Hybrid Transitive Trust Mechanisms Jie Tang, Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes UC Berkeley, Harvard University,

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Presentation transcript:

Hybrid Transitive Trust Mechanisms Jie Tang, Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes UC Berkeley, Harvard University,

Motivation Large multi-agent systems must deal with fraudulent behavior – eBay auctions – P2P file sharing systems – Web surfing Pool collective experience Need mechanisms for aggregating trust

Agent Interaction Model Defn. Agent Type: θ i in [0,1] = prob. of a successful interaction θ1θ1 θ2θ2 θ3θ3 θ4θ4 θ5θ5 s1s1 s2s2 s3s3 s4s4 s5s5

Goals Informativeness: correlation between scores s i produced by the trust mechanism and true agent types θ i (corr(S, θ)) Strategyproofness: Prevent individual agents from manipulating trust scores s i Trust mechanisms should be both informative and strategyproof Optimize tradeoff between informativeness and strategyproofness

Outline Motivation Example Mechanisms Informativeness vs. Strategyproofness Hybrid Transitive Trust Mechanisms – Theoretical Analysis Experimental Results – Informativeness – Efficiency Conclusions

Outline Motivation Example Mechanisms Informativeness vs. Strategyproofness Hybrid Transitive Trust Mechanisms – Theoretical Analysis Experimental Results – Informativeness – Efficiency Conclusions

Example: PageRank

Example: Shortest Path i j

Example: Maxflow i j

Example: Hitting Time i j

Example: PageRank i j

Manipulations Misreport Sybil

Outline Motivation Example Mechanisms Informativeness vs. Strategyproofness Hybrid Transitive Trust Mechanisms – Theoretical Analysis Experimental Results – Informativeness – Efficiency Conclusions

Value-strategyproof example i j Value strategyproofness: an agent cannot increase its own trust score

Rank-strategyproof example i j Rank strategyproofness: an agent cannot increase its rank

ε-strategyproof ε-value strategyproof: Agents cannot increase their trust score by more than ε through manipulation ε-rank strategyproof: Agents cannot improve their rank to be above agents who have ε higher trust score

Informativeness vs. Strategyproofness

Outline Motivation Example Mechanisms Informativeness vs. Strategyproofness Hybrid Transitive Trust Mechanisms – Theoretical Analysis Experimental Results – Informativeness – Efficiency Conclusions

Hybrid Mechanisms Convex weighting of two mechanisms (one with good strategyproofness properties, one with good informativeness) Get intermediate strategyproofness and informativeness properties α ( ) + (1-α) ( )

Main Results Can combine ε-value-strategyproof mechanisms naturally (1- α)Maxflow- α PageRank hybrid is 0.5α- value strategyproof Adjust strategyproofness as we vary α

Main Results: “Upwards value preservance” and value- strategyproofness yield α-rank strategyproofness (1- α) Shortest Path- α Hitting Time hybrid is α-rank strategyproof (1- α) Shortest Path- α Maxflow hybrid is α-rank strategyproof

Outline Motivation Example Mechanisms Informativeness vs. Strategyproofness Hybrid Transitive Trust Mechanisms – Theoretical Analysis Experimental Results – Informativeness – Efficiency Conclusions

Informativeness Informativeness is the correlation between the true agent types θ i and the trust scores given by each trust mechanism s i Can only be measured experimentally Setup – N agents, each with type θ i (fraction of good) – No strategic agent behavior – Agents randomly interact, report results – Vary number of timesteps

Informativeness Properties Sometimes hybrids have informativeness even higher than either of their base mechanisms

Outline Motivation Example Mechanisms Informativeness vs. Strategyproofness Hybrid Transitive Trust Mechanisms – Theoretical Analysis Experimental Results – Informativeness – Efficiency Conclusions

Efficiency Experiments In practice: care about trustworthy agents receiving good interactions Agents will be strategic Measure efficiency as fraction of good interactions for cooperative agents Simulated two application domains, a P2P file sharing domain and a web surfing domain Setup – Agents use hybrid trust mechanism to choose interaction partners – Report results of interactions to trust mechanism

Cooperative, Lazy free-rider, Strategic Cooperative agents have high type Lazy free-rider agents have low type Strategic agents also have low type, but attempt to manipulate the system Simple agent utility model: – Assume heterogenous ability to manipulate – Reward proportional to manipulability of algorithm – As α increases, more strategic agents manipulate

File Sharing Domain

Conclusions Analyzed informativeness and strategyproofness trade-off theoretically and experimentally Hybrid mechanisms have intermediate informativeness, strategyproofness properties For some domains, hybrid mechanisms produce better efficiency than either base mechanism Thank you for your attention

Conclusions Analyzed informativeness and strategyproofness trade-off theoretically and experimentally Hybrid mechanisms have intermediate informativeness, strategyproofness properties For some domains, hybrid mechanisms produce better efficiency than either base mechanism Thank you for your attention