Survey On Anti-Competitive Practices in Mauritius I Main Objectives of the Survey The survey has been conducted with the following main objectives: 1)to.

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Presentation transcript:

Survey On Anti-Competitive Practices in Mauritius I Main Objectives of the Survey The survey has been conducted with the following main objectives: 1)to analyze the extent o f anti-competitive practices prevalent in the country; 2 )to determine the most common types of anti competitive practices; 3)to gauge the level of awareness regarding existing laws regulations and institutions to combat such practices and protect consumers;

4)to analyze the present inadequacies and assess the need for an independent Competition Authority

II Methodology Based on the questionnaires from CUTS, two sets of questionnaires were prepared; one in creole addressed to consumers and the other in English address to firms in the private sector and government institutions including parastatal bodies. Firms in the private sector and the government institutions were chosen so as to have a balance spread of entities in the following sectors: Agriculture, Manufacturing, Energy. It must also be pointed that the questionnaire from CUTS was modified to take into account the realities of the local context.

III Sample A purposive sampling method was adopted given the time constraint for conducting the survey. The questionnaires were addressed to 200 consumers, to 50 firms in the private sector and to 50 government institutions. The sample sizes for the private and government sectors are as suggested by CUTS. The response rates were as follows: 175 consumers, 39 firms in the private sector 43 government institutions.

Survey on Anti-Competitive Practices in Mauritius IV Analysis Of Survey Results Overall, around 92 per cent of the respondents considered that anti-competitive practices are quite prevalent in the Mauritian markets. At the dis-aggregated level, the results are quite similar with 92 percent of consumers, around 93 per cent of firms and 90 per cent of government institutions which participated in the survey agree that such practices are widespread in Mauritian markets. 94 percent of the respondents do agree that consumers are adversely affected by such practices.

Types of Anti-Competitive Practices The participants were also given 11 categories of anti-competitive practices, namely: 1.)collective price fixing, 2.)market sharing, 3.)bid rigging, 4.)tied selling, 5.)exclusive dealing, 6.)concerted refusal to deal,

Types Of Anti-Competitive Practices 7.)resale price maintenance, 8.)price discrimination, 9.)entry barrier, 10.)predatory pricing and 11.)any other. They were required to list the most three important ones by order of importance.

Survey Results 31.6 percent of the total sample considered price fixing as the number one most prevalent anti- competitive practice in Mauritian markets. When the results are disaggregated by category, this view is shared by consumers, the private sector and the government, ranging from 30 to 34 percent as can be observed from the chart below.

% Considering Price Fixing as the Main Cause

Survey Results The second most prevalent anti-competitive practice is market sharing according to the respondents (17 percent). From the disaggregated results, the same response is observed for consumers (17.5 %) and the government sector (20.9 %). But according to the private sector, it is exclusive dealing (21.1 %).

% Considering Mkt Sharing as 2 nd Most Prevalent

Entry barrier is seen as the third most prevalent anti-competitive practice for the whole sample (18.5 %). The same response is given by firms and the government, 24.3 and 20.9 % respectively. However, according to consumers, it is resale price maintenance (19 %).

Overall, the survey results tend to confirm collective price fixing, market sharing and entry barriers as the most common factors affecting competition in the Mauritian markets. This is not surprising given that many markets in Mauritius exhibit oligopolistic characteristics where entry barriers are high and with some form of collective price fixing through price leadership. However, from the survey we see that bid rigging, resale price maintenance and price discrimination are also important factors affecting competition.

Main Types Of Anti-Competitive Practices in Mauritian Markets

At the local level the overall results show that collective price fixing (36.8 %) is the most prevalent anti-competitive practice. The same is observed for all three categories, ranging from 25 % to 39.7 %. The second most prevalent is resale price maintenance (20.7 %). This response is shared by consumers as well (24.7%). However, for the government and private sector, it is market sharing, 19 to 22.2 %. The third most widespread practice is price discrimination for the whole sample (15.5 %). This view is also shared by most consumers (21.9 %).

However, for the private sector and the government, it is entry barrier (20 %) and resale price maintenance ( 20 %) respectively. The response by consumers that price discrimination is prevalent in different parts of the country is not surprising, given that there is significant market segmentation particularly in the retail sector.

At the national level, bid rigging is observed as the most prevalent anti-competitive practice (23 %). From the disaggregated results, the same response is given by consumers (25.3 %). However, for firms and the government sector, it is collective price fixing, 30.6 and 22 per cent respectively. The overall result here might have been influenced by the number of consumers participating in the sample. Taking this into account, the results confirmed the earlier results obtained that collective price fixing is most prevalent.

The second most important anti-competitive practice at the national level is market sharing (19.6 %). The same result is confirmed by all three categories. The third most important practice is entry barrier (14.8 %). The same response is given by the private sector and the government, 22.9 to 16.7 %. For consumers they consider exclusive dealing as the third most prevalent, 17.1%.

Overall, we see that the survey confirms that in the Mauritian markets at both the local level and at the national level, the three most anti-competitive practices are collective price fixing, market sharing and entry barrier and to a marginally lesser extent bid rigging and price discrimination. We see that the results at the local and national level support the findings regarding anti- competitive practices in the Mauritian markets.

Sectors The first most important sector where such practices are prevalent is the consumer goods sector (35.2 %). This view is also shared by the consumers and the private sector, 38.7 and 42.9 % respectively. But according to the government sector it is the services sector which is most affected. The second most important sector is manufacturing (22.4 %).

This is confirmed by consumers and the government sector, 25.3 and 21.9 %. For the private sector, it is the construction industry, 28%. This is expected as views have been expressed that there is considerable bid rigging in this sector. The third sector where such practices are prevalent is the agricultural sector. This response is shared by consumers but not by the private sector and the government.

Around 63 per cent of the respondents agree that some of such practices originate outside the country. At the dis-aggregated, it is not surprising the the private sector and the government seem to apportion most of these practices to multinational corporations than to locally based firms with around 67 and 86 per cent respectively. On the other hand, consumers allocate the practices as 56 percent overseas and around 44 percent home-based. So for consumers, many of these practices originate from the local business environment.

Surprisingly, only about 54 percent are aware that there are laws and regulations to check such practices. This result might be influenced by the consumers’ group, where 52 percent said they are aware of such laws and regulations. For the private sector and government 74 and 61 percent are aware of such laws and regulations.

As far as actions taken when such laws are violated, around 67 percent of the total sample point out that actions to sanction such practices are taken sometimes only. The dis-aggregated results for the three groups confirm the same trend.

From the survey, it seems that consumers are aware of the most important legislations which exist to check such practices, namely the Consumer Protection Act (44.4 %), the Fair Trading Act (37.8 %) and the Hire Purchase Act (11.1%). Thus there could be practical difficulties for them to seek remedies as awareness of the legislation does not seem to be an issue. The present framework for consumers and other stakeholders to address their complaints/grievances most probably must be revisited.

Most consumers believe that it is the Ministry of Commerce which should provide redress (33 %). But many also are aware of ICP (27.6 %), ACIM (25.2 %) and the Consumer Protection Unit (11 %).