Andreas Steffen, 26.06.2009, LinuxTag2009.ppt 1 LinuxTag 2009 Berlin Verifiable E-Voting with Open Source Prof. Dr. Andreas Steffen Hochschule für Technik.

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Presentation transcript:

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 1 LinuxTag 2009 Berlin Verifiable E-Voting with Open Source Prof. Dr. Andreas Steffen Hochschule für Technik Rapperswil

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 2 Where the heck is Rapperswil?

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 3 HSR - Hochschule für Technik Rapperswil University of Applied Sciences with about 1000 students Faculty of Information Technology ( students) Bachelor Course (3 years), Master Course (+1.5 years)

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 4 Cryptographic Voting Systems Due to repeated failures and detected vulnerabilities in both electro-mechanical and electronic voting machines, voters have somehow lost faith that the outcome of a poll always represents the true will of the electorate. Manual counting of paper ballots is not really an option in the 21 st century and is not free from tampering either. Modern cryptographic voting systems allow true end-to-end verification of the complete voting process by any individual voter, without sacrificing secrecy and privacy. Summary of my talk:

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 5 Direct Recording Electronic Voting Machines In the 2006 mid-term federal elections, one third of registered U.S. voters used Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines. In the 2008 federal elections, many states returned to paper ballots with optical scanning but six states used 100% DREs without a Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT). Diebold Elections System DRE voting machine with a VVPAT attachment.

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 6 Losing Trust in Electronic Voting Systems Princeton study on Diebold DRE: Hack the vote? No problem Dutch ES3B voting machines: Hacked to play chess The Morning Call: Voter smashes DRE in Allentown with metal cat March Germany: Bundesverfassungsgericht bans e-voting machines

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 7 Traditional Chain-of-Custody Security Tallying Source: Ben Adida, Ph.D. Thesis 2006 Software Verification Sealing Verification by proxy only

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 8 Desirable: End-to-End Verification by Voter Source: Ben Adida, Ph.D. Thesis 2006 Secrecy? Privacy?

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 9 End-to-End Auditable Voting System (E2E) Any voter can verify that his or her ballot is included unmodified in a collection of ballots. Any voter (and typically any independent party additionally) can verify [with high probability] that the collection of ballots produces the correct final tally. No voter can demonstrate how he or she voted to any third party (thus preventing vote-selling and coercion). Source: Wikipedia

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 10 Solution: Cryptographic Voting Systems Source: Ben Adida, Ph.D. Thesis 2006 AB C A B C threshold

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 11 Proposed E2E Systems Punchscan by David Chaum. Prêt à Voter by Peter Ryan. Scratch & Vote by Ben Adida and Ron Rivest. ThreeBallot by Ron Rivest (paper-based without cryptography) Scantegrity II by David Chaum, Ron Rivest, Peter Ryan et al. (add-on to optical scan voting systems using Invisible Ink) Helios by Ben Adida (

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 12 Helios (

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 13 Create a New Election

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 14 Generate ElGamal Private/Public Key Pair

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 15 Enter Questions and Voter Lists

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 16 Freeze Election [and Election Fingerprint]

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 17 Start Voting Process

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 18 Invite Voters per

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 19 Voting Entry Page

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 20 Fill in the Ballot

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 21 Encrypt Ballot

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 22 Optionally Audit Ballot

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 23 Documented Ballot Format

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 24 Verify Ballot

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 25 Cast Ballot

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 26 Voter Authentication

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 27 Vote Submitted

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 28 Receipt per

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 29 Public Bulletin Board

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 30 Start Tallying

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 31 Final Voting Results

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 32 Public Audit of Voting Process

Andreas Steffen, , LinuxTag2009.ppt 33 Conclusion Modern Cryptographic Voting Systems allow true end-to-end verification of the whole voting process by anyone while maintaining a very high level of secrecy. Due to the advanced mathematical principles they are based on, Cryptographic Voting Systems are not easy to understand and are therefore not readily accepted by authorities and the electorate. But let‘s give Cryptographic Voting Systems a chance! They can give democracy a new meaning in the 21 st century!