Russia and Islam: State approaches, radicalisation and the ‘War on Terror’ Roland Dannreuther and Luke March (with the assistance of Katya Braginskaia) University of Edinburgh Representing Islam: Comparative Perspectives University of Manchester 5-6 September 2008 [

2 Aims of research Explore critical but often neglected dimensions: –Russian academic/elite approaches to study of Islam –How these discourses relate to, or are translated into, state practice and policy –How these state-driven practices affect policies and attitudes on the ground –Engaging with the dominant paradigm: Evidence and concerns over Islamist radicalisation within Russia - e.g. Hahn Russia’s Islamic Threat (2007), Yemelianova, Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union (2009) –Studying Russia’s Muslim communities outside North Caucasus (e.g. Moscow) –State-Muslim-Orthodox relations –Connections to and/or justifications for other developments in Russia under and since Putin Increasing repression of dissent Centralisation of power Social radicalisation (xenophobia, migrantophobia, nationalism) Stability and projection of external power

3 Case studies 3 case studies: Tatarstan Dagestan Moscow city

4 State discourses about Islam (1) Schizophrenia –Islam as ‘an inseparable, fully-fledged, and active part of the multiethnic and multi-denominational nation of Russia’ –Government consistently supports Russian Islam, and official Muslim institutions –Russia as a ‘Muslim power’ (Putin, 2003) –BUT: Islam as religion is also linked to extremism and terrorism –‘Foreign’ and ‘imported’ Islam (a ‘terrorist international’) distinguished from traditional Russian moderate Islam in ‘war on terror’ –Such distinctions often lost in popular discourse

5 State discourses about Islam (2) ‘Securitization’ of domestic policy as part of ‘war on terror’ –Russia as a ‘besieged fortress’ prone to external existential security threats –Centralising measures often justified on an anti-terrorist or anti-extremist basis –Legal definitions of ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ ambiguous –Tendency to designate all variants of non-official Islam as ‘Wahhabism’ –Attempt to ride the ‘nationalist tiger’ –Concept of ‘sovereign democracy’ to consolidate the state against key threats, above all against ‘international terrorism’ Results: –Increased state powers and prerogatives fertile ground for radicalisation (?) –Increase in Caucasophobia and Islamophobia –Reassertion of Russian Orthodox identity and potentially problematic consequences for Russian inter-confessional relationships

6 Moscow Muslims as sizeable and increasing minority (1-2 million) ‘Religious’ versus ‘ethnic’ Muslims Official inter-confessional harmony Immigration and fears of ‘ghettoisation’ (e.g. Butovo) –Assimilationism and not multiculturalism Moscow as key stage for ethnic Russian nationalism, racism Most problems arise from sins of omission not commission Greater cultural assertiveness does not equal radicalisation

7 Tatarstan The exemplar of indigenous Russian Islamic moderation and tolerance? BUT: Increasing central control Struggle for the appropriate locus and interpretation of ‘official’ moderate Russian Islam – ‘Euro-Islam’ –‘Russian Islam’ Disillusionment with ‘official’ Islam increases the attraction of more unofficial and radical Islams

8 Dagestan Battle of ideas between ‘Wahhabism’, and local Islams (often but not exclusively Sufism) Dagestan as one of Russia’s most Islamic republics ‘Wahhabist’ insurgency peaked in 1999, but low-level political violence increasing since 2005 Causes of radicalisation: –Socio-economic policies and youth unemployment –Unpopularity and corruption of elites –Radical anti-Sufi Islam as vehicle for anti-elite opposition State response –Increasing federal control over regions –Replacement of corrupt leaders –Federal funding –Militarization and campaigns against ‘Wahhabism’ Result: Success in Chechnya (?), but spread of radicalisation across North Caucasus and beyond.

9 General conclusions (1) No one Russian Federation, no one Russian umma ‘Islamic Threat’ greatly exaggerated (except in North Caucasus) Competing dynamics of Muslim alienation/radicalisation and integration/de-radicalisation Radicalisation: –Governance issues, corruption, poor economic conditions –State repression and centralisation –Fracturing of Muslim hierarchy –Intergenerational conflict –Migrantophobia

10 General conclusions (2) Deradicalisation –Improved economic situation and state largesse –Increase in Russian ‘patriotism’ –State support for moderate Islam (but controversial) –Chechenisation (even more controversial) –Key future question: what is the impact of the new Russia-West ‘cold peace?’