Global Cooperation & You 1 Exam! One of the course take-aways: Institutions matter… The international arena partly depends on domestic & international.

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Presentation transcript:

Global Cooperation & You 1

Exam!

One of the course take-aways: Institutions matter… The international arena partly depends on domestic & international institutions. What is an institution? –A set of rules (structures/constraints/mechanisms) that govern the behavior of a given set of actors in a given context. –(An equilibrium)

What international institutions do Cooperation – especially coordinating actors on Pareto superior equilibria in prisoner-dilemma-esque situations Commitment –Hands tying of present government (two level game) – change the payoffs for other veto players –Hands tying of future governments – LOCK-IN! –Hands tying of present governments – signaling resolve to foreign and/or domestic audiences Laundering / Dirty work (A 3 rd -party source of information)

Goal: Replace proper nouns & dates with the names of variables! Political + Exchange-rate regime Multi-party dictatorships Age of democracy # of checks and balances Focal point Precedent on trade policy Domestic political constraints Political importance (UNSC) Alliance (voting at the UNGA) Economic ties Regional Organization Membership Distribution of global economic power population, GDP/capita, host-country, Soviet/planned country International Institution (the IMF) CAT membership (Vreeland) ECHR membership (Moravcsik) Slow, steady success of EU International reserve currency (McNamara) Choosing NAFTA or WTO (Busch) China’s internat’l negotiat’n posture (Weiss) IMF/WB loans (Dreher et al.) ADB loans (ADB – Kilby) Conditionality (Lipscy) Democracy (Pevehouse) Global governance Olympic medals!

Take-home analytical tools from the course Time-inconsistent preference problem / Shadow of the future / Commitment problem Prisoner’s dilemma / Collective action problem / Free rider problem Coordination games Repeated games Principal-agent problem Equilibrium (Nash) Factors & sectors Broad & shallow v. narrow & deep organizations Veto players Domestic sources of International Relations (2-level games) Audience costs Laundering Defining variables Coefficient / standard error Linear regression Logit, Probit Survival/hazard models Thinking dynamically Non-random selection & endogeneity Extreme bounds analysis 2 triangles…

The Democratic Peace Democracy International OrganizationsInternational Trade Peace War

Free Capital Flow Fixed Exchange RateSovereign Monetary Policy Inconsistent/Unholy Trinity Or “Trilemma”: a country can only have 2 out of 3 of these

Main IO take-away from the class: Narrow and deep  Broad and deep may be more effective than Broad and shallow  Broad and deep

Cooperation for you Normative incentives Institutional incentives Cooperating  sacrifice Fear the PD “sucker’s payoff” Solution? –COMMITMENT MECHANISMS

One more triangle…

Weighting the exams & Rational expectations Rational expectations: the best predictor for future performance is past performance Expected final grade = midterm grade More precisely: Final grade = midterm grade + >shock< The shock is unobserved to me Still, unless your performance deviates a GREAT deal, you’ll end up with roughly the same grade as the mid-term So, for most of you, allowing you to weight the exam will make no difference

Last time: Think big about global governance changes YOU are part of an ongoing global conversation 13

Faith… Distributions And what you’re doing to shape yours… 14

Typical “uniform” or rectangular distribution (histogram) Frequency PoorLow- income Lower- middle MiddleUpper- middle High- income Rich 15

Typical symmetrical distribution (histogram) Frequency PoorLow- income Lower- middle MiddleUpper- middle High- income Rich 16

17 INCOME? SUCCESS? HAPPINESS?

18

19

What are you doing in college? 20

Implicit throughout the class Theory –Philosophy (from ancient to modern thinkers) –Logic (game theory) Empirics –Data (qualitative, quantitative) History Statistics 21

To understand international relations You need a broad liberal arts education 22

Undergraduate education & the 3 r’s readin’ ’ritin’ ’rithmetic Broad education… 23

Skills Become well-read Learn to write well Learn statistics Learn a foreign language (fluent!) 24

Breadth of undergraduate education & life opportunities Breadth of undergraduate education Life opportunities 25

Graduate school is different (not harder) Fewer hours in class, more hours studying Greater opportunity costs Grades not important Be focused! Statement of purpose 26

Writing First sentence – most important! Organize your argument into sections –What is the question? –What is your answer (or what is the debate)? –What is your methodology? –What is your evidence? –Why should we care? Lay this out in the 1 st para Return to each in its own section (paper outline): 1.Background literature 2.Your theory/argument 3.Method 4.Evidence 5.The intro/conclusion should answer the “so what” question 27

Public Speaking 28 Public Silence

Relationships Letter of recommendation Network of friends Georgetown –Amazing 29

Next step: “What are you going to do when you graduate?” = “How are you doing?” = “Hello” I.e., well intentioned but vacuous question Don’t let it bring you down! No one 22 what life will present them 30

What do we know? 31

Distribution of opportunities before education 32

Distribution of opportunities after education 33

You have bright futures 34

Is that credible? 35

No Woman No Cry No, Woman, Don’t Cry Multivocality “Hope” … “Change” Fugees –Killing Me Softly –The Government Yard in BROOKLYN So, what IS the song about? 36

YOU ARE GEORGETOWN! Privilege Thank you 37

Thank you WE ARE GLOBAL GEORGETOWN! 38