China: Filmmaker Zhang Yimou fined $1 China: Filmmaker Zhang Yimou fined $1.2M for breach of one-child policy Fri January 10, 2014 Hong Kong (CNN) -- Oscar-nominated Chinese filmmaker Zhang Yimou has been fined 7.48 million yuan ($1.2 million) for breaching China's one-child policy, authorities say. A letter sent to Zhang by the family planning bureau of Binhu District of Wuxi City, Jiangsu province in eastern China on Thursday demanded that he pay a penalty for having two "beyond-the-quota" children. Zhang's breach of the policy has set off a firestorm, especially among some citizens who resent how the rich and famous in China flout rules and policies Zhang apologized in an open letter for his "excessive children“ and paid the fine immediately.

China: The one child policy To understand why the Chinese government wanted to lower the population To explain how the Chinese government did this

The population situation in China

The majority of Chinese live in the area that is circled in the East. Chinese Demographics Population distribution Excessive concentration in the eastern part of China 50% of the population lives on 8.2% of the land. Bulk of the population lives along the coast. East China accounts for 90% of the population. 56%, about 728 million, are living in mountainous areas. The majority of Chinese live in the area that is circled in the East.

Anti-natalist policy – means discouraging births. Incentive: an action that encourages people to do something. Disincentive: an action that discourages people from doing something VIDEO: Take notes – Why was the policy needed? What incentives and disincentives were implemented to try to make it a success?

6 mark question Explain the incentives and disincentives used by a country trying to decrease the birth rate.(6) Chosen country .............................................................

Anti-natalist policies Discourage child birth by removing financial benefits or imposing financial penalties on those couples who have more than one child. Massive contraception campaigns and adverts showing the benefits of small families may be launched. Policies can be very forceful and involve compulsory abortions and sterilisation and, in China for example, public denunciation and huge social pressure to have only one child

China is a giant of a country and that description applies to both its land area and its population. During the 1970s the growth rate was rising at an alarming rate. There were fears of exceeding the country’s carrying capacity. In 1980 the government introduced the one-child policy which was rigorously enforced (Figure 12) – much more stick than carrot. Definition carrying capacity: the number of individuals a region can support in terms of its resources

An anti-natalist policy Meaning a policy that discourages births The carrot and stick approach is used – but China uses more stick that carrot!

Incentives and disincentives Incentive: The benefits given for following the rule Disincentive: The sanctions implemented for not obeying the rule

Incentives One incentive is the "one-child certificate" which is a contract between a couple and the local government. It gives parents who agree to have only one child certain economic rewards, such as a monthly stipend, free obstetric care, increased maternity leave, highest priority in education and health care for the child, preferential treatment when one is applying for housing, and a supplementary pension.

Disincentives Disincentives include losing housing and school benefits or having to pay higher fees and fines. Fines, currently called extra tax, may be substantial: according to one source, they amount to 10–20 % of a family's annual income. Children from ‘illegal” pregnancies may not be registered or treated equally until their parents pay the fines imposed as punishment. Especially in urban areas registration with the local authority is required for medical care, schooling and employment. Families closely monitored by female health workers who were trusted members of the communist party - known as the ‘nanny police’.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k0u7_afmT-8

Advertising/Propaganda for the Policy

Figure 2. Billboard in Hebei Province Promoting Girls. The advertisement reads, "There's no difference between having a girl or a boy — girls can also continue the family line."

English translation: One child, prosperous life

English translation: Up agricultural production, down population increase

English translation: The party calls for the partisan to set an example of having only one child.

English translation: It's better to marry and have children at a mature age.

English translation: Control our population at 1,200 million

'If I have one child it will be raised better 'If I have one child it will be raised better. It will have more opportunities, and my career is the most important thing. I really want to excel at it.' Lu Zhufeng, a twenty year old medical student. 1970's

The number of men is thought to outnumber women in China by more than 60 million. A shortage of females in rural China means brides are often bought

Effects on Children

Little Emperor Syndrome Obesity Spoilt High expectations from family

Little Emperors Syndrome parents often still perform basic tasks for them: fixing their hair tying their shoes wiping their bottoms. “They’re impossible to discipline” “Parents have a hard time saying no”

Task Produce a one page summary of the policy. Think about: ‘Why it makes sense to only have one child.’   Why was the one child policy needed? Background information. ‘The benefits of China’s one-child policy.’ What have been the successes? Any statements made need to be backed up by statistics in order to be effective. ‘China’s one child policy is a failure.’ What have been the negatives of this policy? Have the negatives been concentrated more in any particular areas. ‘A summary of the arguments for and against and the balance of evidence’ Your own evaluation of if it is working?

Was the Policy a Success?

Figure 1. Total Fertility Rate (Mean Number of Children Born per Woman) in China, 1969 to 2004.

Peer assessment