Security vs. Efficiency: Assessing Transportation Security Policies & Trade-Offs September 19,2007 CE 5212 Anna Arciszewska, Jessica Horning, Patrick Phenow, Ryan Wilson September 19,2007 CE 5212 Anna Arciszewska, Jessica Horning, Patrick Phenow, Ryan Wilson

Outline Overview / History Current Issues Case Studies Screening the Screeners The El Al Approach Policies & Recommendations Discussion Questions Overview / History Current Issues Case Studies Screening the Screeners The El Al Approach Policies & Recommendations Discussion Questions Source: Associated Press

Establishing a balance Trade-Offs Security Efficiency

Where is the balance point? Regulators  Regulated Limited Resources Emotional / Political Arguments Different balance points for different modes How to measure good/bad trade-offs Regulators  Regulated Limited Resources Emotional / Political Arguments Different balance points for different modes How to measure good/bad trade-offs

Brief History 1960’s - 90’s Airline Hijackings Airport security run by airlines and private contractors Screening for weapons Photo ID “Who packed your bag and when?” “Did you receive anything from a stranger?” “Have you left your bag unattended at any time?” 1960’s - 90’s Airline Hijackings Airport security run by airlines and private contractors Screening for weapons Photo ID “Who packed your bag and when?” “Did you receive anything from a stranger?” “Have you left your bag unattended at any time?”

September 11, 2001

Brief History Aviation and Transportation Security Act (Nov. 19, 2001) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Secure all modes of transportation in U.S. recruit, assess, hire, train, and deploy Security Officers for 450 commercial airports from Guam to Alaska in 12 months provide 100 percent screening of all checked luggage for explosives by December 31, 2002 Aviation and Transportation Security Act (Nov. 19, 2001) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Secure all modes of transportation in U.S. recruit, assess, hire, train, and deploy Security Officers for 450 commercial airports from Guam to Alaska in 12 months provide 100 percent screening of all checked luggage for explosives by December 31, 2002

Brief History Federal control of screening Reactive carry-on restrictions and increases in screening (security theater?) Shoe x-rays Liquid/gel prohibitions (3-1-1 rule) Passenger screening Passenger Name Record Computerized Airline Passenger Screening (CAPS) FaceIt Federal control of screening Reactive carry-on restrictions and increases in screening (security theater?) Shoe x-rays Liquid/gel prohibitions (3-1-1 rule) Passenger screening Passenger Name Record Computerized Airline Passenger Screening (CAPS) FaceIt

Current Issues Budget Costs $6 billion annually Airline industry lost $13 billion in 2001, $11 billion in 2002 Efficiency improvements reduced losses to $3 billion in 2005 Time Costs Passengers must check in 75 minutes before domestic and 2-3 hours before international flights Avg. waiting time at BWI was 20 min, now 12 Privacy / Civil Liberties Budget Costs $6 billion annually Airline industry lost $13 billion in 2001, $11 billion in 2002 Efficiency improvements reduced losses to $3 billion in 2005 Time Costs Passengers must check in 75 minutes before domestic and 2-3 hours before international flights Avg. waiting time at BWI was 20 min, now 12 Privacy / Civil Liberties

Source: Johnston 2004

Security / Efficiency Balance Cargo Transportation Containerized freight increases efficiency, but introduces an additional security threat Time & resources for additional security impact: System cost Speed Efficiency Intermodal capabilities Global trade Economies of scale Cargo Transportation Containerized freight increases efficiency, but introduces an additional security threat Time & resources for additional security impact: System cost Speed Efficiency Intermodal capabilities Global trade Economies of scale

Risk Management The nature of future risks cannot be fully known, Not all risks can be addressed, New technologies aimed at reducing risk inherently create new uncertainty, Risk is reactive thus creating new uncertainties, The complexity of risk management can result in unexpected concurrent failures, Risk management measures may restrict freedom, invade privacy and discriminate. (Ericson 2006). The nature of future risks cannot be fully known, Not all risks can be addressed, New technologies aimed at reducing risk inherently create new uncertainty, Risk is reactive thus creating new uncertainties, The complexity of risk management can result in unexpected concurrent failures, Risk management measures may restrict freedom, invade privacy and discriminate. (Ericson 2006).

Case Study: Screening the Screeners Security must be effective to be efficient, but effective security is not necessarily efficient Screeners failed to detect 13% of dangerous objects in 1978 Failure rate increased to 20% in 1987 Declining performance noted by the 9/11 Commission Newark International failed 20 of 22 tests in October, 2006 Albany International failed 5 of 7 tests in July, 2007 Security must be effective to be efficient, but effective security is not necessarily efficient Screeners failed to detect 13% of dangerous objects in 1978 Failure rate increased to 20% in 1987 Declining performance noted by the 9/11 Commission Newark International failed 20 of 22 tests in October, 2006 Albany International failed 5 of 7 tests in July, 2007

Case Study: Screening the Screeners Single point of failure Threat that is undetected at checkpoint is unlikely to be detected at all Only recourse to failure at one point is evacuation of entire airport Causes time/budget inefficiencies that affect all airports Single point of failure Threat that is undetected at checkpoint is unlikely to be detected at all Only recourse to failure at one point is evacuation of entire airport Causes time/budget inefficiencies that affect all airports

Case Study: Screening the Screeners Prioritizing risks Attention is a limited resource Screeners removed bottled water, but didn’t detect bomb in same carry-on Prioritizing risks Attention is a limited resource Screeners removed bottled water, but didn’t detect bomb in same carry-on

Case Study: Screening the Screeners Investing in people vs. technology Remove “human error” Introduce “computer error” Expense of technology and training Privacy / data security Investing in people vs. technology Remove “human error” Introduce “computer error” Expense of technology and training Privacy / data security

Case Study: El Al’s Approach Israel’s largest airline “World’s most secure airline” Emphasis on security & counterterrorism since formation $80 million annual budget Israel’s largest airline “World’s most secure airline” Emphasis on security & counterterrorism since formation $80 million annual budget

Case Study: El Al’s Approach Multiple levels of security Vehicle checks outside airport Plain-clothes officers in terminal Baggage screening Low-pressure chamber Sky marshals & pilots Reinforced cockpit doors “Explosion proof” cargo bay Multiple levels of security Vehicle checks outside airport Plain-clothes officers in terminal Baggage screening Low-pressure chamber Sky marshals & pilots Reinforced cockpit doors “Explosion proof” cargo bay

Case Study: El Al’s Approach Explosives technology moves faster than security technology Psychological profiling Passenger interviews Body language Suspicious behavior El Al staff check baggage at overseas airports Explosives technology moves faster than security technology Psychological profiling Passenger interviews Body language Suspicious behavior El Al staff check baggage at overseas airports

Policies & Recommendations Non-airline policies Again, primarily reactive Overwhelming focus on commercial passenger air travel TSA purview - highways, railroads, maritime, and non-passenger air travel $1.1 billion of $5.7 billion, fiscal 2006 Cargo transportation - efficiency > security Non-airline policies Again, primarily reactive Overwhelming focus on commercial passenger air travel TSA purview - highways, railroads, maritime, and non-passenger air travel $1.1 billion of $5.7 billion, fiscal 2006 Cargo transportation - efficiency > security

Policies & Recommendations Commercial airline policies MIT Recommendations Reduce “carnival booth”, flagging must be more discrete Improve object screening through technology Merge passenger x-ray technology and standard metal detectors Better train security employees, vary questioning, improve screening Commercial airline policies MIT Recommendations Reduce “carnival booth”, flagging must be more discrete Improve object screening through technology Merge passenger x-ray technology and standard metal detectors Better train security employees, vary questioning, improve screening

Policies & Recommendations Commercial airline policies GAO Recommendations Internet/intranet connectivity to improve screener training. Internal controls for monitoring and documenting completion of required training Commercial airline policies GAO Recommendations Internet/intranet connectivity to improve screener training. Internal controls for monitoring and documenting completion of required training

Policies & Recommendations Commercial airline policies DHS Recommendations Establish a system of procedures for cargo screening and inspection Clearly written guidance and training on regulations, procedures to improve inspections, guidance on security program requirements, a quality control program, and sufficient resources for cargo inspection program Improve PARIS - better guidance, detailed training, and greater funding TSA Interpretation of new law Commercial airline policies DHS Recommendations Establish a system of procedures for cargo screening and inspection Clearly written guidance and training on regulations, procedures to improve inspections, guidance on security program requirements, a quality control program, and sufficient resources for cargo inspection program Improve PARIS - better guidance, detailed training, and greater funding TSA Interpretation of new law

Conclusion

Discussion Questions Is security the enemy of efficiency? How can we weight security concerns against efficiency needs? Are we making good or bad security tradeoffs? Efficiency tradeoffs? Is it possible to develop decision and/or performance criteria to define, achieve, and maintain a balance between security and efficiency? How much risk is acceptable? Is security the enemy of efficiency? How can we weight security concerns against efficiency needs? Are we making good or bad security tradeoffs? Efficiency tradeoffs? Is it possible to develop decision and/or performance criteria to define, achieve, and maintain a balance between security and efficiency? How much risk is acceptable?

Discussion Questions What are your thoughts on the terms “security theater” and “carnival booth”? Can security theater help increase efficiency tradeoffs? Do these terms only add fuel to the fire? Is a life-cycle approach a useful or practical way to describe policy? Can systems be truly secure in the presence of uncertain risk? To what extent does technology improve security versus add additional risk? What are your thoughts on the terms “security theater” and “carnival booth”? Can security theater help increase efficiency tradeoffs? Do these terms only add fuel to the fire? Is a life-cycle approach a useful or practical way to describe policy? Can systems be truly secure in the presence of uncertain risk? To what extent does technology improve security versus add additional risk?