On AS-Level Path Inference Jia Wang (AT&T Labs Research) Joint work with Z. Morley Mao (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor) Lili Qiu (University of Texas,

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
1 Locating Internet Bottlenecks: Algorithms, Measurement, and Implications Ningning Hu (CMU) Li Erran Li (Bell Lab) Zhuoqing Morley Mao (U. Mich) Peter.
Advertisements

Network Layer: Internet-Wide Routing & BGP Dina Katabi & Sam Madden.
Fundamentals of Computer Networks ECE 478/578 Lecture #18: Policy-Based Routing Instructor: Loukas Lazos Dept of Electrical and Computer Engineering University.
1 Interdomain Routing Protocols. 2 Autonomous Systems An autonomous system (AS) is a region of the Internet that is administered by a single entity and.
By Hitesh Ballani, Paul Francis, Xinyang Zhang Slides by Benson Luk for CS 217B.
Inferring Autonomous System Relationships in the Internet Lixin Gao Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Inferring Autonomous System Relationships in the Internet Lixin Gao.
1 Internet Path Inflation Xenofontas Dimitropoulos.
Something We Always Wanted to Know about ASs: Relationships and Taxonomy Dmitri Krioukov X. Dimitropoulos, M. Fomenkov, B. Huffaker, Y.
Part II: Inter-domain Routing Policies. March 8, What is routing policy? ISP1 ISP4ISP3 Cust1Cust2 ISP2 traffic Connectivity DOES NOT imply reachability!
Progress in inferring business relationships between ASs Dmitri Krioukov 4 th CAIDA-WIDE Workshop.
Mohamed Hefeeda 1 School of Computing Science Simon Fraser University, Canada ISP-Friendly Peer Matching without ISP Collaboration Mohamed Hefeeda (Joint.
1 Tutorial 5 Safe “Peering Backup” Routing With BGP Based on:
Tutorial 5 Safe Routing With BGP Based on: Internet.
Mini Introduction to BGP Michalis Faloutsos. What Is BGP?  Border Gateway Protocol BGP-4  The de-facto interdomain routing protocol  BGP enables policy.
1 Traffic Engineering for ISP Networks Jennifer Rexford IP Network Management and Performance AT&T Labs - Research; Florham Park, NJ
Internet Networking Spring 2004 Tutorial 5 Safe “Peering Backup” Routing With BGP.
Stable Internet Routing Without Global Coordination Jennifer Rexford Princeton University Joint work with Lixin Gao (UMass-Amherst)
On Power-Law Relationships of the Internet Topology CSCI 780, Fall 2005.
Measuring the Autonomous System Path Through the Internet Jennifer Rexford Internet and Networking Systems AT&T Labs - Research; Florham Park, NJ
Characterizing the Internet Hierarchy from Multiple Vantage Points Jennifer Rexford Internet and Networking Systems AT&T Labs - Research; Florham Park,
Inherently Safe Backup Routing with BGP Lixin Gao (U. Mass Amherst) Timothy Griffin (AT&T Research) Jennifer Rexford (AT&T Research)
Graphs and Topology Yao Zhao. Background of Graph A graph is a pair G =(V,E) –Undirected graph and directed graph –Weighted graph and unweighted graph.
Stable Internet Routing Without Global Coordination Jennifer Rexford AT&T Labs--Research
Ningning HuCarnegie Mellon University1 A Measurement Study of Internet Bottlenecks Ningning Hu (CMU) Joint work with Li Erran Li (Bell Lab) Zhuoqing Morley.
Measuring the Autonomous System Path Through the Internet Jennifer Rexford Internet and Networking Systems AT&T Labs - Research; Florham Park, NJ
University of Massachusetts, Amherst 1 On the Evaluation of AS Relationship Inferences Jianhong Xia and Lixin Gao Department of Electrical and Computer.
Stable Internet Routing Without Global Coordination Jennifer Rexford AT&T Labs--Research
1 Internet Topology COS 461: Computer Networks Spring 2006 (MW 1:30-2:50 in Friend 109) Jennifer Rexford Teaching Assistant: Mike Wawrzoniak
Stable Internet Routing Without Global Coordination Jennifer Rexford AT&T Labs--Research Joint work with Lixin Gao.
1 Network Topology Measurement Yang Chen CS 8803.
Computer Networks Layering and Routing Dina Katabi
Inter-domain Routing Outline Border Gateway Protocol.
Internet Routing: Measurement, Modeling, and Analysis Dr. Jia Wang AT&T Labs Research Florham Park, NJ 07932, USA
Inter-domain Routing: Today and Tomorrow Dr. Jia Wang AT&T Labs Research Florham Park, NJ 07932, USA
Lecture 8 Page 1 Advanced Network Security Review of Networking Basics: Internet Architecture, Routing, and Naming Advanced Network Security Peter Reiher.
Constructing Inter-Domain Packet Filters to Control IP Spoofing Based on BGP Updates Zhenhai Duan, Xin Yuan Department of Computer Science Florida State.
Impact of Prefix Hijacking on Payments of Providers Pradeep Bangera and Sergey Gorinsky Institute IMDEA Networks, Madrid, Spain Developing the Science.
Introduction to BGP.
Quantifying the Causes of Path Inflation Neil Spring, Ratul Mahajan, and Thomas Anderson Presented by Luv Kohli COMP November 24, 2003.
9/15/2015CS622 - MIRO Presentation1 Wen Xu and Jennifer Rexford Department of Computer Science Princeton University Chuck Short CS622 Dr. C. Edward Chow.
1 © 2003, Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. CCNA 2 Module 6 Routing and Routing Protocols.
How Secure are Secure Inter- Domain Routing Protocols? SIGCOMM 2010 Presenter: kcir.
Jennifer Rexford Fall 2014 (TTh 3:00-4:20 in CS 105) COS 561: Advanced Computer Networks BGP.
A Routing Underlay for Overlay Networks Akihiro Nakao Larry Peterson Andy Bavier SIGCOMM’03 Reviewer: Jing lu.
Towards an Accurate AS-level Traceroute Tool Z. Morley Mao*, Jennifer Rexford , Jia Wang , Randy Katz* *University of California at Berkeley  AT&T Labs--Research.
A Firewall for Routers: Protecting Against Routing Misbehavior1 June 26, A Firewall for Routers: Protecting Against Routing Misbehavior Jia Wang.
A Measurement Study on the Impact of Routing Events on End-to-End Internet Path Performance Feng Wang 1, Zhuoqing Morley Mao 2 Jia Wang 3, Lixin Gao 1,
On Understanding of Transient Interdomain Routing Failures Feng Wang, Lixin Gao, Jia Wang, and Jian Qiu Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering.
A Light-Weight Distributed Scheme for Detecting IP Prefix Hijacks in Real-Time Lusheng Ji†, Joint work with Changxi Zheng‡, Dan Pei†, Jia Wang†, Paul Francis‡
1 Quantifying Path Exploration in the Internet Ricardo Oliveira, Rafit Izhak-Ratzin, Lixia Zhang, UCLA Beichuan Zhang, UArizona Dan Pei, AT&T Labs -- Research.
1 A Framework for Measuring and Predicting the Impact of Routing Changes Ying Zhang Z. Morley Mao Jia Wang.
R-BGP: Staying Connected in a Connected World Nate Kushman Srikanth Kandula, Dina Katabi, and Bruce Maggs.
Advancements in the Inference of AS Relationships Xenofontas Dimitropoulos (Fontas) (CAIDA/GaTech) Dmitri Krioukov Bradley Huffaker k claffy George Riley.
Eliminating Packet Loss Caused by BGP Convergence Nate Kushman Srikanth Kandula, Dina Katabi, and Bruce Maggs.
N. Hu (CMU)L. Li (Bell labs) Z. M. Mao. (U. Michigan) P. Steenkiste (CMU) J. Wang (AT&T) Infocom 2005 Presented By Mohammad Malli PhD student seminar Planete.
Scaling Properties of the Internet Graph Aditya Akella, CMU With Shuchi Chawla, Arvind Kannan and Srinivasan Seshan PODC 2003.
ICNP 2006 Inter­domain Policy Violations in Overlay Routes Srinivasan Seetharaman, Mostafa Ammar Networking and Telecommunications Group College of Computing.
1 Agenda for Today’s Lecture The rationale for BGP’s design –What is interdomain routing and why do we need it? –Why does BGP look the way it does? How.
NetQuest: A Flexible Framework for Large-Scale Network Measurement Lili Qiu University of Texas at Austin Joint work with Han Hee Song.
A Measurement Study on the Impact of Routing Events on End-to-End Internet Path Performance Feng Wang 1, Zhuoqing Morley Mao 2 Jia Wang 3, Lixin Gao 1,
Chapter 25 Internet Routing. Static Routing manually configured routes that do not change Used by hosts whose routing table contains one static route.
1 Effective Diagnosis of Routing Disruptions from End Systems Ying Zhang Z. Morley Mao Ming Zhang.
Michael Schapira, Princeton University Fall 2010 (TTh 1:30-2:50 in COS 302) COS 561: Advanced Computer Networks
Inferring AS Relationships. The Problem  One view  AS relationships  BGP route tables  The other view  BGP route tables  AS relationships  Available.
GLOBECOM 2007 Exit Policy Violations in Multi-hop Overlay Routes Srinivasan Seetharaman, Mostafa Ammar Networking and Telecommunications Group College.
Inter-domain Routing Outline Border Gateway Protocol.
1 On the Impact of Route Monitor Selection Ying Zhang* Zheng Zhang # Z. Morley Mao* Y. Charlie Hu # Bruce M. Maggs ^ University of Michigan* Purdue University.
COS 461: Computer Networks Spring 2014
Stable and Practical AS Relationship Inference with ProbLink
Presentation transcript:

On AS-Level Path Inference Jia Wang (AT&T Labs Research) Joint work with Z. Morley Mao (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor) Lili Qiu (University of Texas, Austin) Yin Zhang (University of Texas, Austin)

On AS-Level Path Inference2 June 10, 2005 Discover end-to-end forwarding path between two hosts Berkeley Internet CNN Calren Level3 GNN QwestSprintUUnet University company AT&T business ISP Berkeley Calren Level3 QwestSprintUUnet University company AT&T business ISP Berkeley Calren Level3 QwestSprintUUnet University company AT&T business ISP

On AS-Level Path Inference3 June 10, 2005 Motivation Network diagnoses Performance optimization Overlay network Content distribution Network modeling

On AS-Level Path Inference4 June 10, 2005 Example – overlay routing Source Destination ? ? ? ? Internet

On AS-Level Path Inference5 June 10, 2005 Outline Related work Routescope Evaluation Improvements  AS relationship inference  First AS hop inference Conclusion

On AS-Level Path Inference6 June 10, 2005 Related work Forwarding path discovery  With direct access to the source Router-level: traceroute AS-level: [Mao Sigcomm2003] [Mao Infocom2004]  Without direct access to the source None!

On AS-Level Path Inference7 June 10, 2005 Challenges Asymmetric routing  Over 60% of AS paths asymmetric Complicated routing policies  Not shortest path routing  Commercial relationship between ASes determines how traffic flow though the Internet Multi-homing  Very common

On AS-Level Path Inference8 June 10, 2005 Routescope Key observation: relationships among ASes play important role in determining feasible forwarding paths Approach: Infer AS-level paths by finding the shortest policy path in an AS graph obtained from BGP tables collected from multiple vantage points

On AS-Level Path Inference9 June 10, 2005 Assumptions Explicit AS relationships  Peer-peer  Provider-customer Shortest AS policy path preferred  “Valley-free” rule Uniform routing policy within an AS AS destination based uniform routing Stability These assumptions are mostly correct.

On AS-Level Path Inference10 June 10, 2005 AS relationships translate into BGP export rules Export to a provider or a peer  Allowed: its routes and routes of its customers and siblings  Disallowed: routes learned from other providers or peers Export to a customer or a sibling  Allowed: its routes, the routes of its customers and siblings, and routes learned from its providers and peers

On AS-Level Path Inference11 June 10, 2005 “Valley-free” rule After traversing a provider-customer or peer-peer edge, cannot traverse a customer-provider or peer-peer edge Invalid path:  >= 2 peer links  downhill-uphill  downhill-peer  peer-uphill

On AS-Level Path Inference12 June 10, 2005 Example of valley-free paths X X [1 2 3], [ ] are valley-free [1 4 3], [ ] are not valley free

On AS-Level Path Inference13 June 10, 2005 AS path inference algorithm Compose the AS graph based on BGP tables Infer AS relationship Classify edges based on AS relationship  Customer-provider (UP) link  Provider-customer (DOWN) link  Peer-peer (FLAT) link Compute shortest policy path conforming the “valley- free” rule using modified Dijkstra’s algorithm Infer the first AS hop if multiple paths returned

On AS-Level Path Inference14 June 10, 2005 Evaluation Based on existing AS relationship inference algorithms  Gao: based on the degree of ASes along the path  SARK: consider AS hierarchy properties  BPP: formulate as 2SAT problem and develop heuristics that yield minimum of invalid paths Compare AS-level paths  Extracted from a large number of BGP tables  Among 125 public BGP gateways

On AS-Level Path Inference15 June 10, 2005 Paths in BGP tables BGP table Algorithm Unique paths Match Match length Exact match ShorterLonger AS7018 (tier-1) Gao %80%33%18%2% SARK67%79%34%15%4% BPP84%85%37%15%0% AS2152 (tier-2) Gao %65%10%34%1% SARK48%57%29%40%3% BPP67% 12%33%0% AS8121 (tier-3) Gao %27%3%69%4% SARK14%23%3%72%4% BPP18%30%3%66%5%

On AS-Level Path Inference16 June 10, 2005 Paths between BGP gateways BGP gateway Algorithm Unique paths Match Match length Exact match ShorterLonger All Gao %51%21%15%35% SARK38%61%24%20%19% BPP18%29%15%5%66% US Gao %43%16%18%40% SARK40%57%24% 19% BPP22%42%18%10%48% BPP yields most accurate AS path inference than GAO and SARK

On AS-Level Path Inference17 June 10, 2005 Possible causes of mismatches Inaccuracy in AS relationship inference  Especially in non-North American regions Multihoming

On AS-Level Path Inference18 June 10, 2005 Inaccurate AS relationship inference 19%~66% of inferred paths are longer than actual paths Significant inconsistency among AS relationship inference results Common peer-peerCommon provider-customer Gao vs SARK229 (3.63%, 36.12%)41730 (89.43%, 94.68%) Gao vs BPP5959 (94.51%, 48.42%)39606 (84.87%, 97.74%) SARK vs BPP334 (52.68%, 2.71%)33752 (85.66%, 93.17%) Solution: infer more accurate AS relationships

On AS-Level Path Inference19 June 10, 2005 A new AS relationship inference algorithm Problem formulation: integer programming  Each edge e in the direct graph G = (V,E) Relation(e) = 1 (customer-provider), 2 (peer-peer), or 3 (provider- customer)  Constraints If r is reverse edge of e, relation(e)+relation(r) = 4. Every path in use is valley-free, i.e., for (e1,e2) on a path, relation(e1) = 1  relation(e2) = 3. For any (src,dst), if there is a path P that is shorter than actual path, then P is not valley free, i.e.,  (e1,e2) on P s.t. relation(e1) ≠ 1  relation(e1) ≠ 3. Novelty: derive additional constraints that violate valley free constraints Solution: improved random walk algorithm [Selman et al. 1993]  Handle non-binary variables  Repeatedly remove stub ASes with out-degree of 0

On AS-Level Path Inference20 June 10, 2005 AS path inference with accurate AS relationship Unique paths Match Match length Exact match ShorterLonger AS7018 (tier-1) %83%35%17%0% AS2152 (tier-2) % 10%35%0% AS8121 (tier-3) %27%3%69%4% All BGP gateways245770%73%30%22%4% US BGP gateways190760%62%27%34%4% The accuracy is among the best of other three in BGP table experiments and is much higher than alternatives in BGP gateway experiments.

On AS-Level Path Inference21 June 10, 2005 Multihoming Over half of the mismatches occur at the very first hop AS If first hop is known, over 15% of mismatches can be eliminated Solution: infer the first hop AS AS S AS T2 AS T1AS D AS C Inferred path Actual path

On AS-Level Path Inference22 June 10, 2005 First hop inference Gather candidate first hop ASes from S by launch traceroute to S from multiple vantage points Identify the transition point T that is likely to be on the path from S to D by testing hop_count(S,T) + hop_count(T,D) = hop_count(S,D) Source Destination AS S AS T2 AS T1AS D AS C Transition point T1 T2 Assume having access to D

On AS-Level Path Inference23 June 10, 2005 Hop count inference Hop_count(S,T) ≈ hop_count(T,S) Hop_count(H,D): H = S or T  Send ping packet to H  Guess the initial TTL value TTL 0 set by H  Get TTL value TTL 1 in ICMP response packet received from H  Hop_count(H,D) = TTL 0 - TTL Common value for TTL 0  32 (Win95/98/Me)  64 (Linux, Compaq Tru64)  128 (Win NT/2000/XP)  255 (most UNIX systems)

On AS-Level Path Inference24 June 10, 2005 Improvement with known first AS hop Unique pathsMatch lengthImprovement AS7018 (tier-1) %3% AS2152 (tier-2) %12% AS8121 (tier-3) %21% All BGP gateways190770%8% US BGP gateways245788%15%

On AS-Level Path Inference25 June 10, 2005 Possible causes of inaccuracy Complicated AS relationships: 15% paths  Two consecutive FLAT links  DOWN link followed by a FLAT link  FLAT link followed by UP link  Dual transit/peering relationship Routing policies  Shortest path vs. customer routes  Inconsistent advertisement to different peering locations  BGP tie-breaking rules AS prepending  > 28% ASes

On AS-Level Path Inference26 June 10, 2005 Conclusion Routescope: AS-level path inference tool without access to the source Two enhancements  AS relationship inference  First hop inference Accuracy: up to 88% inferred paths have the same length as the actual paths New metric for evaluating AS relationship inference Evaluate existing AS relationship inference algorithms