1 ? Admission Control in Peer Groups Gene Tsudik, School of ICS, UC Irvine Yongdae Kim, CS Dept., U. of Minnesota Peer Groups:

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1 ? Admission Control in Peer Groups Gene Tsudik, School of ICS, UC Irvine Yongdae Kim, CS Dept., U. of Minnesota Peer Groups: Any-to-any No hierarchy No centralized authority Common in MANETs Many Internet applications (e.g., content sharing) Security mechanisms difficult Prior work mostly in key mgmt and secure comm. Not really useful without admission control Also need revocation mechanisms (but admission must be solved first) Challenge: HOW TO ADMIT NEW MEMBERS SECURELY?

2 Group Membership Issues Naming: Does name  ownership? Location? Presence: –on-line: e.g., replicated servers, MANETs –off-line: e.g., Gnutella, MANETs Membership: –Static: reflected where? –Enumerated –Dynamic: admission rules/policies? Longevity: –Long-term –Transient What does a prospective member know? Group name, at least… Group location? Group membership? Group charter/policy? Group member(s)’ name(s)/address(es)? LDAP? DNS? What about transient groups?

3 Group Charter Admission policy must be available to prospective members 1 st step: embed in a group charter Who signs group charter? –Owner/Founder?  how to confirm ownership? –Charter members?  “peer”? –Current members?  who are they? Or fraction thereof? –CA?  natural choice Contents of Group Charter: Group name GAUTH Admission Policy Type (APT) APT-dependent data Issuer Name Signature

4 Group Authority Group charter must be available to prospective members Where does it come from? Who vouches for membership? –Owner/Founder? –“Charter” members? –Current members or fraction thereof? –CA? –Group Authority (GAUTH)?  natural choice Must be specified in group charter GAUTH’s placement (e.g., in/out of group) Composition of GAUTH (e.g., one or multiple entities) Sample Admission Policy Types  APT_ACL: easiest, no GMCs, no GAUTH  APT_GAUTH: discretion of GAUTH  APT_GROUP: collective  STATIC: fixed “t” or explicit subset  DYNAMIC: fractional  Any combination of the above… (no policy too weird)

5 Three Stages of Admission Stage 0:GC creation (off-line) Stage 1: New member acquires GC Stage 2: Optional admission procedure Stage 3: GAUTH issues a GMC Group Authority (GAUTH) CA signs Group Charter off-line delivery prospective member current members request to join group here’s our charter Group Authority (GAUTH) results of admission procedure prospective member  We focus on this 

6 Relevant crypto techniques (usable in Stage 2) Plain Signatures Inefficient: O(n) size, O(n) work Can be gathered asynchronously Can be used to prove membership No membership awareness Accountability easy Limited anonymity Linkable Accountable sub-Group Multi-Signatures Due to Ohta, et al. (CCS’01) Based on aggregated Schnorr signatures Efficient (but still linear in size) Synchronous (on-line protocol) Membership awareness Can be used to prove membership Accountability easy Limited anonymity Linkable Threshold Signatures Desmedt/Frankel (1989) and others Usually, fixed t Function sharing to avoid reconstr-n Inefficient Synchronous (on-line protocol) Membership awareness (partial, t) No Accountability Limited anonymity Linkable? Need trusted dealer to set up Dynamic Threshold Signatures Frankel, et al. (FOCS’97) Supports shrinking t Very inefficient Synchronous (on-line protocol) Membership awareness (partial) No Accountability Limited anonymity Linkable? Still need trusted dealer

7 Relevant crypto techniques (contd.) Group Signatures Chaum & Van Heijst (1991) and others Inefficient (relative to plain sigs.) Asynchronous No membership awareness Can be used to prove membership Ltd. accountability (off-line, by Group Mgr) Anonymity Not linkable (except by Group Mgr) Better Dynamic Threshold Signatures Kong, et al. (ICNP’01) Supports growing t Efficiency unclear Synchronous (on-line protocol) Membership awareness (partial) No Accountability Limited anonymity Linkable? Still need trusted dealer to set up

8 Summary of Key Features

9 Goals Investigate/assemble/implement mechanisms for peer group admission control Define formats for group charter and group membership certificates Design a “generic” group authority Develop a toolkit suitable for many APT-s and experiment! Anticipated “headaches”: Negative “voting” in stage 2 Dynamic revocation of membership (procedures, policy) Related Work : Policymaker (AT&T Research) – general policy framework Trustbuilder (UIUC) – allows admission policy expression Antigone (UMich) – stages 1&2 of large mcast (not peer!) groups

10 Preliminary “architecture” GAC = Group Admission Control For more info (including a paper) see: