Summing up 4346B 15/ Carl Henrik Knutsen

From lecture 1

Some important topics Allocation of resources: states and markets Bureaucratic structures and implications for development Politics, institutions and path dependency. Implications for development Modernization theory Inequality and democratization Democracy and economic growth Democracy, dictatorship and property rights Political accountability, institutions and voting Capitalism and politics in rich countries Inequality and development Industrial policy Corruption Neo-patrimonialism

The reading list Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2001). “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation”. The American Economic Review 91: Link Link Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2002). “An African Success Story: Botswana”. London: CEPR. Discussion Paper No 3219.Link Link Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2000). “Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective”. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 115(4): Link Link Boix, Carles (2003). Democracy and Redistribution. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 and pages Boix, Carles and Susan C. Stokes (2003). “Endogenous Democratization”. World Politics 55 (4): Link Link Caporaso, James A. and David P. Levine (1992). Theories of Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 4, 6 and pages K Datta-Chaudhuri, Mrinal (1990). “Market Failure and Government Failure”. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 4 (3): Link Link Engerman, Stanley L. and Kenneth L. Sokoloff (2002). “Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development among New World Economies”. NBER Working Paper No 9259 LinkLink Evans, Peter (1995). Embedded Autonomy. States & Industrial Transformation. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 2 and pages K Fukuyama, Francis (2005). State Building – Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century. London: Profile Books. Selected parts of Chapters 1&2. Approx 100 (short) pages Hall, Peter A. and David Soskice (2001). “An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism” in Peter A. Hall and David Soskice [eds.] Varieties of Capitalism – The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 68 pages Kay, Cristobál (2001). "Asia’s and Latin America’s Development in Comparative Perspective: Landlords, Peasants and Industrialization". The Hague: ISS Working Paper No 336.Link Link Knutsen, Carl Henrik (2008a). “A short note on concepts in microeconomic theory”. LinkLink Knutsen, Carl Henrik (2008b). “Beyond OLS: A non-technical guide to econometric methods”. LinkLink Knutsen (2008c). “From James Monroe and the Quing Dynasty to George W. Bush and the Communist Party: The historical evidence on how democracy and dictatorship affect economic growth”. Oslo: Department of Political Science, University of Oslo. Working Paper. Approx 30p.

The reading list cont’d Lipset, Seymor Martin (1959). “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy”. The American Political Science Review: Link Link Médard, Jean-Francois (1996). “Patrimonialism, Neo-Patrimonialism and the Study of the Post-colonial State in Subsaharian Africa” in Henrik Secher Marcussen [ed.] Improved Natural Resource Management – the Role of Formal Organizations and Informal Networks and Institutions. Médard, Jean-Francois (2002). “Corruption in the Neo-Patrimonial States of Sub-Saharan Africa" in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, and Michael Johnston [Eds.] Political Corruption – Concepts and Contexts (3rd ed). New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. K North, Douglass C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-8 and pages Olson, Mancur (1993). “Dictatorship, Democracy and Development” The American Political Science Review 87(3): Link Link Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2004). “Constitutions and Economic Policy”. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 (1): Link Link Pierson, Paul (2000). “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics”. The American Political Science Review 94 (2): LinkLink Powell, G. Bingham and Guy D. Whitten (1993). “A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context”. American Journal of Political Science 37(2): Link Link Przeworski, Adam (2003). States and Markets – A Primer in Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Selected parts of Chapters 1-3 and 5-8. Approx 100 pages Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi (1993). “Political Regimes and Economic Growth”. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (3): Link Link Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi (1997). “Modernization: Theories and Facts”. World Politics 49 (2) Link Link Rauch, James E and Peter B. Evans (2000). “Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries”. Journal of Public Economics 75 (1): Link Link Rodrik, Dani (2004). “Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century”. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. Paper (prepared for UNIDO).Link Link Scruggs, Lyle (2001). “The Politics of Growth Revisited”. The Journal of Politics 63 (1): LinkLink Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny (1993). “Corruption”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108: Link Link Welzel, Christian, Ronald Inglehart and Hans-Dieter Klingeman (2003). “The Theory of Human Development: A cross-cultural analysis". European Journal of Political Research 42: link link

For the exam Answer all questions that are required: As concrete answers as you possibly can. The essays will incorporate several different questions. Follow the guidelines regarding time structure. You should not use less than 50% of the exam on the short questions and medium essay. Often asked to give brief explanations..follow that guideline The 25% medium essay will probably be most troublesome in terms of finishing in due time. Be sharp here and don’t beat around the bush.

Advice More is better, but don’t discuss all points at once! Make sure you give a logically coherent and stringent answer to the question. Then if you have time left, you can add on extra points, counterarguments, empirical examples etc. You can for example leave some space, and go back to the question after having finished the others Separate theoretical arguments and empirical evidence when discussing. You are free to draw diagrams, tables etc to make points, but comment with text. You are not required to reproduce mathematical models on the exam, but you are allowed to use such models if you like and if it is helpful for explaining a point (not just for showing off modeling skills..) Use relevant results from different articles on the reading list when discussing a topic, if possible. You can of course also refer to additional literature outside the curriculum, but this should compliment rather than substitute the curriculum. Sometimes, you can illustrate your points by referring to particular cases (most often countries)

A hypothetical exam 1. Short questions (25%). Answer 6 of the following 7 questions briefly: 1.1 Define the term “institutional complementarity” 1.2 What is the main finding from Evans and Rauch’s article on how Weberian bureaucratic structures affect economic growth? 1.3 Give a very brief and intuitive account of Acemoglu and Robinson’s explanation of the Kuznets’ curve. 1.4 Name and discuss very briefly two types of externalities that lead to the need for industrial policies, particularly in developing countries, according to Rodrik 1.5 What is the relationship between economic development and the relative size of the transaction cost sector in the economy, according to North? 1.6 Briefly explain the term “neo-patrimonialism”, as used by Medard 1.7 Which dictators will expropriate less property from their citizens according to Olson’s (1993) model framework?

2. Short essay (25%) Present the debate between Przeworski and Limongi (1997) and Boix and Stokes (2003) on the relationship between GDP per capita and democracy, with a particular focus on the empirical relationships estimated in the two articles.

3. Long essay (50%) Answer 1 of the 2 following questions. The more you are able to link your discussion to concrete contributions from the curriculum, the better. 3.1 What is political accountability? Focus now only on democratic regimes: Name some institutional aspects that affect the degree of political accountability. What is the expected effect from political accountability on corrupt behavior, and how do electoral rules affect corruption empirically, according to Persson and Tabellini? At last, how does political accountability affect economic voting empirically, according to Powell and Whitten? 3.2 Name and discuss three theoretical arguments related to how and why democracy should affect economic growth differently than dictatorship. Present some empirical results on the average effect from democracy on economic growth from at least one of the articles on the reading list. Discuss some methodological problems related to estimating the effect of democracy on economic growth statistically.

Finally… Thank you for some intense and productive weeks!! Good luck!!