Legal Limitations on Leakage Control Tim Profeta Director Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions Duke University 6/15/06.

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Presentation transcript:

Legal Limitations on Leakage Control Tim Profeta Director Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions Duke University 6/15/06

Underlining the Importance of Today’s Discussion RGGI is an extremely important initiative on the world stage U.S. is the lynchpin of efforts to address climate change, post-2012 RGGI, along with other less mature state efforts, are being watched as the first true movement within the United States Success is vital Leakage control will be a large part of that success or failure If RGGI does not reduce global GHG emissions, or if it is seen as harmful to the states’ economic interests, it will be cited as a negative precedent. Invitation in the MOU to address this issue up front should be accepted.

Leakage Control: A Challenge that Must be Addressed Rich Cowart’s math yesterday was cowing – a 1.8% increase in imports could swamp the program’s benefits. –The NE ISO numbers, and numbers from other analysis, seem even greater than 1.8%. Of the policies outlined yesterday, only one actually controlled leakage – the cap on LSE’s –Portfolio standards might have a positive effect on emissions, but do not guarantee success If you go with the LSE approach, some serious legal issues should be taken on squarely in the process

Central Themes for Dormant Commerce Clause Purpose, purpose, purpose Do it all as one program Why is there no less discriminatory alternative? Don’t hang your hat on long shot arguments

Purpose, Purpose, Purpose This is a very difficult area of jurisprudence, described as “a tangled underbrush” and “virtually unworkable in practice.” Perception of the program’s purpose appears to influence a court’s skepticism of the arguments presented. Need to counter threat that this will be perceived as defensive, protectionist program – the good news is that it does not appear to be. Need to develop the grounds for acting that we have heard over the past day that justify the program on the interests of the RGGI states: –Need to reduce global GHG emissions to protect states’ physical security and natural resources –Minimization of RGGI’s environmental footprint –Sending of price signal to RGGI consumers

Facial Discrimination may be the entire analysis Potentially dispositive inquiry is whether regulation is facially discriminatory Key question is whether economic burden is placed equally Need to persuade court to take the larger view – regulations impose identical burdens on the electricity market, but simply in two different places –Fighting courts’ tendency to see things by “transaction” –Courts have accepted laws that, “[w]hen the account is made up, the stranger from afar is subject to no greater burdens... then the dweller within the gates.” –Need to ensure the burdens are in fact, equal To maximize chance that the program will be seen as one, greater whole, all components of the program should be imposed at one time

If facially discriminatory: If you are found to be facially discriminatory against imports, your regulation begins as “virtually per se invalid” Analysis will focus on whether states have true interest in global problems, and whether less discriminatory alternative exists –Must establish nonprotectionist purposes that justify choice of generator cap rather than allocation to load. “Compensatory tax” doctrine would constitute a long shot –Courts are loathe to extend it past sales and use taxes –Complexity of calculation of emissions from imports would make it very difficult for a court to compare incidence of burden

If not facially discriminatory: Good chance of survival Legitimate government purpose should be accepted –Impacts assessment, global nature of GHG’s effect, should be put on record Burden likely not excessive if perceived as nondiscriminatory Less restrictive alternative might still create problem –Courts have never struck down a law under intermediate scrutiny on this prong – much more focused on balancing of purpose and burden –Must establish nonprotectionist purposes that justify choice of generator cap

Thank you. Tim Profeta Director, Nicholas Institute