“Justice Lost! The Failure of International Human Rights Law to Matter Where Needed Most” (Hafner-Burton, Emilie Marie, and Kiyo Tsutsui. 2007 ) Radhika Ganesh Prabhu February 24, 2009 International Organizations Professor James Vreeland

A Lesson in Commitment? Source: http://www.cartoonstock.com/newscartoons/cartoonists/mba/lowres/mban935l.jpg

Is seeing believing?

WHAT YOU SEE IS NOT ALWAYS WHAT YOU GET! REPRESSOR STATES: WHAT YOU SEE IS NOT ALWAYS WHAT YOU GET! Nearly half of the world’s governments today are repressive, systematically abusing human beings living within their borders. Since 1995, the international community has seen the creation of a wide spectrum of treaties and laws to help exact justice and prevent the abrogation of human rights. Do the worst of these states change their ways after signing onto human rights law. Is it business as usual? Source: http://www.miketodd.ca/web/archives/000816.html

Key Findings of Authors Governments, including repressive ones, frequently make legal commitments to human rights treaties Commitments mostly have no effects on the world’s most terrible repressors even long into the future Change does not happen on the margins Realistic institutional reforms will probably not help solve this problem. (Hafner-Burton, Emilie Marie, and Kiyo Tsutsui. 2007 ) Emilie Hafner-Burton – Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Princeton KiyoteruTsutsui – State University of New York, Stony Brook

Policy Implications: Why should we care? Is the bare minimum the litmus test we are going for? Are we teaching governments they can get their cake and eat it too? Why are so many Northern governments, concerned with ratification? Hafner-Burton, Emilie Marie, and Kiyo Tsutsui. 2007

Treaties they consider: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) Regarded as the most successful, Outlaw most severe violations, Most studied - Articulates the do’s and dont’s regarding what is appropriate, Governments can choose to recognize or reject the jurisdiction of both committees and to implement or ignore their recommendations

Two Models of the Paper MODEL 1: Do repressors sign on as frequently as those that are “reasonably protective”? MODEL 2: After a year, do the treaties make a difference for those that ratified them? (Hafner-Burton, Emilie Marie, and Kiyo Tsutsui. 2007) Are democracies as equally as likely to sign onto conventoins as repressors? Does it make a difference? Here interesting point is that addressing a flaw in studies of treaty behavior that fail to take into consideration the dynamics of compliance. The authors make an interesting point that findings are often divorced from research and that if based on research fail to take into account the dynamics of compliance – i.e. if you commit and are repressive it will take time for you to reform and it will not always be a linear progression.

Findings “Repressors” commit to treaties as do “protectors” Repressors certainly aren’t afraid to ratify. Commitment, but no follow through. “Democratic” repressors - is that an oxymoron? YES! What will happen in a decade and a half? If you are a repressor state, pretty much nothing. What happens when you make a deeper commitment to human rights treaty law, (ratifying the CCPR Optional Protocol)? CCPR Optional Protocol supposedly deepens a state’s commitment to enforce a human rights treaty. Simply signing the treaty does not really infer you will be punished. Rather Committee sees government’s own reports regarding human rights violations and then makes recommendations. However witrh the signing of the Protocol, monitoring capaicty is enhanced – Protocol delegates greater external competences for oversight and intervention and, therefore, places more substantial constraints on governments’ authority to violate the norms to which they commit. Places a belief of “competence in the committee” Individuals can go to the Committees if believe the state is in violation of the treaty. More grounds for intervention. Hafner-Burton, Emilie Marie, and Kiyo Tsutsui. 2007)

Strengths Provides a comprehensive overview of literature that supports the pros and the cons of the HR regime. Addresses real world applicability Provides robust statistical evidence

Weaknesses CAT and CCPR are not the only treaties… “Don’t get married” advice Reform is not the only end goal of the treaties No counterfactual Indirect effects (Bashir and the ICC) Do not define protectors as strictly as do repressors Points to logical weaknesses of certain studies, including prior ones of her own, when she talks about weaknesses of further studies yet she does the same thign in this study – ie one in a year.

Realism vs. Constructivism “Constructivism fails” Treaties do not reform the countries Socialization is how people claim reform takes place only there is no evidence to show socialization works! Repression pays so leaders continue doing it! Why does the North push for the “legal regime”? Norms or Power? This is an open ended question that the authors do not answer (perhaps to entice us to read their next article!)  First, we share the view that governments are strategic actors that make commitments to human rights treaties for deliberate and self interested reasons. It is our belief that repressive states commonly belong to the human rights regime because they gain certain political advantages from membership but all the while can get away with murder., Second, we are skeptical that repressive states,once they join the treaty regime, will come to internalize the legal norms to which they subscribe over time, through active processes of socialization or learning. Socialization and learning require changing actors’ preferences for repression, and these preferences are likely to be highly valued by repressive states, whose leaders accumulate power andwealth through terror. Moreover, socialization and learning require repeated access to target repressors and many of these actors are likely to be marginalized from participation in human rights institutions, remaining isolated from active processes of norm inculcation. However, we emphasize that repressive states are characterized by leaders that employ or condone repression purposively and strategically; acts of terror are accordingly seldom accidental or random, and they often bring high rewards for those that use them. Reforms are usually deliberate and costly, often requiring leaders in power to give up certain authorities and privileges they have become accustomed to enjoying. Improvements in protection of human rights do not, as a result, happen tacitly or through simple processesof mimicry without some convincingmotivation. Hafner-Burton, Emilie Marie, and Kiyo Tsutsui. 2007)