Visualizing network flows Gregory Travis Advanced Network Management Lab Indiana University

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Presentation transcript:

Visualizing network flows Gregory Travis Advanced Network Management Lab Indiana University

Forest through the trees “Too much information” Abilene generating 5-6,000 flows/second Typically about 270, ,000 “active” active flows during the day “Raw” data analysis inadequate Forest through trees

SNORT raw log file example [**] [117:1:1] (spp_portscan2) Portscan detected from xxx.xxx: 4 targets 21 ports in 28 seconds [**] 10/14-09:50: xxx.xxx:80 -> xxx.xxx:49194 TCP TTL:60 TOS:0x0 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:60 DF ***A**S* Seq: 0xD756E195 Ack: 0xDDC23C59 Win: 0x16A0 TcpLen: 40 TCP Options (6) => MSS: 1460 NOP NOP TS: TCP Options => NOP WS: 0 [**] [116:97:1] (snort_decoder): Short UDP packet, length field > payload length [**] 10/14-09:51: xxx.xxx:0 -> xxx.xxx:0 UDP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:16642 IpLen:20 DgmLen:206 Len: 178 [**] [1:485:2] ICMP Destination Unreachable (Communication Administratively Prohibited) [**] [Classification: Misc activity] [Priority: 3] 10/14-09:52: xxx.xxx -> xxx.xxx ICMP TTL:249 TOS:0x0 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:56 Type:3 Code:13 DESTINATION UNREACHABLE: ADMINISTRATIVELY PROHIBITED, PACKET FILTERED ** ORIGINAL DATAGRAM DUMP: xxx.xxx -> xxx.xxx ICMP TTL:122 TOS:0x0 ID:2394 IpLen:20 DgmLen:92 ** END OF DUMP [**] [106:4:1] (spp_rpc_decode) Incomplete RPC segment [**] 10/14-09:52: xxx.xxx:5190 -> xxx.xxx:32771 TCP TTL:106 TOS:0x0 ID:45414 IpLen:20 DgmLen:98 DF ***AP*** Seq: 0xD9256CFA Ack: 0xC79F78B9 Win: 0x4000 TcpLen: 20 [**] [111:8:1] (spp_stream4) STEALTH ACTIVITY (FIN scan) detection [**] 10/14-13:18: xxx.xxx: > xxx.xxx:13091 TCP TTL:47 TOS:0x0 ID:59791 IpLen:20 DgmLen:52 DF *******F Seq: 0x32BE0760 Ack: 0x0 Win: 0xFFFF TcpLen: 32 TCP Options (3) => NOP NOP TS:

Problems with that Visually unattractive “Angry Fruit Salad” Information overload False-positives

Forest through the trees Evolution of visualization techniques Text-Based 2D visualization of old text information I.e. ACID interface to SNORT

ACID display

Ok, getting better. System is doing some aggregating for us. We have some visualization (traffic profile) This is from a real display (Fall Internet2 member’s meeting)

ACID display But still showing us the same alerts, the vast majority of which are not actually issues.

2D frontends Did much to clean up aggressive “angry fruit salad” of text-only interface Inherent advantage of “eye candy” But still relied on same underlying data Bias towards false-positives

Emergence of statistical tools Next step was emergence of so-called statistical tools Idea of establishing a baseline of “normal” activity Detect deviations from “normal” Throw a nice 2D front-end on it

ARBOR display

Statistical tools Even more aggregation (good) Greatly reduce “false positive” issue over signature tools But the bias is still there What’s more damning, overreporting or underreporting? More good eye candy

Problems with statistical tools You have to be able to establish a baseline of “normal” activity Is that even possible in a dynamic environment? Example: Abilene research Land Speed Records Protocol experiments Video over IP Drive the models “nuts.”

More problems Still have to map a lot of 2D-information onto a conceptual framework of the network “What are the ingress and egress points?” “Is this sourced, destined, or just transiting the network” Miss low-level activity as “noise” in the network I.e. slow portscans, host scans, etc.

Forest through the trees Evolution of visualization techniques Text-Based 2D visualization of old text information I.e. ACID interface to SNORT 3D visualization?

gCube Nascent effort to develop a useful 3D modelling capability. Not an original idea (Shakespeare had it first) Saw a similar tool at SC2003 Steve Lau (LBNL) Cube of potential doom BRO project ( Nevertheless, rooted in tragedy for sure Ongoing development

gCube Abilene in Winter

What is it? Basic version is 3D view of “flow” activity X/Z axis determined by source/destination IP Y axis determined by port number Usually destination port number

Where does it get its input? Three possible inputs: Direct NETFLOW feed Archived NETFLOW (files) PCAP view of local network

Looking down on Abilene

What are we seeing? Entire IPv4 address space (all 4 billion possible source and destination addresses) Blank areas represent portions of IP space not allocated to Abilene-connected institutions Allocation pattern is interesting 4 “towers” Early remnants of class-A allocations MIT,.gov, etc.

Side view of Abilene

What structures are visible? Special “floors” 32K port allocation floor 40K port allocation floor Density of port allocations at lower levels An apparent port scan!

The low level

Visualizing DDoS with gCube Eventual hope is to develop gCube into a DDoS visualization tool Particularly good at detecting Port Scans Host Scans Scans into “abnormal” IP space I.e. Slammer type stuff Rate/bandwidth anomalies

Simple case, portscan

Simulated Portscan

DDoS in the real world

What is that? January 14th, 2003, ~2-3PM EST Port scan of a destination address Spoofed source IP addresses Distributed equally through IP space Had been preceded by apparent “experiments” earlier in the day and earlier in the week (Jan 5th) Experiments used only a single or few test ports

Experiments

Note Attacks to three separate IPs/closely clustered groups of IPs Spoofed source IPs But possibly from as many as three different organizations At least one real source appeared to be suppressing sources from the multicast space

Backscatter