Sandro Bologna - ENEA Claudio Balducelli – YLICHRON (ENEA) Massimo Gallanti - CESI Ricerca Workshop – AICT Roma 6 Dicembre, 2007 ICT nella gestione del Sistema Elettrico: opportunità e nuovi problemi E NTE PER LE N UOVE TECNOLOGIE L’ E NERGIA E L’ A MBIENTE

Current electrical network from source-to-sink Generation Transport Distribution Loads The primary aim of an electricity supply system is to meet the customer’s demands for energy (in sufficient quantity and quality, at the required time and at an acceptable price)

Current Structure of the Electrical System in Europe Transmission National / International Subtransmission Regional Low Voltage Distribution System

National Control Center TCI RTU Optical Fibre Current Electrical Network Management Regional Control Center

Change of energy market environment, e.g. globalization, competition Business process optimization, e.g. new communication channels, Web Pressure on prices and cost together with the trend to more automation Increased value of information, especially with regard to real-time information Stronger customer focus Technology innovation 1st revolution: Open Energy Market Generation company Transmission company Subsidiary Trader Distribution company Business processes Communication kWh Power exchange Local generation Service provider

Distribution Systems Clients Transmission System Generators Qualified Clients IPP Trading Companies Market Operator System Operator Private Communications Network Public Communications Network Growing Interdependencies between Electrical and Telecommunication Systems in the Open Energy Market Operational Planning Real time Control Energy Management

2nd revolution: Distributed Generation The increasing diffusion of Distributed Generation (DG) makes the distribution networks to evolve:  from a mainly passive structure,  toward an active model, very similar to the current transmission networks

Smart Grid: The Vision  Coordinated, local management and full integration of Distributed Generation DG and Renewable Energy Resource RES with large scale central power generation  Extensive small generation connected close to end customers  Flexible, optimal and strategic grid expansion, maintenance an operation  User specified quality security and reliability of supply for the digital age Integrated approach involving technical, commercial and regulatory issues Source: EU 2006

Integrated infrastructures for active network operation Meter storage Demand response Gx Gy Communicati on control local area 3 G2 G3 storage Demand response Meter Communicatio n control local area 2 DSO 1 Communication network G1 storage Demand response Meter Communicati on control local area 1 Bulk gen. TSO DGop n DGop 2 DGop 1 DSO n DSO 2 Information Communication control Power flow Microgrid Power grid

Addressing active network management: the CESI RICERCA approach OBJECTIVE REFERENCE INFRASTRUCTURE Experimental microgrid composed of microgenerators, dispatchable loads, and storage systems Design and experimentation of microgrids management and control functions. The following functions have been implemented: economic dispatching of generators frequency and voltage regulation pseudo islanding operation (meeting a predefined power exchange profile with the main network)

Microgrid central control storagefuel cellPV CHP DSO EMS Forecast data distribution grid & central generators electricity heat information MV network 0.4 kV local lontrol Microgrid communication channel Addressing active network management: the CESI RICERCA approach Control system of the experimental microgrid implemented at CESI RICERCA’s premises

Addressing the safety and security issue: the ENEA SAFEGUARD approach OBJECTIVE REFERENCE INFRASTRUCTURE A supervisory and control system (SCADA) of the electrical transmission network Development of a network of software components (agent oriented) to increment the survivability of information intensive critical infrastructures as the electrical transport and distribution networks, during attacks, intrusions, or anomalies caused by network instabilities.

SAFEGUARD multi-agent architecture Control system of electrical network (RTUs & Control Centers) Home LCCIs Topology agent Negotiation agent MMI agent Other LCCIs Foreign electrical networks Communication networks Correlation agent Action agent Low level agents High level agents Network state monitors Intrusion Detection wrappers Anomaly detector agents Actuators Commands and information Only information Network protection at global level Network protection at local level

Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Substations Loads Generators Power transport network Supervisory and Control System Electrical system physical layer SIA-R CCN CCR SIA-C Remote Units Control Centers Information Network Communication Network Data concentrators IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARD TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM RTU Event sequences checking agent Invariant checking agent Communication ports checking agent RTU state hybrid detector

ENEA Testing Platform of SAFEGUARD Technology emulation on a local network of the components belonging to a SCADA distributed system RTU 1 RTU 2 RTU 3 RTU n Electrical load-flow simulator (e-Agora) SCADA Control Center National Network Data Base (Gegional DB) Network Data Base (National DB) SCADA data exchange bus Attacks/faults Console design running log/document TEST PLATFORM Safeguard high level agents (correlator, action ect.) SCADA Control Center Regional Message “broker” Event sequences hybrid detector (Case Base reasoning) Hybrid detector for State Estimation (Checking Invariants) RTU state hybrid detector (Neural Network) Communication hybrid detector (Data Mining technique) Low Level Agents

ENEA TEST PLATFORM OF SAFEGUARD TECHNOLOGY

OBJECTIVE: REFERENCES INFRASTRUTTURES: An electrical distribution network A public voice/data tele-communication network Provide a technology (named MIT, Middleware Improved Technology) which will reduce the risk of cascading failures caused by interdependency between Large Complex Critical Infrastructures (LCCI) MIT system will support information sharing between LCCIs operators to augment their mutual situational awareness. MIT system will support negotiation and coordinated actions between neighbouring systems for the establishment of effective and optimal measures; Addressing the cascading failures issue: the ENEA IRRIIS approach

Interdependencies between Electrical and Telecommunication Networks

Overall IRRIIS MIT architecture Telecom Data Base Other Data Bases Electrical Data Base Inter LCCIs data exchange Communication Components LCCIs Data Bases & Alarm logs LCCI 1 LCCI 2 LCCI n Add-on Components

The Italian IRRIIS Scenario MANAGING “INTERDEPENDENCY” BETWEEN DIFFERENT INFRASTRUCTURES

The scenario regards the black-out occurred in Rome on January 2004 at the Italian Telecom infrastructure. The described scenario is approximate and refers to subsystems that caused the interruption of the Telecom services that are critical for the ACEA distribution system operators. The main power supply is normally furnished by the service (1) produced by the National power network or, alternatively, by a backup emergency diesel generator (2). A second backup power supply is guaranteed by the battery packs (3), but in this case the power reserve may decrease quickly. Telecom Rome nodeAcea Power Supply Telecom users ACEA Control Centers Generic users Fiumicino Airport operations The Italian IRRIIS Scenario

MIT components Telecom MIT components Electricity Local attacker Telecom Telecom network simulation Power backup simulation Electrical network simulation Local attacker Electricity Global attacker SCADA emulation Test Bed communication channel Local LAN Additional analysis tools Experimentation GUI Logger Local LAN Experimentation Archive MIT communication channel Electricity monitoring panel Experimentation SERVER Telecom monitoring panel View of the IRRIIS Test Bed at ENEA

Conclusions and R&D challenges More than 50% of the electrical load is highly dispersed Increasing part of generation is becoming dispersed Energy market is always more open and interconnected Increasing penetration of ICT for “better” control Improve monitoring information flow issues Distributed control algorithms and models issues Reliability/safety/security issues Inter-dependencies issues Trans-border issues