Wed. Mar. 19

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Contract in CT, performance in Mass Mass court would use law of place of contracting CT court would use law of place of performance

- CA court is entertaining an action brought by a NY guest against an Ontario host concerning an accident in Ontario. - NY court would apply Ontario law - does that mean that a CA ct cannot apply NY law?

complex litigation

In re Air Crash Disaster near Chicago (7 th Cir. 1981)

Filed in: CA, NY, Mich, Hawaii, PR P’s domiciles: CA, CT, Hawaii, Ill, Ind, Mass, Mich, NJ, NY, VT, PR, Japan, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia D’s domicile: McDD: MO, American (NY or TX) Place of harm: Ill. Place of wrongdoing: McDD (CA – designing), American (OK – servicing) Punitives: Yes - MO, TX, OK No – Ill, CA, NY

Illinois – 2 nd Restatement

§ 145. The General Principle (1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.

(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.

Nor do the domiciliary states have an interest in imposing punitive damages on the defendants. The legitimate interests of these states, after all, are limited to assuring that the plaintiffs are adequately compensated for their injuries and that the proceeds of any award are distributed to the appropriate beneficiaries. Those interests are fully served by applying the law of the plaintiffs' domiciles as to issues involving the measure of compensatory damages (insofar as that law would enhance the plaintiffs' recovery) and the distribution of any award. Once the plaintiffs are made whole by recovery of the full measure of compensatory damages to which they are entitled under the law of their domiciles, the interests of those states are satisfied.

Finally, application of Illinois law comports with the general criteria of the Restatement (Second) which emphasize certainty, predictability, uniformity of result, and ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. In this case, it is important to resolve the conflict between states by a principled means. Determining that all other factors being equal, the law of the place of injury shall be used, provides a principled means of decision which also creates certainty. Future defendants cannot predict, of course, where airplane disasters will occur. But air transportation companies will now be on notice that, under the "most significant relationship" test, when there is a true conflict between laws of states having equal interests in the issue of punitive damages, and when the place of injury has a strong interest in air safety and in protection of air transportation corporations, the law of the place of injury will apply.

California - comparative impairment

NY Neumeier rules

Michigan interest analysis with a strong lex fori approach

In re Agent Orange (EDNY 1984)

Kramer: “If choice of law is substantive (in the sense that it defines the parties' rights), then courts should not alter choice-of-law rules for complex cases. The reasoning is straightforward. We start with claims that everyone concedes would otherwise be adjudicated under different laws. We combine these claims, whether through transfer and consolidation or by certifying a class, on the ground that we can adjudicate the parties' rights more effectively and efficiently in one big proceeding. So far, so good. Then, having constructed this proceeding, we are told we must change the parties' rights to facilitate the consolidated adjudication. And that makes no sense. If the reason for consolidating is to make adjudication of the parties' rights more efficient and effective, then the fact of consolidation itself cannot justify changing those rights. To let it do so is truly to let the tail wag the dog.”

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