The Troubled Rebirth of Political Opposition in Russia Vladimir Gel’man (European University at St.Petersburg / University of Helsinki) PONARS Policy conference, George Washington University, Washington DC, September 22, 2014

The Troubled Rebirth of Political Opposition My “Political Opposition in Russia: A Dying Species?” (Post-Soviet Affairs, 2005) – 50 references since then; The argument – consolidation of elites and the major institutional changes in Russia in the 2000s left no room for political opposition, which was doomed to a marginal role; But during and after protests the major re- emergence of political opposition in Russia has been observed; What are the causes of these changes and their possible impact on political opposition in Russia and what we might expect for the future? What are the major challenges and strategic choices for the opposition in Russia in coming years?

The Troubled Rebirth of Political Opposition Before opposition was weak, divided and pushed into various narrow «ghettos» (a «dying spices» phenomenon – Gel’man, 2005); «systemic opposition» parties (CPRF, Yabloko) lost previous influence and more concentrated on their own survival; «non-systemic opposition» groups were noisy but largely irrelevant constellations of incapable freaks with very narrow basis of support; independent opposition movements and groups were by and large NIMBY-like, localized actors and/or (often deliberatively) avoided politicization; no meaningful post-election protests in ; deep divisions among the opposition

The Troubled Rebirth of Political Opposition What has changed before wave of protests? Three major factors: (1) Generation change among opposition leaders and activists – no irreconcilable ideational divides, no past memory of mortal offenses; a different and more forward-looking political style vis-à-vis fading figures from the “roaring 1990s” (e.g., Navalny vs. Nemtsov); (2) minor opening of political opportunity structure under Dmitry Medvedev’s «virtual thaw» – unintended consequences of rhetorical liberalization; (3) shift of public demands for the «good governance» in the wake of economic crisis (Chaisty, Whitefield, 2012) and populist response of the opposition on these demands (Navalny’s effects);

The Troubled Rebirth of Political Opposition 2011 parliamentary elections – a turning point? Effective negative campaign against United Russia (UR) increased public visibility of the opposition and turned into the large-scale mass mobilization; The opposition slogan “vote for anyone but UR” ideally fit the perspective of negative consensus against the status quo regime and reflect populist trends; «Systemic» opposition was the major beneficiary of anti- regime campaign, but remained passive and inept; Numerous «non-systemic» opposition groups either emerged during the campaign and/or joined the process of politicization

The Troubled Rebirth of Political Opposition However, anti-regime protests met their limits: (1) the electoral arena still occupied by the ruling group and «systemic» opposition (no major alternatives for 2012 presidential elections); (2) the scale of mobilization was not enough for major concessions of the ruling group: denial of ideas of bargaining between the ruling group and the opposition and/or of the cooptation of some opposition figures; (3) «systemic» opposition parties still preferred status- quo regime to major political changes, rightly considering their chances for survival

The Troubled Rebirth of Political Opposition «Non-systemic» opposition faced with severe constrains, partly inherited from the previous (pre-2011) experience: Low organizational capabilities and limited pool of available resources; Lack of political strategy, especially given the time constrains (opposition leaders became victims of their own success?); Relative isolation, shortage of «influential allies» among the elites, including those of «systemic» opposition; After 2012: taking to the streets and/or going to the polls – two tactics, small gains

The Troubled Rebirth of Political Opposition New trends on electoral arena: Yekaterinburg, 2013 – Yevgeny Roizman, a local hero and political maverick, won mayoral elections; Moscow, 2013 – Navalny got 27.3% of votes in city mayoral elections (despite many gloomy predictions); Novosibirsk, 2014 – Lokot (CPRF) won mayoral elections as a leader of coalition of five opposition candidates, both left and right; … but “the time of burning fires not came yet” (Navalny)

The Troubled Rebirth of Political Opposition Key challenges for the opposition lies ahead: Kremlin’s «politics of fear»: from public discrediting to criminal prosecutions (and/or threats thereof) towards opposition leaders, activists, and allies; abuse of «divide- and-rule» tactics, access denial to elections; Low degree of public support of the «non-systemic» opposition despite the criticism towards status quo regime; After 2014 annexation of Crimea – no strategic response, lack of cohesion Time horizon problem – demobilizing effect of a need for preparing for the long-term struggle against well- entrenched authoritarian regime (incentives for «exit» rather than «voice»)

The Troubled Rebirth of Political Opposition Major tasks for democratic opposition under authoritarianism (Stepan, 1990): (a) Resisting cooptation into the regime; (b) Guarding zones of the autonomy vis-à-vis regime; (c) Disrupting regime’s legitimacy; (d) Rising the costs of preservation of the status- quo rule; (e) Creating a credible democratic alternative

The Troubled Rebirth of Political Opposition The Kremlin’s harsh approach is likely to turn more citizens and new groups into regime’s enemies, thus making easier tasks (a) and (d) for the opposition; Still, tasks of disrupting regime’s legitimacy and creating of a credible democratic alternatives are more complicated; At the same time, the perspective of «civil society versus the state» (typical for Eastern Europe before 1989 and Latin America in the s) looks irrelevant in case of Russia

The Troubled Rebirth of Political Opposition Thanks for your attention!