Activity 1 Experiences vs. perceptions of corruption 2 minute challenge: Write a question you could ask in a survey, to find out about: people’s experiences.

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Presentation transcript:

Activity 1 Experiences vs. perceptions of corruption 2 minute challenge: Write a question you could ask in a survey, to find out about: people’s experiences of corruption people’s perceptions of corruption Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators

Activity 1 Experiences vs. perceptions of corruption Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators Example fact-based question: In some areas there is a problem of corruption among government or public officials. During 1999, has any government official, for instance a customs officer, police officer or inspector in your own country, asked you or expected you to pay a bribe for his service? yes no don’t know

Activity 1 Experiences vs. perceptions of corruption Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators Example perception-based question: It is known that in some countries the problem of corruption among government or public officials is perceived to be high by citizens. Imagine a person who needs something that is entitled to him/her by law. Is it likely or not likely that this person would have to offer money, a present or a favour (e.g. more than the official charge) to get help from: Member of Parliament? Officials in the Ministries? Elected municipal councillors? Customs officials? Police officers ? Tax/revenues officials? Inspectors? Teachers/Professors? Courts officials? Private sector?

Activity 1 Experiences vs. perceptions of corruption Take a moment to look at the graph on the next slide… Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators

Activity 1 Experiences vs. perceptions of corruption Experiences of victimisation are only a small part of what affects people’s perceptions about corruption. Respondents more likely to perceive corruption tend to: fall between the ages of 20 and 34 have incomes above the median be men feel unsafe have been victims of other offences (e.g. theft, assault) have secondary or university-level education be professionally active live in neighbourhoods with low levels of solidarity and social cohesion Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators

Activity 1 Experiences vs. perceptions of corruption Perception is not a proxy for actual levels of corruption. There are many social factors affecting perceptions, other than victimisation. Perception may be higher, or even lower, than actual levels of corruption Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators

Activity 1 Experiences vs. perceptions of corruption How can perception data help or hinder corruption monitoring? What role does perception data play in practice in your country? Is there such a thing as objective data? Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators

Activity 1 Experiences vs. perceptions of corruption Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators Experience-based data is often favoured by policy- makers, and seen as being “objective” Especially in polarized political climates, where the media is seen to have undue influence in magnifying public perceptions of corruption. Excluding or minimizing perception data, is sometimes seen as being desirable in the design of some assessment methods (e.g. Macedonia’s Responsibility and Transparency Index)

Activity 1 Experiences vs. perceptions of corruption Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators But perception data is important : Perceptions matter because agents base their actions on their perceptions High perceptions of corruption are correlated with low perceptions of state legitimacy High perceptions can fuel corrupt practices by: encouraging people to believe they must pay bribes creating a culture of impunity by reducing public trust Reducing the likelihood of citizens reporting leading those with power to believe that there is nothing wrong with accepting bribes.

Activity 1 Experiences vs. perceptions of corruption Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators The gap between perception and reality can itself be a strong indicator of needed action: Reforms not having impact in practice? Or better communication of AC efforts and awareness raising efforts is needed? Lag - targeting victimisation will not necessarily cause perceptions to decline linearly. Facts are never truly objective, because their selection is not objective.

Activity 2 Scenario Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators Remember the provincial director of the national AC & Ombudsman Commission? He had received, with skepticism, the report on the functioning of the provincial network of anti corruption offices… “Is the deceasing number of complaints filed each month in our offices really evidence that the national AC strategy is working in my province?”

Activity 2 Complementarity in selecting indicators Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators “I’m confident about the quality of our legal framework and the independence of our institutions. I’m just not sure about whether they are really doing their job effectively. I need to find out.”

Activity 2 Complementarity in selecting indicators Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators The director asks his staff to design a framework of indicators for assessing the performance of the offices. After doing some desk research and brainstorming possible indicators, the team decides they need to find out more information. They can refine the indicators after they have better assessed the situation.

Activity 2 Scenario Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators Through interviews with the staff of the offices, their clients and a survey of the public, they make the following findings: New ACOC offices are easy to access They have very manageable caseloads, with access to technical assistance from the provincial office, however, Fewer respondents from low income areas know the process for filing reports, and many assume there is a fee for reporting cases Many respondents do not expect their cases would receive a fair investigation and have little faith in the ACOC institution Different opinions on what is considered corruption

Activity 2 Scenario Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators This information tells me that we need to revise our awareness raising: on corruption itself, on the work we’re doing, and processes for registering complaints. And we need to be make sure our communication reaches the poorer areas.

Activity 2 Complementarity in selecting indicators Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators What lessons or principles can be extracted from this experience, in terms of designing indicators? Complex situations require multiple indicators Indicators may need to be refined as data is collected and important issues emerge. Balanced sets of indicators are needed: input- based indicators (e.g. focusing on the legal and institutional framework), and output-based indicators, (e.g. data on the experiences and opinions of those accessing the reporting mechanism).

Are these descriptions of input based (de jure) or output based (de facto)? Indicators that… Refer to the existence and quality of formal rules found in documents, laws, regulations and the constitution Measure improved governance, including in the long-term Answer the question “What has been done?” Assess the governance system’s deliverables to citizens in a country Are more naturally actionable by governments, citizens and donors (e.g. Can’t choose to lower a crime rate (desired effect), but can put more police on the streets (causal factor)) De jure/ input De facto / output De jure De facto De jure

E.g. In practice, the anti-corruption agency makes regular public reports. Say nothing about actual progress Answer the question: “Are citizens benefiting from specific institutions and policies?” Lack actionability E.g. In law, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference. E.g. In practice, the public feel informed about the activities and services of the anti-corruption agency. De facto De jure De facto De jure De facto

Input based/de jure Existence and quality of formal rules found in documents, laws, regulations and the constitution Answer the question: “What has been done?” Actionable Say nothing about actual progress E.g. In law, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference. Output-based/de facto Assess deliverables to citizens in a country Answer the question: “Are citizens benefiting from specific institutions and policies?” Lack actionability Measure the actual improved governance E.g. In practice, the public feel informed about the activities and services of the anti-corruption agency.

Activity 3 Matching input and output indicators Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators Over to you… Can you match the input and output indicators on your table? Small groups 10 minutes