Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) University of North Carolina at Greensboro.

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Presentation transcript:

Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) University of North Carolina at Greensboro

Scope of Presentation The goal of this presentation is to provide an awareness on the dual use dilemma as it relates to academic research. The specific aims are to provide understanding of: The historical and regulatory perspective of Dual Use Research of Concern. Potential ethical and legal concerns. Understanding of the regulations governing life science research. Familiarity of the DURC criteria. Steps by the Institution to address the issue of DURC

Regulations Governing Life Science Research Understanding regulations that governs academic research will help understand the DURC concept International State Federal Local InstitutionalCollaboration Research Decision

Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) Definition of DURC*: “Research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied by others to pose a threat to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, or material”. * Source: National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB)

Historical Term of “Dual Use” The military has used the term “dual use” for several years to refer to technology that could be used in peacetime as well as in war. An example is “nuclear power” or “satellite technology”.

Agents as Weapons Historical Perspective Agents have been used as weapons: 1346 –Tartars used plague infected corpses to infect their enemies 1915 –livestock was infected with Anthrax and Glanders during WWI 1950 to 1970 –ignited the test and development of bioweapons 1972 –Biological Weapons Convention prohibited R&D of bioweapon 1979 –approximately 100 people were exposed and 64 died in Sverdlovsk, Russia from an accidental release of anthrax. 1984–750 became infected with Salmonella in Oregon after eating from salad bars contaminated by Rajneeshee cult –Sarin gas was released in a Tokyo subway station by cult group

Governance of Research and Biosecurity Dr. Thomas Butler was arrested and convicted of mishandling Yersinia pestis in research Dr. Bruce Ivins noted Anthrax researcher was investigated as a suspect in the Anthrax letters attack. He committed suicide before he was formally charged.

Changing Regulatory Climate The United States Government recognized that information gained from life sciences research could potentially be misused in a way that could threaten public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, or materiel. It therefore charged the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to develop a framework for the oversight of “Dual Use Research of Concern” (DURC)

Dual Use Biosecurity Dilemma The information and knowledge acquired from research work with pathogens could be used for malicious ends as well as legitimate purposes.

National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) 2004 NSABB Charter A system of institutional and federal research review that allows for fulfillment of important research objectives while addressing national security concerns; Guidelines for the identification and conduct of research that may require special attention and security surveillance; Professional codes of conduct for scientists and laboratory workers that can be adopted by professional organizations and institutions engaged in life science research; Materials and resources to educate the research community about effective biosecurity; Strategies for fostering international collaboration for the effective oversight of dual use biological research.

Experiments Identified by NSABB NSABB identified seven (7) categories of research that: 1.Enhances the harmful consequences of a biological agent or toxin; 2.Disrupts the immunity or the effectiveness of an immunization without clinical and/or agricultural justification; 3.Confers to a biological agent or toxin, resistance to clinically and/or agriculturally useful prophylactic or therapeutic interventions against that agent or toxin or facilitate their ability to evade detection methodologies; 4.Increases the stability, transmissibility, or the ability to disseminate a biological agent or toxin; 5.Alters the host range or tropism of a biological agent or toxin; 6.Enhances the susceptibility of a host population; or 7.Generates a novel pathogenic agent or toxin or reconstitute an eradicated or extinct biological agent.

DURC Recommendations for UNCG Provide awareness training to faculty and staff on DURC. Develop and implement an institutional policy Review of Research Review of research through the appropriate channels : Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) EHS Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) Others

Things to Consider Part of the research may be a concern to national security Research may fall into any of the DURC criteria Information to be obtained may be used for malevolent purposes. DURC may apply to non-select agents. Responsibilities of PI’s and researchers to determine if proposed work is DURC. Responsibilities of PI’s and researchers to understand the laws governing life science research. Participate in the discussion and policy making process.

Federal Regulation and NSABB The federal government has not yet adopted recommendations by NSABB. Additional guidelines will likely be developed for institutions to follow. Although the regulation is not yet in place, the institution should begin to address the dilemma in the event that such research may take place. The institution should determine what entity would be in charge to help govern and address the dilemma. NSABB’s recommendations would assist the institution to determine research projects that may be sensitive to the dual use dilemma even if the regulation is never implemented.