FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center Bernard C.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
CDCs 21 Goals. CDC Strategic Imperatives 1. Health impact focus: Align CDCs people, strategies, goals, investments & performance to maximize our impact.
Advertisements

Minnesota Port and Waterway Security Working Group Meeting April 12, 2012.
Department of Homeland Security Site Assistance Visit (SAV)
Homeland Security and Law Enforcement Created By: Ashley Spivey For _Local_Actions_for_Homeland_Security.pdf.
The Laboratory Response Network
DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA)
Science & Technology Directorate Chemical Security Analysis Center George R. Famini, PhD Director Chemical Security Analysis Center.
BIOLOGICAL HAZARDS RISK ASSESSMENT
Christa-Marie Singleton, MD, MPH Associate Director for Science
National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) Prepared for: Biosurveillance Information Exchange Working Group February 22, 2006.
National Infrastructure Protection Plan
1 NGA Regional Bio-Terrorism Conference Boston, Massachusetts January 12-13, 2004.
DHS, National Cyber Security Division Overview
National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Federal Advisory Board DHS Challenges & Opportunities Captain Curtis Dubay, P.E. Department.
Urban Meteorology for Homeland Security Presented to Urban Meteorology Forum September 21, 2004 Nancy Suski Director Emergency Preparedness & Response.
The Laboratory Response Network
PPA 573 – Emergency Management and Homeland Security Lecture 9b - Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan.
Overview of Terrorism Research at the CDC Dixie E. Snider, M.D., MPH. Associate Director for Science Presented at 2003 Medical Research Summit March 6,
Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research FDA Overview Site Visit Carolyn A. Wilson, Ph.D. Associate Director for Research.
Department Operations Center Quarterly Meeting January 18 th, 2011.
Laboratory Response Network Spokane Regional Health District.
FSIS’ Innovative Food Security Initiatives Carol Maczka, Ph.D. Assistant Administrator USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service Office of Food Security.
HOMELAND SECURITY and AMERICAN COUNCIL OF INDEPENDENT LABORATORIES An Environmental Sciences Section Perspective Robert Wyeth Severn Trent Laboratories.
Emergency Management & Homeland Security Interface Samuel Musa National Defense University.
Bioterrorism MLAB 2434: Microiology Keri Brophy-Martinez.
Ohio Department of Health1 The State of Ohio Weapons of Mass Destruction BIO TERRORISM PROTOCOL PROCEDURES FOR LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERAL PERSONNEL AND AGENCIES.
Technician Module 2 Unit 8 Slide 1 MODULE 2 UNIT 8 Prevention, Intelligence & Deterrence.
Visual 3. 1 Lesson 3 Risk Assessment and Risk Mitigation.
Part of a Broader Strategy
1 DHS Bioterrorism Risk Assessment Background, Requirements, and Overview DHS Bioterrorism Risk Assessment Background, Requirements, and Overview Steve.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention TM Presenter name Presenter Title, SNS.
Overview of NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience October 2013 DRAFT.
Overview of the Laboratory of Respiratory and Special Pathogens Michael Schmitt, Ph.D. Chief, Laboratory of Respiratory and Special Pathogens.
The Climate Prediction Project Global Climate Information for Regional Adaptation and Decision-Making in the 21 st Century.
Agroterrorism and Food Systems Defense key issues and research needs.
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) Sector Specific Plan (SSP) AFDO Annual Meeting June 7, 2005 LeeAnne Jackson, Ph.D. Center for Food Safety.
Local Emergency Response to Biohazardous Incidents Dr. Elizabeth Whalen, MD Medical Director Albany County Health Department April 8, 2005 Northeast Biological.
EDS Incident Command System Tabletop Exercise [Exercise Location] [Exercise Date] [Insert Logo Here]
BSAF-BIONET Meeting Robert J. Hashimoto, CBSP University of California, Berkeley October 2, 2009.
Risk Assessment. Risk As defined by Kaplan and Garrick, risk analysis consists of answering three specific questions: what can happen? what is the chance.
Dual Use Research of Concern Boston University and Boston Medical Center.
Critical Infrastructure Protection Overview Building a safer, more secure, more resilient America The National Infrastructure Protection Plan, released.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Program Overview
Information Sharing Challenges, Trends and Opportunities
EPA's Radiological and Nuclear Emergency Response Program June 18, 2009 Presented by: Ronald Fraass, Lab Director National Air and Radiation Environmental.
Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) University of North Carolina at Greensboro.
United States Department of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service 1 National Advisory Committee on Meat and Poultry Inspection August 8-9, 2007.
Public Health Preparedness Summer Institute for Public Health Practice August 4, 2003.
Food and Agriculture Sector A Collaborative Path to Agriculture Security and Food Defense LeeAnne Jackson, HHS/FDA Multistate Partnership Meeting Madison,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY SCIENCE AND TECHOLOGY Evolution of Systems Engineering Dr. Phil DePoy Former Director Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems.
Emergency Management Training and Education System Protection and National Preparedness National Preparedness Directorate National Training and Education.
A-16 Data Theme Gaps for Homeland Security and Homeland Defense Mike Lee - FGDC Homeland Security Working Group January 15, 2008.
The Integrated National Biodefense Portfolio Initiative “One-Portfolio” Chemical Biological Defense Acquisition Initiatives Forum (CBDAIF) May 6, 2009.
, 2003 Overview of FDA’s Food Security Program Joseph A. Levitt Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition November 6, 2003.
Created by: Ashley Spivey For Department of Homeland Security All information from:
Homeland Security CJ 355 Unit 6 Professor David R. Thompson.
DHS S&T Investment in Chemical and Biological Incident Response Technology Erik M. Lucas, Ph.D. Science and Engineering Technical Assistant to Chemical.
Diseases in Nature Conference John Herbold DVM, MPH, PhD, DACVPM, FACE Center for Biosecurity & Public Health Preparedness University of Texas School of.
Laurie E. Locascio, Ph.D. Director, MML/NIST NIST/MML: Measurement Assurance for Biological Systems.
NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Department of Homeland Security Executive Office of Public Safety.
November 19, 2002 – Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002, creating a new cabinet-level agency DHS activated in early 2003 Original Mission.
ON “SOFTWARE ENGINEERING” SUBJECT TOPIC “RISK ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT” MASTER OF COMPUTER APPLICATION (5th Semester) Presented by: ANOOP GANGWAR SRMSCET,
DHS/ODP OVERVIEW The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) implements programs designed to enhance the preparedness.
HSPD-7 Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization and Protection: designates EPA as the sector-specific lead agency for critical water infrastructure.
Dual Use Research of Concern
Stanford University Dual Use Research of Concern in the Life Sciences
Community Health Centers of Arkansas Hazard Vulnerability Assessment Workshop August 11, 2017 Mark Fuller.
An Overview on Risk Management
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Chapter 4 Hazards.
Presentation transcript:

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center Bernard C. Courtney, Ph.D. Scientific Director, National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center Science & Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security Committee on Methodological Improvement to the Department of Homeland Security’s 2006 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment 28 August 2006 Bernard C. Courtney, Ph.D. Scientific Director, National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center Science & Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security Committee on Methodological Improvement to the Department of Homeland Security’s 2006 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment 28 August 2006

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY National Center for Foreign Animal & Zoonotic Disease Defense Texas A&M, College Station, Texas Biodefense Knowledge Center Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Livermore, California National Center for Food Protection & Defense University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota Plum Island Animal Disease Center Orient Pt., New York National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center Frederick, Maryland DHS/S&T Headquarters Washington, DC HS Biodefense Complex: Microcosm of the Homeland Security Complex

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Mission Provide the nation with the scientific basis for awareness of biological threats and attribution of their use against the American public Goals Understand current and future biological threats, assess vulnerabilities, and determine potential impacts to guide the development of biodefense countermeasures. Provide national capability to conduct forensic analysis of evidence from bio-crimes and terrorism, to attain a “biological fingerprint” to identify perpetrators and determine the origin and method of attack. Provide national scientific reach-back capability, biodefense knowledge stewardship, and threat awareness products. National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NBACC Facility Description Budget FY04 FY05FY03 PLANNING CONSTRUCTION Concept Design $5M Appropriated $88M $35M NBACC FacilityTimeline Description / Capabilities Dedicated, secure, and responsive biocontainment laboratory capability to conduct bioterror threat characterization and risk assessment Dedicated bioforensics operational capability 3 rd Q/08 Artist’s Rendition Estimated size: 160,000 Gross sq. ft. Net - laboratory: 70,000 sq. ft. - 20% BSL % BSL- 2 & 3 Estimated staff: approximately 120

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NBACC: A Center of Centers Biological Threat Characterization Center (BTCC) Characterizes biothreats, anticipates future threats. Conducts comprehensive risk assessments and targeted laboratory studies to guide the development of policy and countermeasures National Bioforensic Analysis Center (NBFAC) Conducts forensic analysis to attain a “biological fingerprint” to identify perpetrators and determine the origin and method of attack Biodefense Knowledge Center (BKC) Integrates biological threat data and emerging scientific research findings to enable expert analysis with knowledge discovery tools and to support 24/7 reachback

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NBACC: Key Accomplishments Biological Threat Characterization Center Completed first-of-its-kind biennial Bioterrorism Risk Assessment Report (BTRA) Published animal model standards reports for 7 high-consequence biothreat agents National Bioforensic Analysis Center Completed processing of 45 bioterror/biocrime cases for the FBI (thousands of samples and detailed implementation and analysis plans) 24/7 bioforensic analysis capability Biodefense Knowledge Center Completed 5 Material Threat Assessments (An additional 3 are in Final Production) 24/7 Reach-back for DHS operational entities Partnership with Lawrence Livermore National Lab

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY BTCC results will inform biodefense policy and countermeasures strategies The Mission of BTCC is to Increase Threat Awareness Biological Threat Characterization Program Produces laboratory-based assessments of biological threats and vulnerabilities that will directly increase threat awareness. Executes critical targeted research projects that: may occur under high containment (BSL-4) employ various model systems including non-human primates may be classified Provides validation of potential technical capabilities identified by intelligence sources Risk Assessment Program Conducts in-depth risk assessments of current and emerging biological threats Identifies knowledge gaps and vulnerabilities to biological threat agents

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Traditional Naturally occurring bacteria, viruses and toxins. Simple delivery mechanisms ●Assessing BW- enabling characteristics ●Comparing virulence by exposure route ●Threats to Food Emerging Newly emerging diseases or traditional agents acquired, produced or delivered in a new method ● Establish process to identify & evaluate emerging bio threats ●Assess potential bio hazard posed by highly pathogenic Avian Influenza virus Enhanced Agents selected or modified to increase virulence, stability or circumvent counter- measures ● Assessing difficulty of selection for enhanced organisms (Yersinia pestis) Advanced Non-naturally occurring, engineered agents. Complex or novel delivery systems ● Establish process to identify & evaluate enabling technical advances ●Craft procedure to identify, evaluate & integrate technical & Intel information Inform Novel Defensive Strategies and Architectures BTCC Assesses the Near-term and the Long-term Threat hemorrhagic fever virusesorthopoxviruses plague influenza viruses ricin tularemia anthrax botulinum toxins encephalitic viruses enteric bacteria

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY The BTRA Supports Biodefense Decision-making A Flexible Risk Analysis Tool  Per HSPD-10: first systematic end- to-end risk assessment of bioterrorism, incorporating subject matter expert and literature input from intelligence, law enforcement, scientific, public health, and classified biodefense research information  Allows decision makers and risk managers to create tailored risk assessments and examine risk mitigation strategies for bioterrorism risk and impact. Likelihood Consequences RISK Guides DHS biodefense research Next generation BioWatch detectors Prioritization the Material Threat Assessments for BioShield

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Closing Critical Risk Knowledge Gaps

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY BTCC Integrates Biothreat Characterization and Risk Assessment

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Both Science and Intelligence Inform the BTCP Process VULNERABILITIES Credible, High-impact threats AGENT CHARACTERISTICS ADVERSARIES’ Capability And Intent  Intelligence reporting and open source information are used to identify credible immediate and future threats  Scientific and technical knowledge are integrated with intelligence to determine which threats are realistic  Threats and vulnerabilities are evaluated in collaboration with federal agencies (NIH, FDA, USDA, Customs and Border Patrol) and industry partners

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Characterization of: AgentAgent MatrixMatrix Support of traditional forensics with bio agent contaminated evidenceSupport of traditional forensics with bio agent contaminated evidence Coordinate “directed” Bioforensic research to fill capability gaps Unique fingerprint of biological agent Evidence Collection NBFAC Integrates Sample Analysis and R&D National Bioforensic Analysis Program

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NBFAC Operates as a “Hub” and “Spoke” NBFAC provides a national capability to conduct and coordinate forensic analyses of evidence from biocrimes and bioterrorism

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Actionable information Identified gaps Unidentified gaps You know …you know…you don’t know You don’t know Biodefense Knowledge Center Non-accessed information Exploit the existing scientific knowledge base ‘Reachback’ support Collaboration tools SME access/directories Accelerate understanding of the biological threat Material threat assessments Knowledge gap ID/communication Emerging threat awareness Enable these objectives through technology Knowledge discovery tools Threat awareness tools Dual-use technology awareness Information The Mission of the BKC is to Enable a Better, more Timely Understanding of the Threat from Bioterrorism

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Operational Support 24/7 science and technology (S&T) 'Reachback' service to operational entities within the Department of Homeland Security Biological Threat Awareness In-depth analysis of biodefense issues, including material threat assessments for Project BioShield and 'Awareness Bulletins', focused on homeland security-relevant biological events and emerging biotechnology Knowledge Discovery Tool Development State-of-the-art analysis tools, providing unique data integration, analysis, and visualization capabilities Biodefense Knowledge Stewardship A biodefense knowledge management infrastructure built as an enduring asset to NBACC and the biodefense community Biodefense Knowledge Stewardship Knowledge Discovery Tools Biothreat Awareness Operational Support Four BKC Functions Facilitate Bioterror Threat Anticipation, Prevention, and Response

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY AssessmentFYStatus Bacillus anthracis MTA04Published Radiological materials MTA04Published Nuclear detonation effects on target population: Initial evaluation 05Published Volatile nerve agents MTA04Published Yersinia pestis MTA05Published Francisella tularensis MTA05In final production Cyanide: initial evaluation05In final production Filoviruses (Marburg/Ebola) MTA05In final production Viral hemorrhagic fever viruses06In progress Bulkholderia spc.06Draft in circulation Rickettsia spc.06Draft to be completed August 06 Material Threat Assessments Provide the Foundation for BioShield Procurements

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY BKC Awareness Bulletins: Topical Information for a Policy Audience Technology focused: Cloning kits Nebulizers Large porous particle technology Synthesis of genes/proteins Viral purification technologies Formulation Stabilizing technologies Aerosol vaccine technology Agricultural biocontrol devices Etc.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Knowledge Center, Bioforensics & Threat Characterization Program Integration Experimental closure of scientific gaps Future Threat Anticipation (Emerging Technology) Material Threat Assessments (Actionable S&T) BT & BW related Intelligence (Capabilities & Intent) Risk Assessment Major S&T Gap Identification Intelligence Collection & Analysis Operational & Reachback Support Biodefense Knowledge Center Biological Characterization Center Bioforensics Analysis Center

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Questions?

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY