Masked Ballot Voting for Receipt-Free Online Elections Sam Heinith, David Humphrey, and Maggie Watkins.

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Presentation transcript:

Masked Ballot Voting for Receipt-Free Online Elections Sam Heinith, David Humphrey, and Maggie Watkins

Why Online Voting? - Quick election results - No paper ballot recounts - Less costly for the voter than mail-in elections - No long lines to vote - Faster than mailing in absentee ballots

Requirements For Secure Online Voting Universally Verifiable Receipt Free Individually Verifiable Untappable Channels Anonymous Channels

How Masked Ballot Voting for Receipt-Free Online Elections Works - Three stages to an election stage 1: Registration stage 2: Voting stage 3: Unmasking - Security ElGamal Encryption ensures a vote cannot be linked to a voter (secret ballots)

During an Election Bulletin Board Registrar/ Authority Voter Private Public

Bulletin Board Registrar/ Authority m, d V, 〚 m 〛 Store Private Key Publish Public Key Voter Stage 1: Registration Public Private m = unique mask d = security verifier 〚 m 〛 = encrypted mask V = unique voter ID

Voter Bulletin Board Registrar/ Authority 〚 vote - m 〛, p Public Stage 2: Voting 〚 vote - m 〛 = masked and encrypted vote p = proof of plaintext knowledge Private

Voter Bulletin Board Registrar/ Authority V, 〚 vote 〛 Electio n Results Unencrypted Results to be counted vote Public Stage 3: Unmasking 〚 vote 〛 = encrypted vote Read from BB Private

ElGamal Encryption - The Masked Ballot Voting scheme depends on a homomorphic encryption system because the masking and unmasking happens while the vote is still encrypted. - ElGamal is a Homomorphic encryption system. A homomorphic encryption system allows for performing operations on the cyphertext that predictably change the plaintext. Example of homomorphic property of ElGamal: 〚 vote - m 〛 = 〚 vote 〛 - 〚 m 〛 Decrypts to: vote - m

Assumptions Authority is not corrupt Authority has plenty of processing power Voters have little processing power Untappable channel during registration Voting is an atomic process

Sources Wen, Roland, and Richard Buckland. "Masked Ballot Voting for Receipt-Free Online Elections." Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol (2009): pp Schneier, Bruce. Applied Cryptography: Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C. New York: Wiley, Print. (sited over 8,000 times according to Google Scholar)

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