1 A Secure System Based on Fingerprint Authentication Scheme Author ： Zhe Wu,Jie Tian,Liang Li, Cai-ping Jiang,Xin Yang Prestented by Chia Jui Hsu Date ：

2

3 Outline Introduction Fingerprint Authentication Scheme Implementation Manipulation Security Analysis Conclusion References

4 Introduction Inherent shortcoming and flaw of PKI –Certificates are not easily located –There need strict online requirement –Validating policy is time-consuming and difficult to administer –Certificates leak data and users must pre- enroll

5 Inherent shortcoming and flaw of IBE –It is difficult in prove self-identity to Trust Authority (TA) and authenticate sender’s identity.

6 This paper proposes a new secure system based on a fingerprint authentication scheme which combines fingerprint authentication technology with IBE scheme.

7 Fingerprint Authentication Scheme Setup Encryption Decryption Verification

8 Setup TA initializes a secure area Constructs a supersingular elliptic curve satisfying Weil Diffie-Hellman (WDH) TA chooses three secrets s,u,v

9 Encryption Step1 –Usb-key A authenticates A Step2 –Usb-key A generates A’s signature FPS A Step3 –Obtains authentication data AUTH A Step4 –CIPH 1 = Enc AB +Hash(Enc AB )+AUTH A +r ‧ P

10 Decryption When receiving the from A, B computes the session key K AB with his private K AB of identifier and uses K AB to decrypt Enc AB to get M.

11 Verification When B wants to verify A's identity, TA provides online identity authentication service. Receiving AUTH A sent from B, TA first encrypts it and obtains A's onsite fingerprint summary b A, then verifies the signature FPS A by verification function Ver.

12 If Ver is true, TA matches b A with the registered fingerprint summary b A stored in database by function FPM. TA returns the matching result to B after encryption and signature. Finally, B verifies A's identity.

13 Implementation TA -client

14 TA

15 User registration Step1 –generate b A Step2 –TA enrolls A’s identifier ： ID A Step3 –TA computes A’s fingerprint certificate C A Step4 –TA computes A’s Q FP-A and D FP-A Step5 –TA writes the public params { P,P T-pub, P pub P online, H, H1, H2, Sig } and A's personal params { D FP-A,,C A, R A, b A } into Usb-key A, and handsover into A.

16 Usb-key We integrate fingerprint sensor and USB token into one device called Usb-key. The Usb-key is able to capture and process fingerprint image. There is an independent time Besides, it also contains fingerprint summary matching algorithm and Identity-Based Signature algorithm (Sig and Ver ), and be able to be protected against duplication of private key of fingerprint.

17 Online Secret-key distribution Step1(B→TA) –CIPH 2 =C pri +Hash(C pri )+c ． P Step2 –Use Ver and FPM to authenticate B’s identity Step3(TA→B) –CIPH 3 =C back +Hash(C back ) Step4 –B obtains his private key of identifier from TA

18 Online Identity authentication B sends A's authentication data to TA. TA authenticates A's identity and returns matching result to B.

19 Online Identifier update Assume B wants to update his identifier, he could apply to TA online for relevant service. B computes C pri which also contains B's new string. Then B sends CIPH 2 to TA. After authenticating B's identity, TA provides update service requested by B.

20 TA recomputes B's identifier and fingerprint certificate, encrypts them with the session key and obtains C update, then returns CIPH 4 to B where CIPH 4 = C update +Hash(C update ) B takes new idetifier and figerprint certificate instead of in Usb-key B

21 -client Local login authentication Encryption and decryption Intercommunication with Usb-key Intercommunication with TA

22 Intercommunication with TA Private key of identifier distribution sender’s identity authentication Identifier update

23 Manipulation Step1 Step2 Step3 Step4 Step5 Step6

24 Security Analysis C pretends B to ask TA for B’s private key of identifier Cpretends A to send an to B B pretends A to send to other users like D or TA

25 C pretends B to ask TA for B’s private key of identifier user C

26 C pretends A to send an to B user C

27 B pretends A to send to other users like D or TA user C

28 Conclusion In the system, we user Usb-key to keep secret data and help completing relevant encryption process. Usb-key can only be used by its legitimate owner. Thus the system successfully combines cryptographic key with legitimate users.

29 References p?punumber= http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/RecentCon.js p?punumber=