1 The Criminal Justice System in California The Story

2 Three Mistakes Since 1970 #1: After the debate about the death penalty detention became the primary objective of the Criminal Justice System (CJS) resulting in a massive prison building program #1: After the debate about the death penalty detention became the primary objective of the Criminal Justice System (CJS) resulting in a massive prison building program #2 The “War on Drugs” in the 1980’s replaced serious violent offenders with relatively harmless substance abusers #2 The “War on Drugs” in the 1980’s replaced serious violent offenders with relatively harmless substance abusers # 3 The California CJS recycled inmates from parole to prison because of failure to support parole # 3 The California CJS recycled inmates from parole to prison because of failure to support parole

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5 5 Prison Building since 80’s: Some Ideas Death Penalty Controversy in the 70’s Death Penalty Controversy in the 70’s Was death penalty effective? Was death penalty effective? Was death penalty moral? Was death penalty moral? Ignoring incentives Ignoring incentives Expected cost of punishment deters everybody Expected cost of punishment deters everybody Detention only controls those you catch Detention only controls those you catch The law of unforeseen consequences The law of unforeseen consequences Relying on detention means the gulag Relying on detention means the gulag The power of ideas The power of ideas The “Constancy of Imprisonment” hypothesis The “Constancy of Imprisonment” hypothesis The “Serious Offender” The “Serious Offender”

6 Recall Offenses per capita began leveling off before prisoners per capita began rising Offenses per capita began leveling off before prisoners per capita began rising Does imprisonment have any effect on crime? Does imprisonment have any effect on crime?

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8 8 Four Periods: # except WWII, constancy # 2 WWII # , expansion #

9 What is true for CJS in California Is pretty much true for the USA Is pretty much true for the USA

11 Use the California Experience Crime rates Have Fallen. Why Haven’t Imprisonment rates? Crime rates Have Fallen. Why Haven’t Imprisonment rates? Apply the conceptual tools developed prior to the midterm Apply the conceptual tools developed prior to the midterm Criminal justice system schematic Criminal justice system schematic crime control technology crime control technology

12 Crime Generation Crime Control Offense Rate Per Capita Expected Cost of Punishment Schematic of the Criminal Justice System: Coordinating CJS Causes ?!! (detention, deterrence) Expenditures Weak Link “The Driving Force”

13 What are the facts? Expenditures per capita on the CA criminal justice system Expenditures per capita on the CA criminal justice system

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15 Moral of the story If you do not pay enough for public services, you end up paying the price If you do not pay enough for public services, you end up paying the price Support for UC started falling off in the sixties Support for UC started falling off in the sixties Support for the criminal justice system started falling off in the seventies Support for the criminal justice system started falling off in the seventies Economic principle: “there is no free lunch” Economic principle: “there is no free lunch” You need a balance between private goods and public goods to prosper You need a balance between private goods and public goods to prosper

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17 Expenditures Per Pupil FiscalYear CARank Nominal $, CA US

18 Private Public Sweden UK US Mexico Canada

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20 Bottom Line It is not because we are not spending on CJS It is not because we are not spending on CJS We may not be spending enough We may not be spending enough And we may be spending on the wrong things And we may be spending on the wrong things Should we be spending so much on prisons? Should we be spending so much on prisons?

21 Crime Generation Crime Control Offense Rate Per Capita Expected Cost of Punishment Schematic of the Criminal Justice System; Death Penalty Causes ? (detention, deterrence) Expenditures Weak Link Variable, up & down Steady increase

22 What are the facts? Expenditures per capita on the CA criminal justice system Expenditures per capita on the CA criminal justice system Expenditures per capita in real $ are rising steadily Expenditures per capita in real $ are rising steadily The big ticket items are enforcement and corrections The big ticket items are enforcement and corrections Offenses per capita Offenses per capita Are offenses related to causal conditions? Are offenses related to causal conditions? Are offenses affected bt high imprisonment rates? Are offenses affected bt high imprisonment rates?

23 Trends In Crime in California Source: Crime and Delinquency in California, Social Welfare Lecture (#1 LP) Growth level

24 Crime in California 2007

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26 Possibility Since offense rates were falling in the nineties while real expenditures per capita were going up, it suggests that maybe there was a change in causal conditions Since offense rates were falling in the nineties while real expenditures per capita were going up, it suggests that maybe there was a change in causal conditions

27 Can we identify the causes? The factors that cause crime might have been getting better in the latter 90’s The factors that cause crime might have been getting better in the latter 90’s

28 Crime Generation Crime Control Offense Rate Per Capita Expected Cost of Punishment Schematic of the Criminal Justice System; Jobs and Crime Causes ?:Economic Conditions (detention, deterrence) Expenditures Weak Link

29 Can we find a connection between causal variables and crime? Try the misery index Try the misery index Misery index is the sum of the unemployment rate and the inflation rate Misery index is the sum of the unemployment rate and the inflation rate

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32 Note: The misery index bottoms out in 1998 and the crime rate bottoms out in 1999 The misery index bottoms out in 1998 and the crime rate bottoms out in 1999 There is visual evidence that there may be a connection There is visual evidence that there may be a connection

33 Jobs and Crime

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35 What is Affecting Crime Rates? Economic Conditions? Economic Conditions? Imprisonment Rates? Imprisonment Rates? Both? Both?

36 Model Schematic Crime Generation: California Index Offenses Per Capita Causality: California Misery Index Crime Control: California Prisoners Per Capita

37 CA Crime Index Per Capita (t) = *Misery Index (t) – 3.60*Prisoners Per Capita (t) + e(t) where e(t) = 0.95*e(t-1)

38 Ln CA Crime Index Per Capita (t) = *ln Misery Index (t) ln Prisoners Per capita (t) +e(t) where e(t) = 0.93 e(t-1)

39 This study was for CA over time How about across states? How about across states?

40 Source: Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice Expect Get

41 UCR Offenses Per Capita By State Crime Generation: OF = f(CR,SV, SE, MC) Crime Generation: OF = f(CR,SV, SE, MC) OFPC = (PRPC, SE,MC), i.e offenses per capita varies with prisoners per capita, causal variables and moral compliance OFPC = (PRPC, SE,MC), i.e offenses per capita varies with prisoners per capita, causal variables and moral compliance SE: causal variables SE: causal variables Human capital: % of students above basic grade 4 reading, deaths per 100,000 from heart disease,% of children below poverty Human capital: % of students above basic grade 4 reading, deaths per 100,000 from heart disease,% of children below poverty MC moral compliance MC moral compliance % catholic, % weekly church attendance % catholic, % weekly church attendance 41

42 No control Bad Health (low human capital) decreases crime

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44 No Control Education Reduces crime Moral compliance ditto Less Poverty ditto Health insignificant

45 Expenditures Per Capita CCT Income Education Moral Compliance Less poverty UCR Offenses Per Capita

46 What Happened in the 80’s? The prisons filled up rapidly The prisons filled up rapidly There was overcrowding There was overcrowding Average timed served started to fall Average timed served started to fall Public complained Public complained Prison building program got underway Prison building program got underway

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51 Prison Dynamics and Economics Admissions * mean years served = prisoners Admissions * mean years served = prisoners

52 Relationships Between Stocks and Flows: Coordinating CJS In equilibrium: In equilibrium: Inflow = Outflow Inflow = Outflow The outflow is proportional to the stock The outflow is proportional to the stock Outflow = k * Stock Outflow = k * Stock constant of proportionality, k, equals one divided by mean time served constant of proportionality, k, equals one divided by mean time served Admits * mean years served = stock of prisoners Admits * mean years served = stock of prisoners

53 The Stock of Prisoners InflowOutflow Stock of Prisoners New Admissions from Court Released to Parole Coordinating CJS

54 45 degrees Constraint: Admits per year*Average years served = Prisoners Average Years Served Admits per Year Coordinating CJS

55 Prison Realities We can not build prisons fast enough to increase capacity soon enough We can not build prisons fast enough to increase capacity soon enough The public wants more convicts sent to prison The public wants more convicts sent to prison But prisons are full But prisons are full So, what happens? So, what happens?

56 Consequence Release violent offenders Release violent offenders Innocent children are kidnapped, raped and murdered: example-Polly Klass Innocent children are kidnapped, raped and murdered: example-Polly Klass

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58 Consequence Polly’s father campaigns for three strikes law Polly’s father campaigns for three strikes law

59 Consequence More convicts are sent to prison More convicts are sent to prison

60 Three Mistakes Since 1970 #1: After the debate about the death penalty detention became the primary objective of the Criminal Justice System (CJS) resulting in a massive prison building program #1: After the debate about the death penalty detention became the primary objective of the Criminal Justice System (CJS) resulting in a massive prison building program #2 The “War on Drugs” in the 1980’s replaced serious violent offenders with relatively harmless substance abusers #2 The “War on Drugs” in the 1980’s replaced serious violent offenders with relatively harmless substance abusers # 3 The California CJS recycled inmates from parole to prison because of failure to support parole # 3 The California CJS recycled inmates from parole to prison because of failure to support parole

61 Correctional Trends in California: Custodial Populations Prisoners Per Capita Prisoners Per Capita Institutional Population Institutional Population Felons Felons Civil Narcotics Addicts Civil Narcotics Addicts Parolees Per Capita Parolees Per Capita Parole and Outpatient Population Supervised in California Parole and Outpatient Population Supervised in California

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65 Correctional Trends in California: Inflows to Prison Felon New Admissions from Court Felon New Admissions from Court Parole Violators Returned to Custody Parole Violators Returned to Custody Parole Violators With a New Term Parole Violators With a New Term

66 California Department of Corrections 1996 Prisoners 145,565 Parolees 100,935 Felon New Admits 46,487 Releases to Parole 111,532 Discharged and Died 27,691 57,984 Parole Violators Returned to Custody Parole Violators With a New Term 17,525 Parolees At Large 18,034 Discharged and Died 3,984 Absconded 29,376

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68 “Charlie on the MTA” Song: “Charlie on the MTA” Song: “Charlie on the MTA” Eg Eg Eg Eg Y-IlU Y-IlU Y-IlU Y-IlU Eg Eg Eg Eg

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71 Two Policy Issues Composition of New Admissions from Court Composition of New Admissions from Court Large Volume of Parole Violators Returned to Prison Large Volume of Parole Violators Returned to Prison

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Next Tuesday The Power of an Idea: “The Serious Offender” The Power of an Idea: “The Serious Offender” 74