Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 1 Security of Distributed Systems Part II Elisa Bertino CERIAS and CS &ECE Departments Purdue University.

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Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 1 Security of Distributed Systems Part II Elisa Bertino CERIAS and CS &ECE Departments Purdue University

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 2 XACML - Topics Goals Approach Examples Summary

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 3 Goals Define a core XML schema for representing authorization and entitlement policies Target - any object - referenced using XML Fine access control grained control Access control based on subject and object attributes Access control based on the object contents; if the object is not an XML document, the object attributes can be used Consistent with and building upon SAML

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 4 XACML – Key Aspects General-purpose authorization policy model and XML-based specification language XACML is independent of SAML specification ( Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) is an XML-based standard for exchanging authentication and authorization data between security domains) Triple-based policy syntax: Negative authorization is supported Input/output to the XACML policy processor is clearly defined as XACML context data structure Input data is referred by XACML-specific attribute designator as well as XPath expression ( XPath is used to navigate through elements and attributes in an XML document.) Extension points: function, identifier, data type, rule-combining algorithm, policy-combining algorithm, etc. A policy consists of multiple rules A set of policies is combined by a higher level policy (PolicySet element)

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 5 XACML Protocol Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) Policy Decision Point (PDP) Policy Access Point (PAP) Policy Information Point (PIP) XACML Request/ Response

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 6 XACML Protocol When a client makes a resource request upon a server, the PEP is charged with AC In order to enforce AC policies, the PEP will formalize the attributes describing the requester at the PIP and delegate the authorization decision to the PDP Applicable policies are located in a policy store, managed by the PAP, and evaluated at the PDP, which then returns the authorization decision Using this information, the PEP can deliver the appropriate response to the client

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 7 XACML Protocol 1.The Policy Administration Point (PAP) creates security policies and stores these policies in the appropriate repository. 2.The Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) performs access control by making decision requests and enforcing authorization decisions. 3.The Policy Information Point (PIP) serves as the source of attribute values, or the data required for policy evaluation. 4.The Policy Decision Point (PDP) evaluates the applicable policy and renders an authorization decision. Note: The PEP and PDP might both be contained within the same application, or might be distributed across different servers

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 8 XACML Protocol XACML Request –Subject –Object –Action XACML Response –Permit –Permit with Obligations –Deny –NotApplicable (the PDP cannot locate a policy whose target matches the required resource) –Indeterminate (an error occurred or some required value was missing)

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 9 Data Flow Model

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 10 Data Flow Model 1.PAPs write policies and policy sets and make them available to the PDP. These policies or policy sets represent the complete policy for a specified target 2.The access requester sends a request for access to the PEP 3.The PEP sends the request for access to the context handler in its native request format, optionally including attributes of the subjects, resource, action and environment 4.The context handler constructs an XACML request context and send it to the PDP 5.The PDP requests any additional subject, resource, action, and environment attributes from the context handler 6.The context handler requests the attributes from a PIP 7.The PIP obtains the requested attributes 8.The PIP returns the requested attributes to the context handler 9.Optionally, the context handler includes the resource in the context

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 11 Data Flow Model 10. The context handler sends the requested attributes and (optionally) the resource to the PDP. The PDP evaluates the policy 11. The PDP returns the response context (including the authorization decision) to the context handler 12. The context handler translates the response context to the native response format of the PEP. The context handler returns the response to the PEP 13. The PEP fulfills the obligations 14. (Not shown) If access is permitted, then the PEP permits access to the resource; otherwise, it denies access

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 12 XACML Schemas Policy SchemaRequest SchemaResponse Schema PolicySet (Combining Alg) Policy* (Combining Alg) Rule* (Effect) Target Subject* Resource* Action* Environment Effect Condition Obbligation* Request Subject Resource Action Response Decision Obligation*

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 13 XACML Schemas Policy SchemaRequest SchemaResponse Schema PolicySet (Combining Alg) Policy* (Combining Alg) Rule* (Effect) Subject* Resource* Action Condition* Obligation* Request Subject Resource Action Response Decision Obligation*

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 14 Policies and PolicySet The key top-level element is the which aggregates other elements or elements The element is composed principally of, and elements and is evaluated at the PDP to yield and access decision. Since multiple policies may be found applicable to an access decision, (and since a single policy can contain multiple Rules) Combining Algorithms are used to reconcile multiple outcomes into a single decision The element is used to associate a requested resource with an applicable Policy. It contains conditions that the requesting Subject, Resource, or Action must meet for a Policy Set, Policy, or Rule to be applicable to the resource. The Target includes a build-in scheme for efficient indexing/lookup of Policies. Rules provide the conditions which test the relevant attributes within a Policy. Any number of Rule elements may be used each of which generates a true or false outcome. Combining these outcomes yields a single decision for the Policy, which may be "Permit", "Deny", "Indeterminate", or a "NotApplicable" decision.

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 15 Policies and Policy Sets Policy –Smallest element PDP can evaluate –Contains: Description, Defaults, Target, Rules, Obligations, Rule Combining Algorithm Policy Set –Allows Policies and Policy Sets to be combined –Use not required –Contains: Description, Defaults, Target, Policies, Policy Sets, Policy References, Policy Set References, Obligations, Policy Combining Algorithm Combining Algorithms: Deny-overrides, Permit- overrides, First-applicable, Only-one-applicable

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 16 Overview of the Policy Element …

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 17 Combining Algorithms –Policy & Rule Combining algorithms Permit Overrides: If a single rule permits a request, irrespective of the other rules, the result of the PDP is Permit Deny Overrides: If a single rule denies a request, irrespectiveof the other rules, the result of the PDP is deny. First Applicable: The first applicable rule that satisfies the request is the result of the PDP Only-one-applicable: If there are two rules with different effects for the same request, the result is indeterminate

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 18 Rules Smallest unit of administration, cannot be evaluated alone Elements –Description – documentation –Target – select applicable rules –Condition – boolean decision function –Effect – either “Permit” or “Deny” Results –If condition is true, return Effect value –If not, return NotApplicable –If error or missing data return Indeterminate Plus status code

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 19 Target Designed to efficiently find the policies that apply to a request Makes it feasible to have very complex Conditions Attributes of Subjects, Resources and Actions Matches against value, using match function –Regular expression –RFC822 ( ) name –X.500 name –User defined Attributes specified by Id or XPath expression Normally use Subject or Resource, not both

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 20 Rule Element The main components of the element are: –a the element consists of –a set of elements –an environment the element may be absent from a. In this case the of the rule is the same as that of the parent element –an Two values are allowed: “Permit” and “Deny” –a

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 21 Policy Element The main components of a element are: –a element the element consists of –a set of elements –an environment the element may be declared explicitly or may be calculated; two possible approaches: –Make the union of all the target elements in the inner rules –Make the intersection of all the target elements in the inner rules –a rule-combining algorithm-identifier –a set of elements –obligations

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 22 PolicySet Element The main components of a element are: –a –a policy-combining algorithm-identifier –a set of elements –obligations

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 23 A Policy Example The Policy applies to requests for the server called “SampleServer” The Policy has a Rule with a Target that requires an action of "login" and a Condition that applies only if the Subject is trying to log in between 9am and 5pm. Note that this example can be extended to include other Rules for different actions. If the first Rule does not apply, then a default Rule is used that always returns Deny (Rules are evaluated in order).

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 24 A Policy Example SampleServer

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 25 A Policy Example <AttributeValue DataType=" <ActionAttributeDesignator DataType= AttributeId="ServerAction"/>

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 26 A Policy Example <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:time-greater-than-or-equal" 09:00:00 <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:time-less-than-or-equal" 17:00:00

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 27 Condition Boolean function to decide if Effect applies Inputs come from Request Context Values can be primitive, complex or bags Can be specified by id or XPath expression Fourteen primitive types Rich array of typed functions defined Functions for dealing with bags Order of evaluation unspecified Allowed to quit when result is known Side effects not permitted

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 28 Functions Equality predicates Arithmetic functions String conversion functions Numeric type conversion functions Logical functions Arithmetic comparison functions Date and time arithmetic functions Non-numeric comparison functions Bag functions Set functions Higher-order bag functions Special match functions XPath-based functions Extension functions and primitive types

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 29 Request and Response Context Request Context –Attributes of: Subjects – requester, intermediary, recipient, etc. Resource – name, can be hierarchical Resource Content – specific to resource type, e.g. XML document Action – e.g. Read Environment – other, e.g. time of request Response Context –Resource ID –Decision –Status (error values) –Obligations

Elisa Bertino Purdue University Pag. 30 XACML History First Meeting – 21 May 2001 Requirements from: Healthcare, DRM, Registry, Financial, Online Web, XML Docs, Fed Gov, Workflow, Java, Policy Analysis, WebDAV XACML OASIS Standard – 6 February 2003 XACML 1.1 – Committee Specification – 7 August 2003 XACML 2.0 – In progress – complete summer 2004