July 24, 2008 SOUPS 2008 Universal Device Pairing using an Auxiliary Device Nitesh Saxena, Md. Borhan Uddin and Jonathan Voris Polytechnic Institute of.

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July 24, 2008 SOUPS 2008 Universal Device Pairing using an Auxiliary Device Nitesh Saxena, Md. Borhan Uddin and Jonathan Voris Polytechnic Institute of New York University

SOUPS The "Pairing" Problem How to bootstrap secure communication between two wireless devices when they have  No prior association  No common trusted third party Examples o Pairing a Bluetooth cell phone with a headset o Pairing a WLAN laptop with an access point

SOUPS Main Solution Idea  Utilize an Out-Of-Band (OOB) channel between the devices o Created with “human-sensory” (audio, visual, tactile) output o The OOB channel is physically authenticatable  Place a minimal burden on device users o Usability is of extreme importance

SOUPS Security Model  Devices are connected by two channel types: o An insecure, high bandwidth wireless channel o An authenticable, (typically) low bandwidth OOB channel  Adversary has complete control over the wireless channel o Can eavesdrop on, delay, drop, replay, reorder, and modify messages  Adversary has a limited control over the OOB channel o Can not modify messages, but can eavesdrop on, delay, drop, replay, and reorder messages

SOUPS Prior Work  Seeing-is-Believing by McCune et al. [Oakland’05] oBased on protocol by Balfanz et al. [NDSS’02] AB pk A pk B H(pk A ) H(pk B ) Insecure Channel Secure with: o A weakly CR H() o An 80 bit permanent key o A 48 bit ephemeral key Authenticated Channel

SOUPS SAS Protocol A Wireless Channel Unidirectional OOB Channel  Short Authenticated Strings (SAS) pairing protocol by Pasini-Vaudenay [PKC’06] An adversary can not succeed with a probability greater than 2 -k k=15 offers reasonable security in practice pk A, c A pk B, R B dAdA B Accept (pk B,B) if Accept (pk B,A) if

SOUPS Drawbacks with Prior Research Geared for specific pairing scenarios None are universally applicable  Require hardware and interfaces not common across all devices User doesn’t know what method to use with what pair of devices  confusion! We believe: universality would immensely improve security as well as usability

SOUPS A Universal Pairing Method (1) Prasad-Saxena [ACNS’08] Use existing SAS protocols The strings transmitted by both devices over OOB channel are  the same, if everything is fine  different, if there is an attack or fault Both devices encode these strings using a pattern of  Synchronized beeping/blinking  The user acts as a reader and verifies if the two patterns are same or not

SOUPS A Universal Pairing Method (2) Usability?  It was shown that human users are capable of efficiently performing  Blink-Blink  Beep-Blink However, in practice users will commit mistakes  Due to a slight distraction, for example Motivation for this paper: can we do better?

SOUPS The Proposed Scheme  Automate the prior scheme based on manual comparison  Utilize an auxiliary device to perform the comparison A B Success/Failure

SOUPS Manual vs Automated or Manual Pairing using Blink-Blink or Audio-Blink Automated Pairing using Blink-Blink or Audio-Blink Device1 Device2 Device1 Device2 ATD Result

SOUPS ATD Requirements  In the Blink-Blink setup, the ATD requires a camera as a receiver  For the Audio-Blink setup, the ATD requires a camera and a microphone as receivers  Both require a screen or speaker to output the pairing outcome  Today’s camera phones are suitable ATDs  The ATD does not connect over the wireless channel with the devices being paired  The ATD does not need to trusted with any cryptographic secret

SOUPS Implementation  For testing, a Dell Laptop was used as an ATD o2.0 megapixel, 30 FPS webcam  Devices being paired were simulated using a desktop computer oVisual output interface: LEDs connected via a parallel port oAudio output interface: Desktop speakers

SOUPS Experimental Setup Overall setup Audiovisual receiver: Laptop camera and microphone LEDs used to simulate two devices’ visual output interfaces

SOUPS Encoding Method  A ‘1’ SAS bit is expressed by activating the output interface for a given signal interval  A ‘0’ SAS bit is represented by disabling the output interface for the duration of the signal interval  Optimal intervals determined experimentally o Dependant on the ATD’s processing speed  Which output interfaces are used depends on which pairing scheme is in use  In our experiments, we used a 15-bit SAS

SOUPS Visual Data Processing/Decoding  Visual data was encoded using blinking LEDs oSignal interval: 250 ms  The ATD used saturation and luminance measurements to detect LEDs and capture their encoded SAS data  Overall transmission time: 4.5 seconds to transmit and capture 18 frames o15 data frames o3 control frames: All-OFF, All-ON, SYNC

SOUPS Audio Data Processing/Decoding  Audio data was encoded as spoken English words using the Microsoft Speech API (SAPI) 5.0 Text-To- Speech engine oSignal interval: 400 ms  The ATD captured the audio data via a microphone and decoded it using the SAPI Speech Recognition engine  Overall transmission time: 7.2 seconds

SOUPS Usability Testing  Schemes tested with 20 subjects  The same tests were performed with the manual and automated setup  Each subject was presented 24 test cases  20 reliability tests for the Blink-Blink and Audio-Blink schemes  4 tests for the robustness of the ATD  Test goals: o Determine if the ATD could be used to reliably pair devices o Determine which scheme:  Demonstrated the least amount of errors  safe errors or false positives, and  fatal errors or false negatives  Users qualitatively preferred

SOUPS Testing Interface (1) Blink-Blink Setup: Failed Pairing

SOUPS Testing Interface (2) Audio-Blink Setup: Successful Pairing

SOUPS Testing Interface (3)

SOUPS Usability Testing Results CombinationAverage Timing (seconds) Safe Error Rate (%) Fatal Error Rate (%) Blink-Blink (sd a =3.524) Audio-Blink (sd= 3.387) CombinationAverage Timing (seconds) Safe Error Rate (%) Fatal Error Rate (%) Blink-Blink (sd=3.107)2.00 Beep-Blink (sd=2.659) Results of Automated Comparison Tests Results of Manual Comparison tests a = Estimated Standard Deviation from the sample  80% of the subjects (16 out of 20) preferred the automated scheme  20% of the subjects (4 out of 20) preferred the manual scheme.

SOUPS Discussion (1)  Results indicate that the use of an ATD makes the pairing process safer and less burdensome o No fatal errors o Reduced safe error rate  The higher safe error rate of Audio-Blink is attributable to the ATD picking up background noise o The ATD’s audio robustness is expected to improve when implemented on a smartphone as opposed to the current proof-of-concept o Users of this scheme must be sure of the origin of the SAS audio to guard against attacks

SOUPS Discussion (2)  Whether the ATD is a help or hindrance in terms of speed is dependant on its decoding rate for a particular setup o Blink-Blink: Automated is faster than manual due to the fast visual decoding process o Audio-Blink: Automated is slower than manual due to the relatively slower audio decoding process

SOUPS Conclusion  Both the manual and automated schemes are universally applicable to any pairing scenario  Use of an ATD is not mandatory, but test results show it increases usability when available  An ATD can handle SAS encodings that a human users can not oLonger strings oMultiple simultaneous output interfaces

SOUPS Thank you!