SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal1 Contingency Software in Autonomous Systems Robyn Lutz, JPL/Caltech & ISU Doron Tal, USRA at NASA Ames Ann Patterson-Hine,

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SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal1 Contingency Software in Autonomous Systems Robyn Lutz, JPL/Caltech & ISU Doron Tal, USRA at NASA Ames Ann Patterson-Hine, NASA Ames This research was carried out at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, and at NASA Ames Research Center, under a contract with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The work was sponsored by the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance under the Software Assurance Research Program led by the NASA Software IV&V Facility. This activity is managed locally at JPL through the Assurance and Technology Program Office NASA OSMA Software Assurance Symposium August 9-11, 2005

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal2 CONTINGENCY SOFTWARE in AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS Problem PROBLEM STATEMENT Autonomous vehicles currently have a limited capacity to diagnose and mitigate failures. We need to be able to handle a broader range of contingencies (anomalous situations). GOALS 1.Speed up diagnosis and mitigation of anomalous situations. 2.Automatically handle contingencies, not just failures. 3.Enable projects to select a degree of autonomy consistent with their needs and to incrementally introduce more autonomy. 4.Augment on-board fault protection with verified contingency scripts

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal3 CONTINGENCY SOFTWARE in AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS Availability of Data: High Autonomous Rotorcraft Project: gov/AR/tasks/ARP.html

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal4 Right Grayscale Camera Left Grayscale Camera Color Camera Vision Computer Flight Computer Camera Manager Stereo Vision Stereo Conversion to World Frame Stereo Point Cloud In World Frame Tilt Control SICK Laser Image Rectification R image L image Pan/Tilt Camera Pose MIDG GPS 3-axis accelerometer 3-axis gyro Laser Conversion to World Frame Laser Point Cloud In World Frame IMU: 6 DOF Tilt 6 DOF CONTINGENCY SOFTWARE in AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS Overview of Perception Subsystem Perception is a critical function in systems requiring obstacle avoidance, threat detection, science missions and “opportunistic” discovery.

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal5 CLAW Flight Control Laws DOMS Distributed Messaging System GPS APEX Reactive Planner Telemetry CONTINGENCY SOFTWARE in AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS Partial Onboard Architecture *domsD – DOMS transport daemon * Yamaha System

CONTINGENCY SOFTWARE in AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS Perception Instrumentation Onboard Rotorcraft Gray scale wing tip (stereo vision) Color Camera Firewire Hub Onboard Flight Computer Left Wing Right Wing Scanning Laser Range Finder (SICK) RS232 Firewire

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal7 Cases in which the cameras are a critical system: 1.Cameras assigned responsibility during nominal ops No line of sight -> Camera provides position info 2.Cameras are backup when other subsystems fail Failed/degraded GPS -> Camera provides position info Failed/degraded ARP -> Camera provides landing-site data 3.Images as mission objective (surveillance) Failure of cameras can jeopardize success CONTINGENCY SOFTWARE in AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS Camera Criticality

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal8 ARP Functional Requirements: Current Planned Contingency Analysis: SFMECA SFTA Contingency Planning: Available indicators Contingency triggers Contingency responses 2-Level (recover/predict) CONTINGENCY SOFTWARE in AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS Contingency Process Overview 1. Brainstorm with UAV team to uncover candidates for software contingencies Review UAV literature and project reports Lead brainstorming sessions with domain experts Work with team to identify and prioritize high-concern candidates Select top priority candidates 2. Model unit of interest (i.e. cameras, communications systems…) Model system including: Architecture & State diagram Verify models with UAV team 3. Contingency requirements verification Perform SFMECA and SFTA in context of Obstacle Analysis [RE’05] 4. Analyze testability Identify how each contingency can be detected Perform SFTA Experiment with assignment of measure of uncertainty 5. Develop recovery strategy Determine candidate strategies for contingency responses (prevent/respond/safe) Determine availability of data needed to determine/execute appropriate contingency 6. Prototype contingency in progressively higher fidelity testbeds 7. Monitor contingency performance

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal9 CONTINGENCY SOFTWARE in AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS Contingency Analysis Used Bi-Directional Safety Analysis to find contingencies Forward analysis from potential failures to their effects (Software Failure Modes, Effects & Criticality Analysis) Backward analysis from failures to contributing causes (Software Fault Tree Analysis) Guides to thinking about possible ways to handle contingencies: Use “Mitigation” column in SFMECA Remove leaf nodes from SFTA graphs Use obstacle resolution patterns [van Lamsweerde & Letier, 2000] TEAMS produces a diagnostic tree of checks needed to detect & isolate contingencies, identifies missing checks and recovery action “Testability Engineering and Maintenance System” Modeling & analysis toolset Won NASA Space Act Award Used successfully on 2 nd generation RLV IVHM risk reduction program

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal10 Properties for each function, switch & test-point are entered into the TEAMS tools TEAMS builds a Dependency Matrix in which each row is a fault source (e.g., a camera that can fail) and each column is a test (e.g., whether we have a good Stereo image). Here, we select the normal or contingency scenario (camera OK or not) for the analysis. CONTINGENCY SOFTWARE in AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS Results

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal11 Executing the Contingency scenario, we check that the behavior is correct: left COLOR camera is available (no red slash) & being used; confirm that tests can isolate failure to which camera. Most useful: the automatic Diagnostic Tree: --Shows best sequence of checks to detect & isolate --Shows indistinguishable failures (“ambiguity groups”) --XML output option is being translated into rotorcraft’s planning language (APEX) to simulate contingencies on the vehicle - - <![CDATA[ CONTINGENCY SOFTWARE in AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS Results

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal12 CONTINGENCY SOFTWARE in AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS Importance / Benefits 1.Contingency management is essential to the robust operation of complex systems such as spacecraft and Unpiloted Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 2.Automatic contingency handling allows a faster response to unsafe scenarios, with reduced human intervention 3.Results, applied to the Autonomous Rotorcraft Project and Mars Science Lab, pave the way to more resilient, adaptive autonomous systems

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal13 Improved contingency handling needed to safely relinquish control of unpiloted vehicles to autonomous controllers More autonomous contingency handling needed to support extended mission operations Potential applications: Safety-critical UAVs and Mission-critical spacecraft and rovers Relevance to NASA CONTINGENCY SOFTWARE in AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal14 Next Steps CONTINGENCY SOFTWARE in AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS  Autonomous Rotorcraft Project: Continue working with team to expand and evaluate contingencies for imaging and ranging systems Technology Readiness Level: FY05: 3 (“Experimental demonstration of critical function &/or proof of concept”) FY06: 4 (“Validation in a lab environment”) on rotorcraft  Mars Science Lab: Update and enhance model for spacecraft pointing contingencies with domain expertise from software development team  Infusion across NASA: Document process for technology transfer to other projects

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal15 Backup Slides

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal16 TEAMS uses a hierarchical model of the system: *Boxes are key requirements (stereo processing, etc.) *Squares are switches: using left grayscale camera (nominal) or using left color camera (contingency) *Circles are test-points: #1: check whether has good (unfailed) stereo image #2: check whether good range data CONTINGENCY SOFTWARE in AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal17 CONTINGENCY SOFTWARE in AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal18 Critical Pointing for Spacecraft Autonomous, contingency response for critical scenarios: Commandability lost Before trajectory-correction maneuvers Before Entry/Descent/Landing

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal19 What do we know when a “quit-failed” signal occurs?

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal20 What is a contingency? Contingencies are obstacles to the fulfillment of a system’s high- level requirements that can arise during real-time operations –Failures: camera fails due to hardware or software problem –Operational situations of concern: lens cap left on means that all images are black, so can’t land unassisted –Environmental situations of concern: strong crosswind interferes with imaging, thus with finding landing site Contingency-handling involves requirements for detecting, identifying and responding to contingencies. Contingency handling includes, but extends, traditional fault protection

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal21 Autonomy Something previously not done automatically is now done by the software –Previously done manually, or –Previously could not be done Example of incremental autonomy: –Collision avoidance (not hitting buildings) 1.Remote control by pilot steering from ground 2.Path calculated on ground, loaded into system, path-plan executed in flight 3.Path calculated in flight based on real-time imaging Autonomy allows system to detect and respond to a broad class of anomalies in many more ways

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal22 Safety-critical Safety-critical: –Requires collision-avoidance –Requires autonomous take-off & landing in populated areas –Use for critical missions: finding lost hikers, downed pilots; detecting highway accidents; imaging (early warning) forest fires

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal23 Obstacle Analysis Approach KAOS framework for goal-oriented obstacle analysis –Goal is a set of desired behaviors –Obstacle is a set of undesirable behaviors that impede a goal Relevance to application: –Contingencies are Obstacles to achieving goals, or Indications that goals are unrealizable with available agents Advantages –Structured approach early-on (anticipatory planning) –Supports more formal analysis, as needed

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal24 Obstacle Analysis Approach Step 1. Identify the goals Step 2. Identify the agents Step 3. Identify the obstacles Step 4. Identify alternative resolutions to the obstacles Step 5. Select a resolution among the alternatives.

SAS_05_Contingency_Lutz_Tal25 Other Related Work Requirements evolution –Use goal & obstacle analysis to refine requirements in a developing system [Anton & Potts] Maintenance –Focus on management of requirements changes [Bennett & Rajlich] –Evaluate in terms of traceability or change-impact [Cleland- Huang] Dynamic monitoring –Monitor operational systems for mismatch assumptions/environment & perform remedial evolutions [Fickas and Feather] Autonomous fault handling with AI planners Safety in autonomous systems Vehicle health management