Technical Communication Skills Practicum (TCSP) Presented by Nuhairi & Azad Team 10: “Hazard Rover” 2/21/2007.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Left to Right: Michael Kelton, Ethan Hall, Greg Wegman, Vashisht Lakhmani.
Advertisements

Autonomous Sensor and Control Platform Rover Tae Lee Josh Reitsema Scott Zhong Mike Chao Mark Winter.
Part 1: Introduction FRC Introduction  FRC 2907 since 2008  Each area of the robot has a team assigned  The Electronics team is headed this year.
Remote Surveillance Vehicle Design Review By: Bill Burgdorf Tom Fisher Eleni Binopolus-Rumayor.
R3R3 Ethan Hall Michael Kelton Greg Wegman Vashisht Lakhmani.
Team 8:Recon Robot Safety and Reliability Analysis Abhinav Valluru (presenter) Vinit bhamburdekar Arjun Bajaj Aabhas Sharma.
Team 13 John Ashmore, Brian Bell, Jason Giles, Jing Li.
TEAM BRIGHTRIDERS Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis “We put the SOUL in SOULAR racing”
Microcontroller Robot Design Spring 2003 Advisor : Prof. Hayler Engineering Team: Mark Vo Jing Hua Zhong Abbas Ziadi.
Xin Jin Zelun Tie Ranmin Chen Hang Xie. Outline  Project overview  Project-specific success criteria  Block diagram  Component selection rationale.
Reliability & Safety Jason Holmes Matt Wickesberg Matt Guenette Michael Piercy.
Defender Safety and Reliability Analysis Kirk Iler Brian Bentz Stephen Wolf Fuhe Xu.
Daryl SielaffBen McQuiston Will McKennaDavid Hartman Functional Blocks and FMECA Chart.
Team 01 : QuadSquad Safety and Reliability Andrew Boldt 11/6/2013 the ECE quadcopter senior design Purdue University1.
Wall-E Prototype I Team 1 Xin Jin
Technical Communication Skills Practicum (TCSP) Presented by Nuhairi & Azad Team 10: “Hazard Rover” 2/21/2007.
ECE 477 Group 3 The Gauntlet George Hadley Kelli Hacker Sean Ma Jacob Champion.
Team 3 Humphrey's Treasure Chest Roy Scheck Tony Leichty Charles Lan Steve Kingsley.
Team 6 DOODLE DRIVE Alexander Curtis Peachanok Lertkajornkitti | Jun Pan | Edward Kidarsa |
Pop’em Drop’em Robots TCSP #8 – Reliability & Safety Analysis Duncan Swartz.
Group 11. CriticalityFailure EffectMax Probability HighInjury to user may occur. LowLoss of some or all functions of the device. Customer dissatisfaction.
P ROJECT PRINT TCSP 8 – R ELIABILITY & S AFETY A NALYSIS Team 8 – Siddharth Bhosale.
Team 13 Michael Stuckenschneider Loren Garby Arin Chakraverty Janell Niekamp.
ECE 477 Design Review Team 10  Spring 2007 JUSTIN AZAD AFIFF NUHAIRIADAM.
VEX ARM® Cortex®- based Microcontroller. The VEX ARM® Cortex®-based Microcontroller coordinates the flow of all information and power on the robot. All.
TCSP – Reliability and Safety. Reliability Analysis Major component chosen for analysis:Major component chosen for analysis: Switching Regulators (LM2679SD-5.0,
Group 12 – H.E.A.D Gear Maximum Power Point Tracker Reliability and Safety Analysis Harsha Eric Atandra Daniel Vengapaty Aasen Burman Da Silva.
Not So Deep Blue. LED chess board Detect piece movement Magnets/Reed switches Show possible moves Track game time (picture taken from a DIY project)
Team 9 - Scribacious Rabble Safety and Reliability Analysis Mitchell Erdbruegger (presenting) Paul Rosswurm William Hess Ben Kobin.
RCD Laser System Corey Lane, Ryan Scott, Danny Barjum.
ALEX BUSCHKOETTER ALEX GLENN KIMBERLY SOONG PETRA MUSTAFA Group 4: 3MS.
FLAC Audio Player Brett Mravec with Isaac Jones Greg McCoy Danielle Miller Team 9.
Bryan McDonnel Michael Mize Ryan Taylor (presenter) Miles Whittaker
The “Drink Mixer” Reliability and SafetyAnalysis.
ECE 477 Senior Design Team 7 Reliability and Safety Ben Horst Katie Taller Matt Klass Jacob Wyant.
Technical Communications Practicum: Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis SmartShopper Jeff Richards, John Sweeney, Stevi Wood and Tera Wong.
Team 5 Reliability & Safety TCSP. High Criticality = λ < Low Criticality = λ < High Criticality determined by constant vehicular movement.
Final Year Project(EPT4046) Development of an internet controlled Surveillance Mobile Robot By Mimi Madihah Bt Mohd Idris Id: BACHELOR OF ENGINEERING.
Wall-E Prototype I TCSP #8 Safety and Reliability Analysis Team 1 Xin Jin Ranmin Chen Hang Xie Zelun Tie.
Maze Twinbots Group 28 Uyen Nguyen – EE Ly Nguyen – EE Luke Ireland - EE.
 Today we will cover:  Voltage regulators  Sensors  motordrivers iBOT1.
Home Enhancement Suite Presenter: Allen Humphreys William Bouchonnet, Daniel Sabo, Nathan Irvin.
Steve Andre Eric Glover Shaun Greene Russell Willmot.
Electronic Cornhole Team 7 Safety/Reliability Analysis Jimmy Tsao Tom Collopy Andrew Reder Ryan Scheckelhoff.
© 2008 RoboRubik1 11 Technical Communication Skills Practicum Ethical & Environmental Impact Analysis Report.
Technical Communication Skills Practicum (TCSP) Presented by Team 10: “Hazard Rover” 2/21/2007.
Fly Spy – Group 12 Reliability and Safety Analysis Heather Barrett.
DOODLE DRIVE Presenter: Edward Kidarsa Team 6 Tablet Controlled Vehicle.
Fire Fighting Robotic Vehicle. Introduction:  It is designed to develop a fire fighting robot using RF technology for remote.
DOODLE DRIVE Presenter: Peachanok Lertkajornkitti Team 6 Reliability and Safety Analysis.
Phillip Byers Jonathan Mulvaine Josh Schortgen Michael Broski TEAM BOAR.
Team 3 ATV Daniel Barrett Sebastian Hening Sandunmalee Abeyratne Anthony Myers.
P-REV Michael Connaboy Stephen Schiffli Ram Hudiara Win Than Aung.
Electrical Engineer Responsibilities
Autonomous Rescue Vehicle (Team 10)
Electrical Engineer Responsibilities
Team 16 : Project Minotaur Presenter : John Hubberts
Monitoring Robot Prepared by: Hanin Mizyed ,Abdalla Melhem
Reliability and Safety Analysis
Electrical Engineer Responsibilities
Electrical Engineer Responsibilities
Safety and Reliability
Reliability & Safety Analysis
ECE477 Senior Design Android Street Car PCB TCSP
Joe Trefilek Jeff Kubascik Paul Scheffler Matt Rockey
Safety and Reliability
Team We Ate 9 FMECA Worksheet.
Dong-Han Ryu Yukeun Sim Shiv Biddanda Po-Cheng (Robert) Wang
Reliability & Safety Analysis
Presentation transcript:

Technical Communication Skills Practicum (TCSP) Presented by Nuhairi & Azad Team 10: “Hazard Rover” 2/21/2007

HAZARD ROVER At-A-Glance: At-A-Glance: –Web-based Wi-Fi control interface –Wireless webcam streams video to website –Capabilities:  Movement  Light sensor/LED  Robotic Arm –Model, designed for use in hazardous areas

HAZARD ROVER

SCHEMATIC six different subsystems: Power Supply (P), Sensors (S), Motor Control (D), Microcontroller (M), Wi-Fi Interface (F), and Webcam (W)

OVERALL SCHMEMATIC

ARM MOTOR

POWER

CAMERA SERVO

STEERING MOTOR

STEERING SENSOR

LEVELS OF CRITICALITY –Negligible  Rover can continue to function close to normally –Potentially Hazardous  Rover may be able to function partially depending on severity of failure –Hazardous  Failure will result in the rover’s inability to complete its task –Dangerous  Failure could possibly cause the rover to become a destructive force.

FMECA Analysis: Power Supply Failure No. Failure ModePossible CausesFailure EffectsMethod of DetectionCriticality P1Battery Voltage too low Chemical defect in battery, overuse, needs recharging Possible inoperation of other components Dim LED, voltmeter, lack of functionality of some components, battery life readings on microcontroller incorrect Potentially Hazardous P2Voltage Regulator output too high Input too high, short within regulator Damage to any components supplied by regulator, overheating Regulator or other components heating up, not functioning properly Hazardous P3Voltage Regulator output too low Faulty/shorted bypass capacitor (C8), Input too low, short within regulator Possible inoperation of components supplied by regulator Dim LED, voltmeter, lack of functionality of some components Potentially Hazardous

FMECA Analysis: Sensors Failure No. Failure ModePossible CausesFailure EffectsMethod of DetectionCriticality S1Light sensor readings inaccurate Obstruction of sensor, parts of sensor faulty Inaccurate readings, improper LED function LED does not light up in the dark, or lights up in the light Negligible S2LED always onImproper readings, short in connections More power consumption, possible damage to microcontroller LED is always onNegligible S3LED always offLED burned out, short in connections Possible lack of night vision, possible damage to microcontroller LED is always offNegligible

FMECA Analysis: Motor Control Failure No. Failure ModePossible CausesFailure EffectsMethod of DetectionCriticality D1Pan/Tilt servos not moving properly Damage to motor, input signal is too fast for AND gate tolerance (U17A,B) Inablility to move camera, possible damage to AND gates Camera movement not operational, motors heating up Hazardous D2Pan/Tilt servos not moving/stuck Faulty AND gate, short in motor Inability to move camera, possible damage to AND gates Camera movement not operational, motors heating up Hazardous D3Arm/steering motors always off Faulty bypass capacitor, faulty DC Motor Driver, short in motor Damage to driver chip, motors, or microcontroller Inability to move robotic arm or steer, motors getting hot Hazardous D4Arm/steering motors always on Short in Driver chip, connections from microcontroller Damage to driver chip, motors, or microcontroller Steering always in the same direction, robotic arm stuck in one position Hazardous D5Drive motor always off Short in H-Bridge chip, connections to microcontroller Damage to driver chip, motor, or microcontroller Inability to moveHazardous D6Drive motor always on Short in H-Bridge chip, connections to microcontroller Damage to driver chip, motor, or microcontroller Inability to stop or control rover Dangerous

FMECA Analysis: Microcontroller Failure No. Failure ModePossible CausesFailure EffectsMethod of DetectionCriticality M1Output not correct Possible corruption of assembly code in memory, shorts within or near ports Incorrect operation of components connected to microcontroller Incorrect operation of various components Potentially Hazardous M2Output not present Microcontroller not receiving power, damaged microcontroller Inoperation of all components Hazardous

FMECA Analysis: Wi-Fi Interface Failure No. Failure ModePossible CausesFailure EffectsMethod of DetectionCriticality F1Data received from Wi-Fi link incorrect Possible short in connection, signal interference, faulty wireless bridge Damage to microcontroller, wireless bridge Operation of components not to user’s specification Potentially Hazardous F2No data received from Wi-Fi link Broken connection, damage to wireless bridge Microcontroller software detection should stop all rover movement All movement on rover stops Hazardous

FMECA Analysis: Webcam Failure No. Failure Mode Possible CausesFailure EffectsMethod of DetectionCriticalityRemarks W1Webcam video data corrupted Possible short in connection, signal interference, faulty wireless webcam link, weak signal Possible damage to webcam/receiver Video data not present or distorted/corrupted Potentially Hazardous W2Webcam video data not present Broken connection, damage to webcam/receiver No video feed to user, possible damage to webcam/receiver No video feed to userHazardousIn this case, the user should stop moving all motors to prevent any further dangerous situations