –The robot can now ‘name’ objects in Chinese. –Does the robot understand Chinese?

Consciousness and aspect Searle: the robot still doesn’t understand, but ‘simulates’ understanding To understand, we need consciousness –Aspectual shape is essential to genuine Intentionality –Only consciousness provides aspectual shape (point of view)