Why ICANN failed Milton Mueller Associate Professor, Syracuse University School of Information Studies
Internet Governance Governance definition: –the exploitation of technical bottlenecks or access to technical resources to regulate socio-economic conduct. –E.g., broadcasting ICANN is in the business of governance, not technical coordination –dispute resolution policy and famous marks –imposing a business model on domain name registration –WG discussions –Sovereignty claims to TLDs
ICANN’s Pre-history Internet Architecture Board (IAB) 1990; Internet Society (ISOC), 1992 IANA’s attempt to privatize itself, –150 new gTLDs, $ % of revenues The IAHC and the gTLD-MoU –ISOC-IANA, WIPO, ITU, new registrars –shared registry model –cartel-ized top-level domain space –links domain name assignment to trademark protection
The White Paper and ICANN White Paper abdicates direct government action Behind-the-scenes agreement with US Govt, Europeans, IBM, WIPO, and ISOC-IANA on governance agenda –essentially the same as gTLD-MoU Initial Board gives complete control of ICANN to gTLD-MoU faction
Conclusions The rhetoric of “industry self-regulation” was a mask that allowed a specific coalition of actors, led by the Internet Society, IBM, and a small number of European allies, to take over the administration of the Internet. Administration concentrated exclusively on e- commerce and ignored implications of handing governance power to an unaccountable private entity
Conclusions ICANN’s initial board was controlled by a single faction with a specific governance agenda that did not command consensus. The determination of that faction to implement its agenda as quickly as possible fatally undermined the new corporation’s ability to: function as a vehicle for consensual “self-regulation” develop durable, trusted processes
Difficult questions for the future Can ICANN be fixed or should we start over? How much globalization is appropriate?