Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks: Theory, Models, and Applications Lecture 3 Differential Game Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad, Tamer.

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Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks: Theory, Models, and Applications Lecture 3 Differential Game Zhu Han, Dusit Niyato, Walid Saad, Tamer Basar, and Are Hjorungnes

Overview of Lecture Notes Introduction to Game Theory: Lecture 1 Noncooperative Game: Lecture 1, Chapter 3 Bayesian Game: Lecture 2, Chapter 4 Differential Game: Lecture 3, Chapter 5 Evolutional Game : Lecture 4, Chapter 6 Cooperative Game: Lecture 5, Chapter 7 Auction Theory: Lecture 6, Chapter 8 Game Theory Applications: Lecture 7, Part III Total Lectures are about 8 Hours

Introduction Basics Controllability Linear ODE: Bang-bang control Linear time optimal control Pontryagin maximum principle Dynamic programming Dynamic game Some materials are not from the book. See some dynamic control book and Basar’s dynamic game book for more references.

Basic Problem ODE: x: state, f: a function,  : control Payoff: r: running payoff, g: terminal payoff

Example Moon lander: Newton’s law ODE Objective: minimize fuel Maximize the remain Constraints

Controllability

Linear ODE

CONTROLLABILITY OF LINEAR EQUATIONS

Observability Observation

Bang-Bang Control And this bang-bang control is optimal

EXISTENCE OF TIME-OPTIMAL CONTROLS Minimize the time from any point to the origin

MAXIMUM PRINCIPLE FOR LINEAR SYSTEM

Hamiltonian Definition

Example, Rocket Railroad Car x(t) = (q(t), v(t))

Example, Rocket Railroad Car Satellite example

Pontryagin Maximum Principle “The maximum principle was, in fact, the culmination of a long search in the calculus of variations for a comprehensive multiplier rule, which is the correct way to view it: p(t) is a “Lagrange multiplier”... It makes optimal control a design tool, whereas the calculus of variations was a way to study nature.”

FIXED TIME, FREE ENDPOINT PROBLEM

Pontryagin Maximum Principle adjoint equations maximization principle transversality condition

FREE TIME, FIXED ENDPOINT PROBLEM

Pontryagin Maximum Principle

Example LINEAR-QUADRATIC REGULATOR

Introducing the maximum principle

Using the Maximum Principle

Riccati equation

Solve the Riccati equation convert (R) into a second–order, linear ODE

Dynamic Programming “it is sometimes easier to solve a problem by embedding it in a larger class of problems and then solving the larger class all at once.” – must from an assistant professor

HAMILTON-JACOBI-BELLMAN EQUATION “it’s better to be smart from the beginning, than to be stupid for a time and then become smart”. choice of life, must from a ph.d. Backward induction: change to a Sequence of constrained optimization

DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING METHOD

EXAMPLE: GENERAL LINEAR QUADRATIC REGULATOR

HJB

Minimization

Connection between DP and Maximum Principle Maximal principle starts from 0 to T DP starts from t to T Costate p at time t is the gradient

Introduction Basics Controllability Linear ODE: Bang-bang control Linear time optimal control Pontryagin maximum principle Dynamic programming Dynamic game

Two-person, zero-sum differential game basic idea: two players control the dynamics of some evolving system, and one tries to maximize, the other to minimize, a payoff functional that depends upon the trajectory.

Strategies Idea: one player will select in advance, not his control, but rather his responses to all possible controls that could be selected by his opponent.

Value functions

DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING, ISAACS’ EQUATIONS

GAMES AND THE PONTRYAGIN MAXIMUM PRINCIPLE

Noncooperative Differential Game Optimization problem for each player can be formulated as the optimal control problem The dynamics of state variable and of payoff each player For player to play the game, the available information is required Three cases of available information –Open-loop information –Feedback information u At time t, players are assumed to know the values of state variables at time where is positive and arbitrarily small u The feedback information is defined as: –Close-loop information

Noncooperative Differential Game The Nash equilibrium is defined as a set of action paths of one player to maximize the payoff given the other players' behavior To obtain the Nash equilibrium, it is required to solve a dynamic optimization problem The Hamiltonian function Where is co-state variable, Co-state variable is considered to be the shadow price of the variation of the state variable.

Noncooperative Differential Game The first order conditions for the open-loop solution For the close-loop solution, the conditions are slightly different Further reading: Basar’s book

Summary of Dynamic Control Dynamic problem formulation –ODE and payoff function Conditions for controllability –Rank of G and eigenvalue of M Bang-bang control Maximum Principle –ODE, ADJ, M and P Dynamic programming –Divide a complicated problem into sequence of subproblems –HJB equations Dynamic Game: Multiuser case Future reading: Stochastic game

Applications in Wireless Networks Packet Routing For routing in the mobile ad hoc network (MANET), the forwarding nodes as the players have incentive from the destination in terms of price to allocate transmission rate to forward packets from source A differential game for duopoly competition is applied to model this competitive situation L. Lin, X. Zhou, L. Du, and X. Miao. Differential game model with coupling constraint for routing in ad hoc networks. In Proc. of the 5th International Conference on Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing (WiCOM 2009), pages , September 2009.

Applications in Wireless Networks Packet Routing There are two forwarding nodes that are considered to be the players in this game Destination pays some price to forwarding nodes according to the amount of forwarded data Forwarding nodes compete with each other by adjusting the forwarding rate (i.e., action denoted by a i (t) for player i at time t) to maximize theirs utility over time duration of [0,∞]

Applications in Wireless Networks Packet Routing Payment from the destination at time t is denoted by P(t) Payoff function of player i can be expressed as follows: - P(t)a i (t) is revenue - g(a) is a cost function given vector a of actions of players For the payment, the following evolution of price (i.e., a differential equation of Tsutsui and Mino) is considered Quadratic cost function

Applications in Wireless Networks Packet Routing Using optimal control approach, feedback Nash equilibrium strategies of this game can be expressed as follows Iterative approach based on greedy adjustment is proposed to obtain the solution Algorithm gradually increases the forwarding rate of the player as long as the payoff is non-decreasing If the payoff of one player decreases, the algorithm will allow the other players to adjust the forwarding rate until none of players can gain a higher payoff

Applications in Wireless Networks Dynamic Bandwidth Allocation with Dynamic Service Selection in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks In heterogeneous wireless network, user can access multiple wireless networks (e.g., 3G, WiFi, WiMAX) However, none of existing works consider the dynamic bandwidth allocation in heterogeneous wireless networks in which the users can change service selection dynamically The network systems are naturally dynamic, a steady state of the network may never be reached Therefore, the dynamic optimal control is the suitable approach for analyzing the dynamic decision making process Z. Kun, D. Niyato, and P. Wang, "Optimal bandwidth allocation with dynamic service selection in heterogeneous wireless networks," in Proceedings of IEEE GLOBECOM'10, Miami FL USA, 6-10 December 2010.

Applications in Wireless Networks Dynamic Bandwidth Allocation with Dynamic Service Selection in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks Designing a dynamic game framework for optimal bandwidth allocation under dynamic service selection –For service providers: the profit can be maximized –For users: the performance can be maximized under competition

Applications in Wireless Networks Dynamic Bandwidth Allocation with Dynamic Service Selection in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks Two-level game framework for optimal bandwidth allocation with dynamic service selection

Applications in Wireless Networks Dynamic Bandwidth Allocation with Dynamic Service Selection in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks Game formulation: Evolution of Service Selection –Players: N active users in area a. –Strategy: The choices of particular service class from certain service providers. –Payoff: The payoff of user k selecting service class j from service provider i : –The replicator dynamics modeling the service selection:

Applications in Wireless Networks Dynamic Bandwidth Allocation with Dynamic Service Selection in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks Game formulation: Dynamic Bandwidth Allocation –Players: M service providers in area a. –Control strategies: The control strategy of player i denoted by –Open-loop vs Closed-loop –System state: –The instantaneous payoff:

Applications in Wireless Networks Dynamic Bandwidth Allocation with Dynamic Service Selection in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks Optimal Control Formulation

Applications in Wireless Networks Dynamic Bandwidth Allocation with Dynamic Service Selection in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks Open-loop Nash equilibrium

Applications in Wireless Networks Dynamic Bandwidth Allocation with Dynamic Service Selection in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle for Nash Equilibrium A strategy profile is Nash Equilibrium if there exists for every optimal control path such that the following conditions are satisfied 1. The maximum condition holds for all players. 2. Adjoint equation holds for all i, j 3. The constraints and boundary conditions are satisfied 4. is concave and continuously differentiable with respect to

Applications in Wireless Networks Dynamic Bandwidth Allocation with Dynamic Service Selection in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks Cooperative Bandwidth Allocation –Maximize: –The Hamiltonian function: –Observation : In the non-cooperative bandwidth allocation differential game, the selfish behavior of service providers can also maximize the social welfare

Applications in Wireless Networks Dynamic Bandwidth Allocation with Dynamic Service Selection in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks Convergence –The strategy adaption trajectory of the lower level service selection evolutionary game from the initial selection distribution

Summary Two applications of differential game in wireless network, i.e., routing and bandwidth allocation have been presented Differential game can be applied to other applications (e.g., cognitive radio) which are open to explore