1 ANTITRUST AND INTERCHANGE Lacey Plache LECG. 2 Three Main Points 1.Default interchange fees are necessary for the functioning of the Visa and MasterCard.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Interchange fees and innovation in retail payment systems Marc Bourreau, Telecom ParisTech 1.
Advertisements

Government Prepaid Card
The economics of card payments Alberto Heimler Professor of economics SSPA Roma The Role and Regulation of Interchange Fees in European Payment Cards Bruxelles,
NETWORK INTERCHANGE, INNOVATION, AND ENTRY TOOLS TO DRIVE PARTICIPATION AND GROWTH Tim Attinger – Managing Director, MPD June 15, 2011.
MBMC Workers, Wages, and Unemployment in the Modern Economy.
Monopolistic Competition
SMART Classes First Year Chapter (2) The Modern Mixed Economy
The Role and Regulation of Interchange Fees in European Payments Cards The Role and Regulation of Interchange Fees in European Payments Cards Wilko Bolt.
1  Credit Card Industry: Overview. 2  Credit card  13 – 16 digit  Magnetic stripe storing data  11 million merchant location  860 billion worth.
26 Prepared by: Fernando Quijano and Yvonn Quijano © 2004 Prentice Hall Business PublishingPrinciples of Economics, 7/eKarl Case, Ray Fair The Labor Market,
Interchange fees and the quality of service obtained by consumers and merchants Marianne Verdier, EconomiX University Paris Ouest Nanterre 1.
Economic Efficiency and the Competitive Ideal © 2003 South-Western/Thomson Learning.
Prohibited agreements: Article 101 (3) Julija Jerneva ( )
Donna Embry NEAA January 30, 2013 Strange Bedfellows in the Payment System.
Comments on Payment Industry Dynamics  Focus on how paper differs from literature  Discuss nature of asymmetries driving interchange fees  Some other.
1 Antitrust Assessment of MIF and the tourist test Andrea Amelio * European Commission The Role and Regulation of Interchange Fees in European Payments.
1 Essential Question: Identify the two ways that producers can increase profit, List and briefly describe the 6 non-price determinants of supply, and evaluate.
© 2015 Pearson Canada Inc. Chapter 4 Slide 1 Primary Deck.
Unit 2: The Elements of a Market Economy : Understand the relationship of incentives to the law of supply : Discuss the effects of changes.
ACCT3003 Issues in Accounting Theory
Macroeconomic Goals and Instruments
Recent antitrust enforcement activity in the payment card industry – Visa/Morgan Stanley and Cartes Bancaires Peter Willis, Dundas & Wilson LLP ABA Antitrust.
McGraw-Hill/Irwin © 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. 7-1 Defining Competitiveness Chapter 7.
Compensating Employees Definition Objective Bases Types Determining Reward Job Evaluation Compensation Structure.
1 1 BA 210 Lesson III.4 ExternalitiesOverviewOverview.
Interchange Redux—A U.S. Perspective Competition Policy and Platform Industries IDEI, 30 June 2006 Tom Brown.
THE BOND MARKET Frederick University The Bond Market Bond supply Bond demand Bond market equilibrium.
C. Bordoy UWC Maastricht Demand & Supply (Tragakes, 2012, pp )
CONFERENCE COMPETITION POLICY IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS University of Toulouse June 30 Dr Valérie RABASSA* EUROPEAN COMMISSION DG COMPETITION CHIEF ECONOMIST.
Two-sided markets and competition policy Understanding interchange fees Sean Greenaway * IDEI conference, Toulouse 29 June 2006 * Case handler, DG Competition,
Monopolistic Competition Markets that have some features of competition and some features of monopoly. Many sellers Product differentiation Free entry.
Competition, bargaining power and pricing in two-sided markets Kimmo Soramäki Helsinki University of Technology / ECB Wilko Bolt De Nederlandsche Bank.
1. Introduction to Price Fixing: Legal and Economic Foundations Antitrust Law Fall 2014 Yale Law School Dale Collins MORE SLIDES FOR CLASS.
SUPPLY & DEMAND. Demand  Demand is the combination of desire, willingness and ability to buy a product. It is how much consumers are willing to purchase.
MONOPOLIES.  Single seller (pure monopoly) – industry with only one dominant company  Cartel agreement – group of producers who enter a collusive agreement.
ITU Workshop on Digital Financial Services and Financial Inclusion 14 December 2015 Geneva, Switzerland MIF – Competition and regulation in light of recent.
SESSION 6: Market Failures Talking Points 1. For markets to produce the allocatively efficient quantities of goods, the markets must be perfectly competitive.
Advanced Macroeconomics Lecture 1. Macroeconomic Goals and Instruments.
McGraw-Hill/Irwin © 2005 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. 7-1 Defining Competitiveness Chapter 7.
A very important business in the EU… 508 million People 760 million Cards 43.6 billion Transactions 2.2 trillion Euros Source: European Central Bank Press.
Salient features of facility:  Minimum amount of withdrawal Rs.100/- (thereafter in multiples of Rs.100/- ).  Maximum of Rs.1000/- per day per.
1  Credit Card Industry: Overview. 2  Credit card  13 – 16 digit  Magnetic stripe storing data  11 million merchant location  860 billion worth.
How To Choose Your First Credit Card. Do you have a credit card?
International Trade Chapter 17. Absolute and Comparative Advantage Ch 17 Sec 1.
Health Policy Issues An Economic Perspective Copyright © 2015 Foundation of the American College of Healthcare Executives. Not for sale.
Open Source Software Practices Quiz #2 October
The Payment Processing System
Natural Monopolies 2017.
Natural Monopolies 2017.
Essential Question: Changes in Supply SECTION 2
Types of Imperfectly Competitive Markets
Monopolistic Competition
Secure Electronic Transaction
Perfect Competition in the Long-run
Difficult Cases for the Market, and the Role of Government
Monopolistic Competition
The Payment Processing System
The Economics of Pollution
THE ECONOMY: THE CORE PROJECT
Neutrality and regulation One example: card payments
Supply.
Changes In Equilibrium
SUPPLY AND DEMAND TOGETHER
SUPPLY & DEMAND.
Sales Promotion Overview and the Role of Trade Promotions
Changes In Equilibrium
Changes In Equilibrium
MARKET EQUILIBRIUM.
Building Competitive Advantage Through Functional-Level Strategies
Presentation transcript:

1 ANTITRUST AND INTERCHANGE Lacey Plache LECG

2 Three Main Points 1.Default interchange fees are necessary for the functioning of the Visa and MasterCard systems. 2.The level of Visa’s interchange fees can be explained by competitive forces. 3.Contrary to antitrust concerns regarding price- fixing, the primary inefficiency claimed here is not that output has been restricted but rather that output is too high.

3  In two-sided markets, competitive pricing involves balancing demand on each side of the market.  Closed-loop payment card systems balance demand by setting cardholder and merchant prices.  Open-loop payment card systems must use interchange fees to balance demand. 1.Default interchange fees are necessary for the functioning of the Visa and MasterCard systems.

4  “Honor-all-cards” is required for all payment card systems.  Given “honor-all-cards,” a multiple issuer system must set default interchange fees.  Otherwise issuers will have the incentive to raise their individual interchange fees to acquirers/merchants, imposing an externality on the system. 1.Default interchange fees are necessary for the functioning of the Visa and MasterCard systems.

5 2.The level of Visa’s interchange fees can be explained by competitive forces.  Interchange fees are used by open-loop payment card systems to competitively balance the two sides of the market.  Balancing led to lower interchange fees in the past and, since 1998, has led to higher interchange fees.

6

7  Past declines in Visa interchange fees cannot be explained by decreasing Visa market power.  Recent increases in Visa interchange fees cannot be explained by increasing Visa market power. 2.The level of Visa’s interchange fees can be explained by competitive forces.

8

9  Past declines can be explained by Visa’s efforts to achieve “universal acceptance.”  Recent increases in interchange fees can be explained by increasing competition between Visa and MasterCard for issuers.

10 2.The level of Visa’s interchange fees can be explained by competitive forces.  Increasing payment system competition has been caused by increased cardholder loyalty to particular issuers, thereby increasing issuer ability to shift cardholders between payment systems.  Competition for issuers intensified after 1998, as MasterCard and Visa competed for dedicated issuance.

11 2.The level of Visa’s interchange fees can be explained by competitive forces.  Cardholders have received greater benefits (higher rewards and lower fees) from increased payment system competition and higher interchange fees.

12  This inefficiency is not related to market power.  This inefficiency is not specific to the use of interchange fees, or even to payment card systems. 3.Contrary to antitrust concerns regarding price- fixing, the primary inefficiency claimed here is not that output has been restricted but rather that output is too high.