Small Unit Quantity Distances INTRODUCTION: (6 SLIDES, 13 MIN) SLIDE 1 of 6: INTRODUCTION (2 min) There are a number of factors that determine the risks from explosives to people or facilities. These include: The quantity and type of explosive The distance between explosive facilities and people or other facilities The type of explosive storehouses One of the most efficient means of reducing risk - and thereby contributing towards protecting the public from the effects of an explosive event - is by the use of separation distances. Separation distances ensure that people and facilities are always at a tolerably safe distance from the explosives during storage and handling. You will recall that 'tolerable' will need to be defined, and that the risk should be 'ALARP' - As Low As Reasonably Practicable. Note that in this lesson, we will consider Small Unit Storage only (which we will consider to be above ground storage only). Underground storage is a very complex and specialist matter and specialist expertise should be sought in this area. Similarly, IATG covers some detail on the application of Quantity Distances for ports, for example where ships containing cargos of ammunition may be berthed. There is more detail in IATG 02:20 on Quantity Distances for both above ground and underground storage as well as ports. Note regarding applicability to Small Unit Storage: Because IATG is written for potentially large storage depots, for example, the minimum NEQ shown in the table may be greater than the NEQ in your unit store. In this case, use that lowest distance as the minimum separation distance. It may be possible that this is not feasible because of the location of the ammunition store, for example if it is in a small barracks or police station within a town. If there is concern over the achievability of distances and the corresponding requirement for NEQ of the stock, then ammunition technical expertise should be requested. The ammunition specialist should be able to complete an ‘Explosion Consequence Analysis’ (as per IATG 02:10) to see if a more applied (and potentially pragmatic) solution is viable.

Definitions Potential Explosive Site – PES Exposed Site – ES Separation Distance Quantity Distance – QD Inside Quantity Distance – IQD Outside Quantity Distance - OQD INTRODUCTION: (6 SLIDES, 13 MIN) SLIDE 2 of 6: DEFINITIONS (3 min) (Instructor: ensure students have the aide memoire handout) There are a number of definitions that are important for this module. These are stated at the beginning of IATG 02:30. They are also on your Aide Memoire. They are: Potential Explosive Site – PES: The term ‘Potential Explosion Site’ (PES) refers to the location of a quantity of explosives that will create a blast, fragment, thermal or debris hazard in the event of an accidental explosion of its content. This could be a building which is used to store explosives - an Explosive Storehouse (ESH), or it could just be a stack of ammunition on a pallet on a piece of open ground. It could even be a truck and trailer loaded with ammunition which is parked up. Exposed Site - ES: The term ‘Exposed Site’ (ES) refers to a location which is exposed to the effects of an explosion (or fire) at the potential explosion site (PES) under consideration. This could be inside the depot, for example another Explosive Storehouse (ESH), a stack, a truck or trailer loaded with ammunition, or an explosives workshop. Alternatively, it could be outside the depot, such as a hospital, a road, a residential area. Separation Distance: The term ‘Separation Distance’ is a generic term for the safe distance between a potential explosion site (PES) and an exposed site (ES). Safety is usually achieved by locating the PES at a suitable distance from any ES locations, this distance being far enough that the effects of an explosion or fire at the PES will have dissipated adequately by the time it reaches the affected location such as a hospital - ie the ES. Separation distances may involve the use of the 'Quantity Distance' system, or they may be developed through the use of explosion consequence analysis. Quantity Distance – QD: The term ‘quantity distance’ (QD) refers to the designated safe distance between a potential explosion site (PES) and an exposed site (ES). This is based on the quantity and type of explosive, the structure of the ESH, and the type of affected ES. There is software within the IATG package that allows for automatic calculation of QDs based on the data inputted about the explosives, the type of ESGH and what is close by. Inside Quantity Distance - IQD: The term ‘inside quantity distance’ (IQD) refers to the minimum permissible distance between a potential explosion site (PES) and an exposed site (ES) inside the explosives facility. Outside Quantity Distance - OQD: The term ‘outside quantity distance’ (OQD) refers to the minimum permissible distance between a potential explosion site (PES) and an exposed site (ES) outside the explosives facility. Explosives Facility: The term ‘explosives facility’ refers to an area containing one or more potential explosion sites. National Technical Authority: The term 'national technical authority' refers to the government department(s), organisation(s) or institution(s) charged with the regulation, management, co-ordination and operation of conventional ammunition storage and handling activities.

Measurement of Quantity Distances House 1 School 1 School 2 220m 380m 100m PES 300m House 2 INTRODUCTION: (6 SLIDES, 13 MIN) SLIDE 3 of 6: MEASUREMENT OF QUANTITY DISTANCES (2 min) If there are more than one exposed site of a given type to any PES, then the distance of the closest ES is taken as the relevant figure. For example, if we are looking at a given PES, and there are 4 houses and 2 schools in the area, then we use the distance of the closest house and the closest school. For example, if there are 2 schools, one of which is at 100m and one is at 380m, then the distance applied to this PES is the 100m. Similarly, if the four houses are at 120m, 220m, 300m and 390m, then the distance taken is 120m. Note that the measurement is taken from the closest points of each building. In the case of a hard-standing area used for open stacks, the nearest point of the hard standing is used (rather than any particular pallet or whatever that might happen to be on that hard-standing at the time). Distances are measured along a straight line without regard for traverses or earth cover. If there are intervening structures along the line of measurement, these should be discarded. For example, if a house is 500m from a PES, and there is a hospital which is 800m on exactly the same line, then the presence of the house between the PES and the hospital should be irrelevant for our purposes. 120m House 4 390m House 3

Unitisation Highly complex issue Be aware of it though Use of amended Quantity Distances possible Seek specialist ammunition technical advice INTRODUCTION: (6 SLIDES, 13 MIN) SLIDE 4 of 6: UNITISATION (1 min) If the individual stacks within a PES are separated into stacks such that the maximum credible event is limited to the quantity in any one stack, then this is referred to as 'unit risk' or 'unitisation'. In this case, the distances may be measured from the outside of the wall adjacent to the controlling stack concerned. If the separation to prevent practically instantaneous propagation is provided by one or more substantial dividing walls within a PES, then the QD may be measured from these walls instead of from the outside walls. Details on the construction of these types of walls, which are rarely used, may be found by referring to IATG 02:20, Annex B. The use of unitisation may also allow for reduced QD to be applied based on the Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ) of the stacks within the PES. Specialist ammunition technical advice should be obtained in these circumstances as it is a highly complex issue. Similar advice should also be sought should purpose built compartmentalised buildings be available for ammunition and explosive storage.

Aggregation of Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ) Serial Hazard Divisions Storage Requirement 1.1 1.2 1.3 1 YES NO Use HD 1.1 Quantity Distance. 2 Aggregate the HD 1.1 and 1.2 NEQ. Evaluate aggregate as HD 1.1 then as HD 1.2 and use the greater Quantity Distance. 3 Aggregate the HD 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 NEQ. 4 Aggregate the HD 1.1 and 1.3 NEQ. Use HD 1.1 Quantity Distance for the aggregated NEQ total. 5 Use HD 1.2 Quantity Distance. 6 Assess QD for the NEQ of each HD. Use the greatest Quantity Distance. 7 Use HD 1.3 Quantity Distance. INTRODUCTION: (6 SLIDES, 13 MIN) SLIDE 5 of 6: AGGREGATION OF NET EXPLOSIVE QUANTITY (NEQ) (4 min) It is entirely possible that there may be different types of ammunition stored in a PES. Of course, these must have appropriate Compatibility Groups so that they are permitted to be stored together. These different items may have different Hazard Divisions. This poses a potential problem ,as the Quantity Distance tables and calculations would need to be duplicated every time for every type of HD, and these may not reflect the combined effect if there was an explosive event which propagated through the entire stock within the PES. Explosive chemistry does not alter because of stickers and markings on ammunition containers. In the case of several HD’s within a PES, ‘Aggregation Rules’ are applied. This primarily uses a table – which you can see on the screen – and this covers HD’s 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3. Here are a few example to illustrate how the table is applied: If there is only 100kg of HD 1.1, then use the QD for 1.1. If there is 5kg of HD 1.1, and 10 kg of HD 1.2, then add these together and take the NEQ as 15kg. Then identify the QD for 15kg of HD 1.1, and also 15kg of HD 1.2. See which is the greater distance, and use this. You DO NOT add these two figures together as you have already summed up the NEQ together. If there is 5kg of 1.1, 5kg of 1.2, and 5kg of 1.3, add these together to get 15kg. Again, then identify the QD for 15kg of 1.1 and 15 kg of 1.2, and use the greater distance. In practice, you may find this table very helpful. You need to know the NEQs, and what HDs are there, and follow the advice in the right hand column. A few final points here on aggregation: The NEQ does not include substances such as white phosphorus, chemical agents, smoke, or incendiary compositions unless these substances contribute significantly to the dominant HD concerned. Any other energetic materials such as liquid rocket fuels should be aggregated with the explosives NEQ unless it has been determined by testing that they do not contribute to the overall hazard. The distances quoted in the QD Tables for HD 1.1 are applicable to quantities of TNT. Where explosives having a significantly more powerful or less powerful effect than TNT are being considered, a ‘TNT equivalent’ should be used to determine the appropriate QD. Note regarding applicability to Small Unit Storage: Because IATG is written for potentially large storage depots, for example, the minimum NEQ shown in the table may be greater than the NEQ in your unit store. In this case, use that lowest distance as the minimum separation distance. It may be possible that this is not feasible because of the location of the ammunition store, for example if it is in a small barracks or police station within a town. If there is concern over the achievability of distances and the corresponding requirement for NEQ of the stock, then ammunition technical expertise should be requested. The ammunition specialist should be able to complete an ‘Explosion Consequence Analysis’ (as per IATG 02:10) to see if a more applied (and potentially pragmatic) solution is viable. Unless the unit storage is really ‘field storage’ or ‘temporary storage’ – in which cases IATG 04:10 apply – then the requirements in IATG 02:20 should be adhered to.

Aggregation of HD 1.4, 1.5 & 1.6 HD 1.4: Separation distances based on fire risks HD 1.5: Treat as 1.1 for flexibility HD 1.6: See NATO Publication AASPT-1 INTRODUCTION: (6 SLIDES, 13 MIN) SLIDE 6 of 6: AGGREGATION OF HAZARD DIVISIONS 1.4, 1.5 AND 1.6 (1 min) Distances from a PES containing ammunition and explosives of HD 1.4 are not a function of NEQ. Separation distances should be based on the fire risks and fire-fighting capability available. The separation distance for a PES of open stacks or light buildings to any type of ES should be greater than 10m. For more robust buildings the separation distance should be that which is required for emergency access. Ammunition and explosives of HD 1.5 contain insensitive explosive substances, which are so insensitive that there is very little likelihood of initiation or transition from burning to detonation when stored in isolation. Nevertheless, in order to allow for storage flexibility, they should be considered to be HD 1.1 for the purposes of QD estimation. Ammunition of HD 1.6 contains extremely insensitive explosive substances. National efforts to develop HD 1.6 munitions began in the 1970s, and due to the difficulty in developing such munitions, this effort is still under development. Detailed storage advice may be found in the NATO publication AASPT-1, whilst UN Test Series 7 will determine if ammunition and explosives may be classified as HD 1.6

Inside Quantity Distances Outside explosive facility Site perimeter Inside explosive facility PES INSIDE QUANTITY DISTANCES: (1 SLIDE, 3 MIN) SLIDE 1 of 1: INSIDE QUANTITY DISTANCES (3 min) Inside Quantity Distances (IQD) are distances between different sites within an explosive facility. For example, between 2 Explosive Storehouses (ESH). Each of these ESH is a Potential Explosive Site (PES). When comparing the two sites in isolation, we would study one at a time. In this example the ESH which we are considering would the PES. Anything in proximity to the PES is an Exposed Site (ES). So, you will see that a PES can also be an ES to another ESH. The easy way to manage this apparent complication is to study one site at a time as a PES, and consider all things near them as an ES. Note that we are talking about sites within the explosive facility here. On the slide, you will see a PES (the one that poses the risk in our site-by-site assessment), and an ES which is within the perimeter of the explosive facility – we will consider that this is a structure related to the site. (Instructor: click mouse to reveal arrow denoting IQD). You will see that the IQD is simply the quantity distance, or separation distance, between the sites pertaining to the explosive facility. You should also note that there are different distances related to whether the sites are magazines or process buildings. This is because process buildings are usually subject to higher numbers of workers in them at any one time, and the activities that go on there may involve things like exposed ammunition which is removed from packaging, and potentially even dismantled, for repair, inspection, and so on. This means the APB is generally more vulnerable to the hazards presented by an accident in an incident at a PES. The distances here are called Inter-Magazine Distances (IMD) and Process Building Distances (PBD). You will possibly find that, in the case of small unit storage, there is only the one ammunition storage building. There may not be any other magazines, and probably no process building. In these kinds of scenarios, there will be no IQDs to worry about. Internal Quantity Distance (IQD) ES

Outside Quantity Distances Outside explosive facility Outside Quantity Distance (OQD) Site perimeter Inside explosive facility PES OUTSIDE QUANTITY DISTANCES: (4 SLIDES, 8 MIN) SLIDE 1 of 4: OUTSIDE QUANTITY DISTANCES (2 min) Outside quantity distances are those from a PES to sites which are not related to the explosives area. Classic examples are from an Explosive Storehouse at an explosive facility to a public road or railway line outside the establishment, or perhaps a residential house, church or hospital. The principle is the same, but the different approaches are mainly required because civilian or other sites which aren’t associated with the explosive facility are likely to be less well protected (whereas structures at the explosive facility can be protected or otherwise managed), and there are likely to be many more people in public areas, and they may well be totally unrelated to the explosives facility. In essence, the hazard that a PES poses presents more of a risk to the public and to structures outside the PES, than they present to properly managed sites within the perimeter fence, for example. (Instructor: click mouse to reveal arrow denoting OQD). You will see that the OQD is simply the quantity distance, or separation distance, between a sites at the explosive facility and one that is unconnected. ES

Types of Outside Quantity Distances Inhabited Building Distance (IBD): PES to sites where the general public, or workers not directly associated with the explosives facility, live, work or congregate Intended to prevent serious structural damage to ‘traditional’ types of building No direct injury to people in the open from blast/heat Some injury possible from fragmentation OUTSIDE QUANTITY DISTANCES: (4 SLIDES, 8 MIN) SLIDE 2 of 4: TYPES OF OUTSIDE QUANTITY DISTANCES (3 min) There are many types of Exposed Site (ES) when we consider what might be outside an explosive area – potentially all the infrastructure and fabric of modern life. These may be roads, houses, hospitals, places of worship, and so on. These are categorised as follows: Inhabited Building Distance (IBD): The Inhabited Building Distance (IBD) should be the minimum distance to be observed between a Potential Explosion Site (PES) and buildings or sites where members of the general public (or personnel not involved in explosives-related operations) either work, live or congregate. The distances are intended to prevent serious structural damage to traditional types of inhabited buildings (i.e. 230 mm solid brick or equivalent) or caravans, and any consequential death or serious injury to their occupants. Persons in the open would not suffer direct injury from the effects of blast and radiant heat at these distances. Fragments and debris may cause some injuries. The extent of injuries will depend upon the PES structure and the NEQ and fragmentation characteristics of the ammunition and explosives involved. At this distance, the fragment threat is defined as one hazardous fragment of 80 joules/56m2. The fragment threat will decrease as the distance from the PES increases. The distances do not however exclude the risk to the public from projections falling from structures, broken glass, displaced tiles etc, or the risk of some minor injury to occupants. Glazing is an important factor in building occupant protection and protective features are relatively easy to provide. IBD are normally subject to fixed minimum distances to give protection against fragments emanating from a PES. So what does this actually mean? It means that if, for a given type and quantity of explosive, the IBD is stated as 100 meters, then there should be none of this kind of site within 100m of the PES.

Types of Outside Quantity Distances Vulnerable Building Distance (VBD): Used for an inhabited building which is of ‘vulnerable construction’, such as a glass façade A large facility of special importance, such as a school or hospital Normally twice the distance of the IBD OUTSIDE QUANTITY DISTANCES: (4 SLIDES, 8 MIN) SLIDE 3 of 4: TYPES OF OUTSIDE QUANTITY DISTANCES (1 min) Vulnerable Building Distance (VBD): The Vulnerable Building Distance (VBD) is used for an inhabited building which is of ‘vulnerable construction’, such as a glass facade, or is a large facility of special importance, such as a school or hospital. Larger distances from the PES are required to adequately reduce the risk. This risk reduction is achieved by using a greater distance between the PES and the vulnerable site. The calculation for the VBD is normally twice the IBD.

Types of Outside Quantity Distances Public Traffic Route Distance (PTRD): Roads and railways Waterways, including rivers, canals and lakes Airport buildings and facilities (unless ‘vulnerable’) Public rights of way (e.g. footpaths) OUTSIDE QUANTITY DISTANCES: (4 SLIDES, 8 MIN) SLIDE 4 of 4: TYPES OF OUTSIDE QUANTITY DISTANCES (2 min) Public Traffic Route Distance (PTRD): Public traffic routes (and other public areas) include: Roads Railways Waterways, including rivers, canals and lakes Airport buildings and facilities (unless considered as a VBD) Public rights of way (e.g. footpaths) The distance required is based on the amount of usage of the route by vehicles, people, etc, also known as traffic density. Examples of usage rates for each density level that should be considered are shown in the footnotes at Annex D to IATG 02:20. This table is reproduced on the slide. Three alternative QD should therefore be used, dependent on the average public usage of the route, as shown in the table: Density Appropriate QD High Density Usage 100% of IBD Medium Density Usage (the PTRD) 67% of IBD Low Density Usage 50% of IBD The numbers of people exposed to the hazard should be determined by the average of the traffic or people counted, as appropriate, over a number of 24 hour periods. Similar QD to those suggested for public rights of way should be applied to playing fields, golf courses and similar recreational facilities. These should be subject to the same minimum QD requirements. So, how does this actually work? What does 67% of IBD mean? It means that, once we have calculated the “Inhabited Building Distance”, then the Medium Density Usage road should not be closer than 67% of the IBD. Lets say, for example, that the calculation shows that the IBD for a given PES is 100 meters. This means that there should be no inhabited buildings within 100 m of the PES, otherwise the risk will be greater than is required or otherwise desirable. However, the medium use road should not be closer than 67m from the PES – this is because the risk is less than that presented to, say a house, or even a busier road. This is why the distance is more stringent for a busy road than it is for a lightly used road.

The Explosive Limit License (ELL) Each PES will be licensed - therefore each PES has an ELL The ELL states maximum NEQ to be stored in a given PES The ELL has a table to show how the limits were derived The table uses ‘pictograms’ to denote different types of structure, and the Quantity Distance between each type EXPLOSIVE LIMIT LICENSE: (3 SLIDES, 8 MIN) SLIDE 1 of 3: BACKGROUND (1 min) Each PES will be licensed - therefore each PES has an ELL. The ELL states maximum NEQ to be stored in a given PES. The ELL has a table to show how the limits were derived. The table uses ‘pictograms’ to denote different types of structure, and the Quantity Distance between each type. In the table, different types of structure are considered in relation to each other, and this is applied for each Hazard Division stored therein.

Type of Structure / Area Potential Explosion Site (PES) Pictograms Symbol Type of Structure / Area Description Directional Effects Potential Explosion Site (PES) Earth covered ESH or Igloo Building with earth on the roof and against three walls. Through the rear of the structure. Perpendicular to the direction of the ES. Through the door and headwall towards the ES. Reinforced ESH Walls of nominal 450mm Reinforced Concrete (RC) (or 680mm Brick). Protective Roof of 150mm RC. Door is Barricaded if it faces a PES. Through the rear or perpendicular to the ES. Semi-Reinforced ESH No Protective Roof. Any direction to ES. Light Building, Barricaded or Traversed Walls of minimum 215mm brick, or equivalent. Protective roof of 150mm RC. Barricaded side to PES. EXPLOSIVE LIMIT LICENSE: (3 SLIDES, 8 MIN) SLIDE 2 of 3: PICTOGRAMS (2 min) The screen shows some example pictograms. Look at your handout and you will see the range of pictograms included at Annex C to IATG 02:20. These pictograms are simple illustrations to represent different types of site. For example, and earth covered igloo might have a symbol like this… (Instructor: click mouse to reveal a picture of an igloo and associated pictogram). You will see that the pictograms have arrows. This represents the hazard. For example, in this case, the arrows are pointing away from ESH. This means the hazard is being emitted from the site, ie it is giving off the effects of an explosion at this site. So the arrows pointing towards a site are an Potential Explosive Site (PES). Similarly, arrows pointing away form a site mean it is a Potential Explosive Site (PES). (Instructor: click mouse to reveal a picture of an APB, with pictogram as an ES). The picture is an Ammunition Process Building and you can just see the edge of the traverse in the right side of the picture. The pictogram is for an APB with a traverse and a reinforced roof. The arrows show the arrows are pointing toward the APB. This means the hazard is coming into the site, ie it is suffering the effects of an explosion at another site. So the arrows pointing towards a site are an Exposed Site (ES).

Worked Example (Top View) Quantity Distance APB IGLOO (Pictograms) EXPLOSIVE LIMIT LICENSE: (3 SLIDES, 8 MIN) SLIDE 3 of 3: WORKED EXAMPLE (5 min) So – you have now received a lot of information. This may seem fairly disjointed at the moment. We will now look at the ELL matrix to bring it all together. By way of a worked example: We have been tasked with calculating the Quantity Distances for an igloo ESH as in the picture you have just seen. This is our Potential Explosive Site. We have been told that this igloo must be able to store Hazard Division 1.1. We therefore find the tables for HD 1.1. Conveniently, this is the first set of tables, as denoted by the heading at the top of the first page. The first site we intend to look at (because we’ve decided we want to look at that one first) is an APB with a reinforced roof, which is also at the same explosive facility. We know that we need the symbol for an igloo, and we need the arrows pointing out of it because it is a PES. Find the symbols for the igloo PES. You will see that we have the choice of the arrows coming from the front, side or rear. Our APB is in a line out of the back of the igloo. So we need the symbol with the arrows coming out the back of the igloo PES. This PES symbol is along the top line of symbols on the left hand side of the columns. You will see that you need to go three pages in before you find the Exposed Site symbols for an APB with a reinforced roof. When you look at the intersection between our PES and the ES, there is something written in the box which is “D10”. You need to convert this into a meaningful distance. You therefore need to go to Annex E which is the associated tables for Hazard Division 1.1. You may wish to note that there are similar pairings of Annexes for Hazard Divisions 1.2 and 1.3. The process is the same for those too. Getting back to our worked example: You will see a column titled ”D10”. You will see various figures in that D10 column, and these are related to the NEQ (in kilograms) which is shown in the left hand side of the table. This table can be worked in one of two ways: You are told what NEQ of 1.1 the igloo must store, so you calculate how far away an APB could be. If the APB is beyond this distance, then it could be used in this role. If the APB is closer than this distance, then you may have to close the APB activities down and move them elsewhere. For the sake of the example, lets say you’ve been told the igloo must house an NEQ of HD 1.1 of 700kg. The intersection of D10 – NEQ 700kg is 72 meters. So if the APB is located 80 meters from the back of the igloo, then in theory this would be fine. However if it were only located 60m away, this will pose a problem. Alternatively, you are told the NEQ must store HD 1.1, but that the APB must also remain functioning, and it must be outside the Quantity Distance for the PES. The APB is, say, 100 meters away. Going down column D10, you will eventually get to 98 meters and 105 meters. Always take the lower figure – do not round up. In this case, we would need to take the 98 meter figure. You will see that this equates to an NEQ of 1,800 kg. You could therefore (in theory) license this igloo to 1,800 kg, all other things being equal and if there were no other exposed sites that would be affected by an explosive event in this PES. Because these are both inside the explosive facility, this is actually an Inside Quantity Distance (IBD). (Pictograms)

Quantity Distances: Mini-Exercise Nearest residential house (Top View) Perimeter of site ESH 3 ESH 1 MINI EXERCISE: (1 SLIDE, 8 MIN) SLIDE 1 of 1: MINI-EXERCISE (8 min) (Instructor: There is a period of 8 minutes available for this exercise. Students should be given 5 minutes to make the calculations, and then allow 3 minutes to reveal the solution. After revealing the solution, discuss the answers, particularly regarding any obvious errors or disagreements. If necessary, use the usual 5 minutes set aside for questions to further clarify the matter). You will now be shown some basic information regarding some sites within an explosive facility, and there is also a site of interest beyond the perimeter fence. You have 5 minutes to read the information and to make the necessary calculations using the tables in your handouts, which are some of the Annexes to IATG 02:20. We will then take a few minutes to review your answers. Answer the questions on the handout. (Instructor: the answers are below): What is the maximum NEQ of Hazard Division 1.1 that may be stored in ESH 2 (reinforced walls and roof, traversed)?   Max NEQ based on distance to ESH 1 (D9, 100m): 9,000 kg NEQ Max NEQ based on distance to ESH 3 (D9, 260m): 140,000 kg NEQ Max NEQ based on distance to Inhabited Building (D13 ,500m): 10,000 kg    Therefore - maximum permissible NEQ if HD 1.1 to be stored in ESH 2 (lowest distance): 9,000 kg Note that traversing for reinforced structure offers no real advantage in terms of these QD tables in IATG.     What is the maximum NEQ of Hazard Division 1.3.1 that may be stored in ESH 1 (light structure)? Max NEQ based on distance to ESH 2 (100m): The minimum distance for this combination is 10m. No upper NEQ is specified. This would therefore be determined by the physical Units of Space in the ESH. Max NEQ based on distance to ESH 3 (D1, 200m): Over 250,000 kg. Practically speaking, this would therefore be determined by the physical Units of Space in the ESH. Max NEQ based on distance to Inhabited Building (D4, 450m): Over 250,000 kg. Practically speaking, this would therefore be determined by the physical Units of Space in the ESH. Therefore - maximum permissible NEQ if HD 1.3.1 to be stored in ESH 1 (lowest distance): Determined by the practicable Units of Space in the ESH. What is the maximum NEQ of Hazard Division 1.4 that may be stored in ESH 3? Distances from a PES containing ammunition and explosives of HD 1.4 are not a function of NEQ. Separation distances should be based on the fire risks and fire-fighting capability available. The separation distance for a PES of open stacks or light buildings to any type of ES should be greater than 10m. There is a distance of greater than 10m. This therefore also likely to be a function of the available Units of Space. If the NEQ of ammunition that you hold is less than the lowest figures shown in the Quantity Distance Tables in IATG 02:20 but the minimum distances in the tables are too great for your requirements, what might you consider to try to achieve a more tailored and proportionate, pragmatic solution? Request for expert assistance form a ammunition technical specialist. This expert should be able to complete an Explosion Consequence Analysis (ECA) as per IATG 02:10, which may provide you with a reduced separation distance to be applied. Traverse ESH 2

Questions Are there any questions? 1 slide, 5 minutes