THE COALITIONAL PRESIDENTIALISM PROJECT October 15, 2015 The Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Svitlana Chernykh University of Oxford

Outline  Evolution of the presidential debate  What do we know about coalition management already  Research objectives  Theoretical claims  Data October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 2

 First phase of debate: Linz’s classic arguments  Second phase: Mainwaring, Stepan/Skach, and others add party fragmentation to the mix: the “difficult combination” of presidentialism, multipartism, and stable democracy  Third phase: scholars assail the “difficult combination” argument by detailing coalition formation even in least-likely cases (Deheza, Amorim, Pereira, Altman, Zelaznik, Mejía- Acosta, Martínez-Gallardo, Zucco, etc.)  “Presidentialism can work like parliamentarism” From the “perils of presidentialism” to the coalitional approach

 “ Presidentialism can work like parliamentarism” (Negretto/Colomer)  Coalitional politics are the key. Presidents now conceived as formateurs.  Coalition governments almost as common under presidential as under parliamentary regimes  Presidents try to foster the emergence of legislative cartels which will defend the preferences of the executive Where is the debate now?

What we know about coalitional presidentialism so far?  The formation and survival of coalitions depend on legislative powers of presidents. October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 5

What we know about coalitional presidentialism so far?  The formation and survival of coalitions depend on legislative powers of presidents.  The size of the president’s own party matters. October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 6

What we know about coalitional presidentialism so far?  The formation and survival of coalitions depend on legislative powers of presidents.  The size of the president’s own party matters.  Cabinet coalescence (proportionality in the mapping of seats to portfolios) matters for the internal discipline of the coalitions. October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 7

What we know about coalitional presidentialism so far?  The formation and survival of coalitions depend on legislative powers of presidents.  The size of the president’s own party matters.  Cabinet coalescence (proportionality in the mapping of seats to portfolios) matters for the internal discipline of the coalitions.  The selection of non-partisan ministers (technocrats) influences governing style. October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 8

What we know about coalitional presidentialism so far?  The formation and survival of coalitions depend on legislative powers of presidents.  The size of the president’s own party matters.  Cabinet coalescence (proportionality in the mapping of seats to portfolios) matters for the internal discipline of the coalitions.  The selection of non-partisan ministers (technocrats) influences governing style.  Coalitions tend to erode toward the end of the presidential term (lame-duck effect); electoral cycles matter. October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 9

What we know about coalitional presidentialism so far?  The formation and survival of coalitions depend on legislative powers of presidents  The size of the president’s own party matters  Cabinet coalescence (proportionality in the mapping of seats to portfolios) matters for the internal discipline of the coalitions.  The selection of non-partisan ministers (technocrats) influences governing style  Coalitions tend to erode toward the end of the presidential term (lame-duck effect); electoral cycles matter  The very existence of a dominant pro-presidential faction in the legislature creates a new meta-cleavage in political life, which can be described very simply as “ins versus outs” or government versus opposition October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 10

 Too often institutionally univariate  Too often divorced from local context  Too often ignores the role of informal institutions in presidential governance  Too prone to stake big generalizations on the experience of a single country or region (typically Latin America) Deficiencies of the current debate

Objectives of the Project  Uncover and analyze the tools that presidents use to create and manage coalitions in multiparty systems October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 12 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods

Objectives of the Project  Uncover and analyze the tools that presidents use to create and manage coalitions in multiparty systems  Assess the consequences of these tools for democratic accountability: this is the tradeoff of governability versus accountability October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods Page 13 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods

 Presidents are equipped with a “toolbox” which allows them to initiate and cultivate interparty coalitions  Presidents tend to use five key tools, but in varying admixtures  These tools are imperfectly substitutable  Tradeoffs for democratization: these tools enhance presidential power, but can also erode legislative capacity, horizontal accountability, transparency, and party systems We make 4 related claims Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods October 15, 2015

 Agenda power: legislative powers of the president  Budgetary prerogatives: control over public spending, use of “pork”  Cabinet management: allocation of portfolios among coalition parties  Partisan powers of presidents  Informal institutions: clientelistic, paraconstitutional, and indirectly observable practices that govern executive- legislative relations The five tools in the toolbox Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods October 15, 2015

 Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Ecuador)  Ex-USSR (Armenia, Russia, Ukraine)  Africa (Benin, Kenya, Malawi) Cross-regional focus Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods October 15, 2015

Data collected Interviews Objective indicators Case studies 2 successful cases 2 failed cases Budget case study October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods

 350 (total) interviews with national legislators  60% members of the coalition  40% members of the opposition  Inside each group, an approximate reflection of the size of sub- groups (constituent parties)  Appropriate mix of party leaders and backbenchers Sample Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods October 15, 2015

The interview sample Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods October 15, 2015

The Questionnaire October 15, 2015 Coalitional Presidentialism Project: Questions and Methods 12 structured and 10 semi-structured questions 5 main categories of questions: nature of the coalitions in the country, formal and informal tools, presidential powers, personal characteristics and experiences, democracy and accountability Available in 7 languages (English, Portuguese, Spanish, French, Russian, Ukrainian, Armenian)

Preliminary Results