Security and Privacy for Implantable Medical Devices Presented by : Dilip Simha.C.R.

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Presentation transcript:

Security and Privacy for Implantable Medical Devices Presented by : Dilip Simha.C.R.

Authors and Publication Daniel Halperin, Thomas S. Heydt-Benjamin, Kevin Fu, Tadayoshi Kohno, and William H. Maisel Pervasive Computing, IEEE (Volume:7, Issue: 1 )Pervasive Computing, IEEE Issue: 1

Topics What are IMD’s?. Need of Security and Privacy. Design issues Types of intruders Methods to deal with security issues Tensions Future research

What are Implantable Medical Devices Monitor and treat physiological conditions. Placed inside the body Examples Pacemakers ICD’s(Implantable cardiac defibrillators) Drug delivery systems Neurostimulators

Importance of IMD’s Used in treatment of diseases like Cardiac arrhythmia Diabetes Parkinson’s disease Over 25 million US citizens are dependent on IMD’s.

Modern day IMD’s Enable remote monitoring over long-range Communicate with other interoperating IMD’s

Criteria for design of IMD’s Safety and Utility goals Security and Privacy goals

Safety and Utility goals Data accuracy Device Identification Configurability Updatable Software Multidevice Coordination Auditable

Data accuracy Measured and stored data should be accurate. Incudes data about physiological conditions and timing.

Device Identification Authorized personnel must detect the presence of IMD’s. Example- ICD’s removal before heart surgery FDA considered attaching RFID(Radio Frequency ID) to IMD’s.

Configurability Authorized personnel must be able to change IMD settings. ICD’s and Open loop Insulin pumps.

Updatable Software Appropriately engineered updates are necessary Updates need to come from authorized personnel

Multidevice Coordination Current IMD’s have some examples of coordination CROS(Contralateral routing of signals) hearing Aid. Projected future devices use more coordination closed loop insulin delivery system

Auditable In case of failure Device’s operational history to manufacturers. Might differ from the data received by healthcare professionals.

Resource Efficient Power consumption More energy for wireless communications. Must minimize computation and communication. Data storage requirements

Security and Privacy Goals Authorization Availability Device software and settings Device Existence Privacy Device-type privacy Specific Device ID privacy Measurement and Log privacy Bearer privacy Data integrity

Authorization Personal Authorization Specific basic rights are granted Patients and primary-care physicians Role-based authorization Authorized for a set of tasks Physician or Ambulance Computer IMD selection Only interact with intended devices.

Availability DoS attack prevention Intruder should not be able to Drain battery Overflow data storage Jam the communication

Device software and settings Authorized personnel should only modify IMD’s. Avoid accidental malfunctions.

Device existence privacy IMD’s are expensive. Avoid detection by unauthorized personnel.

Specific device ID privacy Attacker should not be able to track IMD’s. Location privacy.

Measurement and log privacy Private information about measurements and audit log data.

Bearer Privacy Private information of patient Name Medical history Detailed diagnoses.

Data integrity Avoid tampering of past data. Avoid inducing modifications to future data.

Classes of adversaries Passive adversaries Active adversaries Coordinated adversaries Insiders

Tensions Security v/s Accessibility Security v/s Device resources Security v/s Usability

Research directions Fine grained access control Open access with revocation and second- factor authentication Accountability Patient awareness via secondary channels Authorization via secondary channels Shift computation to external devices

QUESTIONS?