Consociational democracy Operation and pre-conditions

Recap Consociational democracy: A form of consensus democracy Parties and elites cooperate Typically characterized by Power-sharing at the top  larger than normal coalitions  Elite accommodation ‘Subcultural’ autonomy:  Key groups have power to regulate their own affairs (or at least some of them)

Typical characteristics Grand or (nearly grand) rather than minimum- winning coalitions Proportional allocation/sharing out of positions & policies Mutual veto Some degree of subcultural autonomy:  “sovereignty in their own sphere”

Cases: Netherlands Belgium Austria Switzerland Lebanon before 1982

Netherlands: Religious and class cleavages:  schools  suffrage  “social question” Mobilization of Calvinists, Catholics & Socialists Formation of a segmented or pillarized society (19 th & early 20 th c)

Pacification Settlement All-party settlement, negotiated Entrench state support for denominational schools in Dutch Constitution Universal manhood suffrage from 1918  Universal suffrage from 1922 Proportional representation  Plus requirement to vote Entrench proportional allocation

From s Larger than minimum-winning coalitions Divisive issues settled by proportional allocation Broadcasting as template:  Catholic, Calvinist, Social Democratic and Liberal broadcasting organizations share time on two radio frequenciez  Proportional allocation of funds to Catholic, Calvinist & state (secular) schools  Proportional allocation to other groups, entities: e.g. housing corporations, organizations providing social welfare

Late 1960s & beyond: Challenges to party elites ‘De-pillarization’ Regrouping of parties Merger of some former subcultural organizations:  Trade Union federations  Employers associations Result: Vestiges remain:  A large # of parties  Separate schools  ‘Delegations of authority to former religious or ideologically based organizations Netherlands remains a consensus democracy but no longer consociational

Lijphart’s argument Netherlands lacked cross-cutting cleavages Should have ‘flown apart’ as a result Didn’t because:  Elites saw the dangers of conflict  Compromised instead In addition:  Fact of segmentation results in a ‘self-denying’ hypothesis: pillars or segments don’t clash because they don’t interact

Pre-conditions: Consociation more likely if: authoritative elites well-defined segments or subcultures Mutual balance of power (no one group is dominant) International pressures encourage cooperation

Problems: Was the Netherlands as divided & conflict ridden as Lijphart argues? Role of ordinary citizens? What happens if elites are not authoritative?  How do elites sell compromises? How democratic is consociational democracy?

Is consociation a viable solution for deeply divided societies? Application to Sri Lanka? Cypress? Balkans? Canada The former Czechoslovakia? Other solutions? How different is consociational democracy?