The World Stands By, Again Darfur Yundi Liu and Becky Lang The World Stands By, Again

Historical Background Largest African Country Darfur an Independent Muslim Sultanate until 1916 40 years under British Colonial Rule Grouped with two other territories to form Sudan when British withdrew in 1956

Diverse Sudan North: Ethnicity Arab, Religion Muslim South: Ethnicity African, Religion Christian Darfur: Ethnicity African, Religion Muslim Main three tribes: Fur (Darfur = Land of the Fur) Zhaghawa Masalit Nomadic Arabs (Sudan and Chad)

Lasting Conflict 1980s Oil and ethnic tension further complicate 1990s Civil war in Chad spills over into Darfur Beginning of a 20 year civil war between Sudan’s Muslim North (central govt in Khartoum) and Christian South (SPLA) Oil and ethnic tension further complicate 1990s Terrorist Connections and Osama bin Laden (1991) Unilateral U.S. Sanctions

A Precedent for Darfur

Darfur: Conflict waiting to Erupt Darfur’s tribal-administration conflict resolution mechanisms weakened in favor of ineffectual state institutions 2001-2003 “breakdown of local governance” No trusted system of conflict resolution Desertification increases economic competition Tribes gather arms to protect economic intersts Ethnic tension

Peace Talks as a Catalyst for Conflict Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Naivasha Agreement) Signed 2005 Negotiated by the USA, UK and Norway Increased USA involvement Similarly disenfranchised Darfur demands political reform and economic assistance Appeal to government to have their concerns addresed in the peace process When this approach fails, feel only option left is a rebellioin that could get similar international treatment as the south

Darfurian Rebels Lack united political front Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/SLA) Abdel Wahid al Nur (Fur) Minni Minawi (Zaghawa) Formed February 2003 Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) Lack united political front

Who are the Janjaweed? Translates as “evil horseman” or “devil on horseback” Not a self-identifying term Government funded (proxies) Nomads who came from Chad and West Africa 1970s, 1980s Local, Arab camel-herders Free to pursue own agenda in return for suppressing the rebellion

Civilians Targeted Bombing by Sudanese government Attack by Sudanese armed forces Followed by Janjaweed raids Driven from destroyed village Corpses in wells ensure inability to return Approximately 200,000 dead, 2 million displaced Still no security in camps Vulnerable to attack and rape Deaths from malnutrition and preventable disease

BCC Report

Khartoum’s Motivation Unclear “Arabize” Sudan Could not afford to placate another rebel group VS Or some combination of the two

International response For much of 2003, the international response to the Darfur crisis was limited to the delivery of humanitarian aid. By the spring of 2004, mass atrocities and crimes against humanity were widely known to be occurring in Darfur. The actions of the government of Sudan resembled a text book illustration of a government unwilling to live up to its responsibility to protect its citizen.

Response from the “Western Powers” The UK, the USA, Canada and the EU were vocal advocates of the R2P principle. However, this did not mean that these same countries were prepared to agree on a comprehensive strategy along the lines of the R2P framework in relation to Darfur.

Response from the UN In April 2004, the UN Human Rights Commission Dispatched a fact-finding team to Darfur. “ a disturbing pattern of disregard for basic principles of human rights and humanitarian law, which is taking place in Darfur for which the armed forces of the Sudan and the Jan-jaweed are responsible.” Condemned by Pakistan and Sudan governments. The draft was watered down. The redrafted resolution neither condemned Sudan nor mentioned its crimes.

June 11, 2004, Resolution 1547 3 different positions required ceasefire and peace agreement passed unanimously 3 different positions Pakistan, China, Russia USA, UK, France Philippines Pakistan, China, Russia USA,UK, France Philippines

July 30, 2004, Resolution 1556 This resolution gave the government of Sudan 30 days to disarm the Janjaweed and punish human rights abusers, threatening economic sanctions if it failed to do so.

September 8,2004, Resolution 1564 US continued to push for stronger measures the finding of genocide the finding of Sudanese government’s breach of Resolution 1556 Resolution 1564 contained many of these measures but in a much-dinted form  the resolution failed to claim the breach of resolution 1556, impose measures on it, or even criticize the government

Action taken by the international community AMIS( African Union Mission in Sudan) UNMIS(United Nations Mission in Sudan) UNAMID(Hybrid UN-AU Mission in Sudan)

AMIS Peacekeeping force operating primarily in the region of Darfur Foundation: the Ndjamena agreement + UNSC resolution 1564 “protection of the monitors” Initially, an AU force of approximately 3,000 troops

UNMIS AMIS too weak to protect civilians (“not working”) In the early 2005, US government AMIS should be handed over to a UN peacekeeping force Both the AU and UN were reluctant, Sudanese government was opposed.  Resolution 1590, 1591, and 1593 Established by the UNSC under Resolution 1590 (as a response to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement)

UNMIS to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army on 9 January 2005 and to perform certain functions relating to humanitarian assistance, and protection and promotion of human rights.

UNAMID Resolution 1706, ‘invited ‘ Sudan’s consent to a UN force rejected by president Omar al Bashir A compromise proposal for a ‘hybrid’ AU-UN force was adopted at a high-level meeting chaired by the UN Secretary General on 16 November 8 months of wrangling, the SC finally obtained Sudan’s consent to the hybrid AU-UN force UNAMID was duly mandated in Resolution 1769 of 31 July, 2007

Failures of the international community AMIS It was generally thought that the AMIS force was too small and poorly equipped. the mandate of ceasefire monitoring arising from the Ndjamena agreement was insufficient the AU had no mechanism for obtaining sufficient contributions from its member states to support AMIS

Failures of the international community UNMIS & UMAMID they demoralized the AMIS troops stationed in Darfur any possibly of long-term planning in AMIS evaporated and morale began to decline

Failures of the international community AMIS, UNMIS and UNAMID Lack of strategic and logical operations Until now, neither AMIS, UNMIS nor UNAMID have fulfilled their mission  neither disarmament nor the protection of civilians

Failures of the international community Failed to have more robust measures on the Sudanese government Western powers The use of R2P framework was deadlocked The ICC and NGOs failed to get access to Darfur promptly The procrastination of effective sanctions Increases Sudanese government’s confidence it can act with impunity and diminishes the international community’s leverage

R2P Critera Just Cause O Right Authority O/ Right Intention Last Resort X/ Proportional Means X Reasonable Prospects X/

Wheeler’s Criteria Two not included in R2P: Selectivity X Positive Humanitarian Outcome X/

Current situation in Darfur Despite the presence of the United Nations/African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur (UNAMID), civilians remain vulnerable to attacks and human rights violations. Information about security in Darfur and the impact of violence on civilians is largely unavailable despite the large presence of UN peacekeepers and civilian staff in Darfur.

Current situation in Darfur There are clear signs that the situation in Darfur is getting worse. But the international community is failing to monitor and respond properly to what is happening in Darfur.

Current Situation in Darfur With South Sudan gaining independence last year and no consensus on how to share oil profits with the north, oil production is at a standstill crippling the Northern Sudanese economy Before this point some Darfurians were able to return to their homes But this has caused another surge in violence in Darfur

Sources Khartoum, Sudan., Jeffrey Gettleman; Isma'il Kushkush Contributed Reporting From. "Mixed Signals in Darfur as Attacks Shadow Progress." The New York Times. The New York Times, 19 Aug. 2012. Web. 01 Dec. 2012.