Javier Bolzico Washington, June 4-6th 2003 The World Bank - IMF - US Federal Reserve Board Critical Issues in Financial Stability:

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Presentation transcript:

Javier Bolzico Washington, June 4-6th 2003 The World Bank - IMF - US Federal Reserve Board Critical Issues in Financial Stability: Preventing and Confronting Bank Insolvency BANK RESTRUCTURING AND RESOLUTION Some well applied experiences

Contents  Introduction  Bank Resolutions Schemes applied more frequently  The proposed Bank Resolution scheme  A practical example of how it works  Argentine experience during ´90  Preconditions  Challenges faced by supervisors

Introduction In past years bibliography on Banking Supervision puts:  A lot of emphasis on how to supervise a bank  Some emphasis on how to open a bank  Not so much emphasis on how to close a bank

Introduction Fortunately, Bank Restructuring and Resolution has gained attention in the last years. Why Bank Restructuring matters ?  A mismanaged bank closure may provoke systemic effects.  It is at this moment when incentives are set  How the bank is closed impacts on the total cost of resolution  This is when judgment about supervisor is made

Schemes applied A. Plain payment of Deposits Alternatives used in many countries to deal with bank insolvency : C. Government intervention B. Merger with other banks (encouraged by authorities)

A) Plain payment of Deposit Insurance The bank is closed and the deposit insurance is paid. The bank is later liquidated. Disadvantages:  Very costly  Loss of banking service and jobs  Deterioration of assets due to the judicial liquidation process

B) Acquisition by other banks (encouraged) The bank is absorbed by another bank Disadvantages:  May cause problems to acquiring bank  May discourage private investment  Moral hazard

C) Government intervention The Central Bank (or other institution) replaces the bank´s authorities and takes over the bank Disadvantages:  May cause greater monetary and fiscal impact  Increase State Owned Banks share (proven to be less efficient)  Moral hazard

What can be done …??? Apply the resolution process based on “good bank” - “bad bank” separation scheme This was the scheme applied in Argentina and some other countries, since the mid 90’s.

“Good Bank”- “ Bad Bank” scheme How it works… 1. Separate the bank in two Good bank Bad bank 2. Transfer the “good bank” to one or more solvent banks willing to acquire it 3. Leave the “bad bank” to its owners.

Good bank:  Liabilities: Deposits and Labor claims  Assets: the best assets; must equal the amount of liabilities Bad bank:  Rest of liabilities and remaining assets The most efficient way of transferring assets is through a trust “Good Bank”- “ Bad Bank” scheme

What happens if the “good assets” are not enough to cover deposits (good bank with negative net-worth) ? Who is the natural candidate to lose ? Deposits Insurance Agency (up to the cost of paying the insurance) Big depositors, (LR) “Good Bank”- “ Bad Bank” scheme

Troubled Bank balance sheet Assets 70 Liabilities 100 Cash 10 Loans 30 Bad Loans 20 Fixed Assets 10 Deposits80 Labor 10 Other 10 Net Worth -30 A practical example GOOD BANK AssetsLiabilities Cash 10 Loans 30 Bad Loans 10 Fixed Assets 5 Total 55 Deposits80 Labor10 Total90 Net Worth -35 Deposit Ins. A. 35 BAD BANK AssetsLiabilities Cash 0 Loans 0 Bad Loans 10 Fixed Assets 5 Total 15 Deposits 0 Others 10 Dep. I. A. 35 Total 45 Net Worth -30

Some advantages  It provides rapid resolution  Minimizes contagion risk  Minimizes impact on clients and employees  Eliminates legal contingencies for buyer (all hidden claims remain with the bad bank)  Minimizes Costs:  No further deterioration of assets  Stops operating and financial losses In the case of Argentina the fiscal cost = 0 “Good Bank”- “ Bad Bank” scheme

Applied Experience –Argentine case (90´s) Banks resolved in Argentina (97-00) DateBank Total Deposits (millions) Paid Deposits (millions) % of Paid Deposits SEDESA (millions) 31-Mar-97Coopesur CL %40 30-Abr-97 Banco Unión Comercial e Industrial SA % May-97Nuevo Banco de Azul SA23 100%9 12-Dic-97Banco Argencoop %60 18-Dic-97Banco Crédito Provincial SA (3) %87 30-Abr-98Banco Platense SA (4)452454%18 04-Jun-98Banco Patricios SA % Jun-98Banco Medefin UNB SA % 30-Oct-98Banco Mayo CL % Nov-98Banco Almafuerte CL %60 12-Feb-99Banco Israelita de Córdoba %60 16-Abr-99Banco Mendoza SA % May-00 Compañía Financiera Luján Williams SA %3 TOTAL %1026

 With GB-BB schemes, 97% of deposits were recovered  In 17 of the 19 restructured banks, depositors recovered 100% of their deposits  The last failed bank before the introduction of GB-BB scheme had only recovered 8% of total deposits Applied Experience –Argentine case (´90s)

Bank Restructuring – Learning Curve “Close the bank on Friday and open it on Monday”

 Very efficient bank restructuring scheme, applied prior to a bank´s failure  Implies minimum fiscal and financial system costs  It does not affect other banks by contagion or cost generalization  Minimizes moral hazard, especially for bankers GB-BB scheme in Argentine experience Applied Experience –Argentine case (´90s)

 This scheme is only a part of a whole system involving aspects of banking regulation and supervision Applied Experience –Argentine case (´90s)  It requires a set of adequate prudential regulations, and an independent banking supervision authority, with the resources to enforce it

Although this resolution scheme has proved to be very efficient and there is consensus about its convenience, it is not widely applied WHY ? Requires a prompt action Natural fear to apply new procedures and schemes Other alternatives appear easier and less painful

Preconditions to apply “Good Bank - Bad Bank scheme” : Adequate legal and regulatory framework Technical capabilities Minimum enhanced supervision Political will

Challenge faced by supervisor : Adopt, timely, a resolution scheme that, providing reasonable protection to depositors, minimizes : resolution cost systemic impact The scheme described fulfills these conditions Challenges

Javier Bolzico Washington, June 4-6th 2003 The World Bank - IMF - US Federal Reserve Board Critical Issues in Financial Stability: Preventing and Confronting Bank Insolvency BANK RESTRUCTURING AND RESOLUTION Thank you !