12: Choosing Mitigation Policies "It is our choices that show what we truly are, far more than our abilities.” J. K. Rowling, Harry Potter and The Chamber.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
The Design of the Tax System
Advertisements

Public Goods and Tax Policy
Local Government Services and revenue.
Correcting Market Distortions: Shadow Prices, Shadow Wages and Discount Rates Chapter 6.
Fall 2008 Version Professor Dan C. Jones FINA 4355 Class Problem.
7: How Much is Enough? NPR March 11, 2014 Lecture 72.
Chapter 4 Return and Risks.
The Federal Government Taxes, Spending, and National Debt.
Copyright © 2011 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 6 The Theory of Tariffs and Quotas.
Heterogeneity One limitation of the static LS model lies in the heterogeneity assumption. In reality, individuals differ in preference and in information.
$100M retrofit of Memphis VA hospital, removing nine floors, bringing it to California standard Such measures would cost $billions over 100s of years Is.
Interactions of Tax and Nontax Costs n Uncertainty u Symmetric uncertainty u Strategic uncertainty (information asymmetry) F Hidden action (moral hazard)
Climate Change 1. What is climate change? IPCC: A change in the state of the climate that can be identified by changes in the mean and/or the variability.
$100M seismic retrofit of Memphis hospital, removing nine floors, bringing it to California standard Does this make sense? How can we help society decide?
More Insurance How much insurance We started talking about insurance. Question now is “how much?” Recall that John’s expected utility involves his wealth.
$100M seismic retrofit of Memphis VA hospital, removing nine floors, bringing it to California standard Does this make sense? How can we help society decide?
The Economic Theory of Pollution Control
15 Monopoly.
2.04 Acquire knowledge of the impact of government on business activities to make informed economic decisions.
1 The Disaster Insurance Project Wharton Center for Risk Management and Decision Processes University of Pennsylvania Insurance Information Institute and.
1 Consumer Choice and Demand Chapter 6 © 2006 Thomson/South-Western.
© 2008 Pearson Addison Wesley. All rights reserved Chapter Five Consumer Welfare and Policy Analysis.
CHAPTER 5 SUPPLY.
Healthcare. Healthcare  America has the “best healthcare system” on earth. But on measures such as life expectancy, infant mortality, and especially.
Chapter 33: Taxes: Equity versus Efficiency Copyright © 2013 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin 13e.
What is the proposed ballot issue? Referred measure 3B: Increased funding for education in School District 51 only Shall taxes on peoples’ property (house,
Public Finance (MPA405) Dr. Khurrum S. Mughal. Lecture 13: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Government Investments Public Finance.
Chapter 7 The Government Sector. Introduction: The Growing Economic Role of Government Most of the growth over the past seven decades was due to the Depression.
Entrepreneurship II 1.05 Describe the Nature of Taxes
Chapter 14 Government Revenue & Spending
Chapter 12 Savings.
C h a p t e r f o u r © 2007 Prentice Hall Business Publishing; Essentials of Economics, R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick O’Brien Prepared by: Fernando.
How do local governments get their money and what is it used for?
PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS: The Role of Government in the American Economy Randall Holcombe 15 CHAPTER Taxes On Business Income and Wealth.
Chapter 5: Market Failure: A Role for Government
1 The Players and the Goals In this experiment, each team controls a firm that sells to a group of consumers. Firms select what price.
Describe the nature of taxes. What are taxes Legally mandated payment to the government that is not made in exchange for a good or service Examples: income.
Fixed cost, Financing and Limited Liability. Financing and Uncertainty The necessity of fixed cost often raises the question of financing. Sometimes financing.
$100M retrofit of Memphis VA hospital, removing nine floors, bringing it to California standard Such measures would cost $billions over 100s of years Is.
Economic efficiency Who gains and who loses when prices change? 1.
Warm-up 5/10/12  Yesterday we talked about welfare programs to help people in need. How does the government pay for these programs?  What limits how.
SUPER NOTES CHs LOOK for the $-MONEY QUESTIONS.
Pearson Education, Inc., Longman © 2008 The Congress, the President, and the Budget: The Politics of Taxing and Spending Chapter 14 Government in America:
PowerPoint Slides prepared by: Andreea CHIRITESCU Eastern Illinois University Monopoly 1 © 2012 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied,
International Institute for Geo-Information Science and Earth Observation (ITC) Cost-benefit analysis exercise RiskCity Cees van Westen
1 Consumer Choice and Demand CHAPTER 6 © 2003 South-Western/Thomson Learning.
Chapter 8 Principles of Taxation 1: Efficiency and Equity Issues Chapter outline 1.Efficiency Issues in Tax Design 2.Equity Issues in Tax Design.
Copyright © 2008 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 18 Taxation and Public Expenditure.
Chapter Nine Applying the Competitive Model. © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. 9-2 Topics  Consumer Welfare.  Producer Welfare. 
© 2010 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license.
Government Influences on Markets CHAPTER 7 C H A P T E R C H E C K L I S T When you have completed your study of this chapter, you will be able to 1Explain.
Encouraging Growth Cause: increased government spending raises output and creates jobs Cause: Tax cuts allow individuals to have more money to spend and.
Chapter 22: The Competitive Firm Copyright © 2013 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin 13e.
Modeling the Market Process: A Review of the Basics Chapter 2 © 2007 Thomson Learning/South-WesternCallan and Thomas, Environmental Economics and Management,
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2004 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 2 Objective and Risk Management.
Chapter Monopoly 15. In economic terms, why are monopolies bad? Explain. 2.
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 13 Economics of Pollution Control: An Overview.
Health Care in Australia Medicare and Private Health Insurance.
Fiscal Policy and Taxes Test Review Ch. 14 and 15.
WHAT ROLE DOES THE GOVERNMENT PLAY???. WHAT DOES THE GOVERNMENT PROVIDE FOR IN A MARKET ECONOMY? The government provides goods and services such as military.
2.04 Acquire knowledge of the impact of government on business activities to make informed economic decisions MM 2.00 Understand Financial Analysis.
Economic Analysis in the Public Sector Benefit/Cost Analysis.
An Intro to the Economics of Climate Policy
Why aren't earthquake hazard maps better. Seth Stein1, M
Economics of Pollution Control: An Overview
Monetary Policy and The Money Supply
13. Discounting Reading: BGVW, Chapter 10.
A Family Affair: Jerome Stein (Father, Econ) and Seth Stein (Son, Geo)
Economics of Pollution Control: An Overview
Catastrophes Insurable vs. Non-Insurable Catastrophes
Presentation transcript:

12: Choosing Mitigation Policies "It is our choices that show what we truly are, far more than our abilities.” J. K. Rowling, Harry Potter and The Chamber of Secrets, 1999

Retrofitting California Hospitals Law assumed retrofits would be cheap Retrofit cost close to that of new buildings At least $24 B needed No funding provided After 40+ years, slow progress Deadlines already extended Won’t be done before at least 2030 Following hospital collapses in 1971 San Fernando earthquake that caused ~50 deaths, California required seismic retrofits CQ: How many lives might this safe? Do you think this this a wise use of resources? If so, how should it be funded? Lecture 123

COST-BENEFIT ISSUES IN HAZARD MITIGATION “There's no free lunch” Resources used for one goal aren’t available for another This is easy to see in the public sector, where there are direct tradeoffs. Funds spent strengthening schools aren’t available to hire teachers, upgrading hospitals may mean covering fewer uninsured (~$1 K/yr), stronger bridges may result in hiring fewer police and fire fighters (~$50 K/yr), etc...

COST-BENEFIT ISSUES IN HAZARD MITIGATION “There's no such thing as other people's money” Costs are ultimately borne by society as a whole Imposing costs on the private sector affects everyone via reduced economic activity (firms don't build or build elsewhere), job loss (or reduced growth), and the resulting reduction in tax revenue and thus social services.

How much mitigation is enough? Societally optimal level minimizes total cost = sum of mitigation cost + expected loss Expected loss = ∑ (loss in i th expected event x assumed probability of that event) Compared to optimum Less mitigation decreases construction costs but increases expected loss and thus total cost More mitigation gives less expected loss but higher total cost Stein & Stein, 2012 For earthquake, mitigation level is construction code Loss depends on earthquake & mitigation level Optimum

Including risk aversion & uncertainty Consider marginal costs C’(n) & benefits Q’(n) (derivatives) Stein & Stein, 2012 More mitigation costs more But reduces loss Optimum is where marginal curves are equal, n* Uncertainty in hazard model causes uncertainty in expected loss. We are risk averse, so add risk term R(n) proportional to uncertainty in loss, yielding higher mitigation level n** Crucial to understand hazard model uncertainty cost Benefit (loss reduction )

Even without uncertainty, mitigation rarely will be optimal for societal reasons,but can still do some good Net benefit when mitigation lowers total cost below that of no mitigation Net loss when mitigation raises total cost above that of no mitigation

Within range, inaccurate hazard estimates produce nonoptimal mitigation, raising cost, but still do some good (net benefit) Inaccurate loss estimates have same effect Stein & Stein, 2013

NY Times

PROBLEM: UNFUNDED MANDATE Property owners don ’ t benefit (can ’ t charge higher rent) & so resist Maybe society should fund: Would public pay higher taxes for safety?

CQ: If you were a student in Los Angeles, how much more would you pay in rent each month to live in an earthquake-safe building?

Lecture 1213

NYT 10/31/2012

CQ: Given the damage to New York City by the storm surge from Hurricane Sandy, possible options range from continuing to do little, through intermediate strategies like providing doors to keep water out of vulnerable tunnels, to building barriers to keep the surge out of rivers. Progressively more extensive mitigation measures cost more, but are expected to produce increasing reduction of losses in future hurricanes. How would you develop a strategy to choose between the various proposed options? How would you include the anticipated but uncertain effects of global warming? Lecture 1215

“The direct costs of federal environmental, health, and safety regulations are probably on the order of $200 billion annually, or about the size of all federal domestic, nondefense discretionary spending. The benefits of those regulations are even less certain. Evidence suggests that some recent regulations would pass a benefit-cost test while others would not.”

PAN 12.1: a) The optimal mitigation level, n*, minimizes the total cost, the sum of expected loss and mitigation cost. b) n* occurs when the reduced loss -Q’(n) equals the incremental mitigation cost C’(n). Including the effect of uncertainty and risk aversion, the optimal mitigation level n** increases until the incremental cost equals the sum of the reduced loss and incremental decline in the risk term R’(n).

Lecture 1219 PAN 12.2: Illustration of the effects of overmitigation and undermitigation

PAN 12.3: a) Comparison of total cost curves for two estimated hazard levels. For each, the optimal mitigation level, n*, minimizes the total cost, the sum of expected loss and mitigation cost. b) In terms of derivatives, n* occurs when the reduced loss -Q’(n) equals the incremental mitigation cost C’(n). If the hazard is assumed to be described by one curve but actually described by the other, the assumed optimal mitigation level causes nonoptimal mitigation, and thus excess expected loss or excess mitigation cost. (Stein and Stein, 2013b)