Attack Methods Chapter 4 Corporate IT Security Copyright 2002 Prentice-Hall
2 Figure 4-1: Targeted System Penetration (Break-In Attacks) Unobtrusive Information Collection Do research before sending any packets into the network Use in social engineering attacks Use as background for packet attacks Corporate website Trade press (often online and searchable) Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) web-enabled Internet financial database (Figure 4-2)
3 Figure 4-2: Securities and Exchange Commission's Edgar Service
4 Figure 4-1: Targeted System Penetration (Break-In Attacks) Unobtrusive Information Collection Whois database (Figure 4-3) Information about responsible person Information about IP addresses of DNS servers, to find firm’s IP address block Easy if assigned a classful address block (Figure 4-4) Difficult is CIDR address block or a block of ISP addresses
5 Registrant: Panko, Ray (PUKANUI-DOM)PUKANUI-DOM 1000 Pukanui St. Honolulu, HI US Domain Name: PUKANUI.COM Administrative Contact: Panko, Ray 1000 Pukanui St. Honolulu, HI US (808) Figure 4-3: Whois Entry for Pukanui.Com (from
6 Registrant: Technical Contact: VeriSign, Inc. (HOST-ORG) VeriSign, Inc Ridgetop Circle Dulles, VA US fax: - Record expires on 07-Jul-2003 Record created on 07-Jul-2001 Database last updated on 7-Jun :07:22 EDT. Domain servers in listed order: NS76.WORLDNIC.COM NS75.WORLDNIC.COM Figure 4-3: Whois Entry for Pukanui.Com (from DNS Servers
7 Figure 4-4: Classful IP Address Allocations Example Suppose DNS server is Must be a Class B address block (from table lookup) Therefore, the network part is 16 bits: Address block must be to ClassInitial IP Address in Class Last IP Address in Class Size or Network Part Addresses in Block Allocated to Firm A ,777,214 B ,534 C
8 Figure 4-1: Targeted System Penetration (Break-In Attacks) IP Address Spoofing (Figure 3-17) Put false IP addresses in outgoing attack packets Attacker is blind to replies Use series of attack platforms (Figure 4-5)
9 Figure 4-5: Using a Chain of Attack Hosts Attacker Victim Compromised Host Compromised Host Attack Replies Allows Reading of Replies Without Exposing Attacker
10 Figure 4-5: Using a Chain of Attack Hosts Subsequent Trace Back Successful Connection Broken Connection Broken Compromised Host Compromised Host Attacker Victim
11 Figure 4-1: Targeted System Penetration (Break-In Attacks) Host Scanning To identify IP addresses of potential victims Ping individual hosts (Figure 4-6) Ping all IP addresses in block for live IP addresses (Figure 4-7)
12 Figure 4-6: Ping at the Windows Command Prompt
13 Figure 4-7: Ping Scanning With Ping Sweep